

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING BAR- RIERS

FRIDAY, JULY 18, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING
THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Duncan, Kucinich, Lynch, Maloney, Sanchez, Ruppersberger, Bell and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Joe McGowen, detailee; Chris Skaluba, fellow; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to call this hearing to order.

It has been observed that modern warfare consumes governments and civic order, leaving anarchy and chaos in its wake. Lasting victory can only be declared when security, the rule of law, and economic vitality have been restored.

The liberation of Iraq was a modern war. Superior military force brought down a brutal, repressive regime, but also severed all the sinews of a highly centralized governmental control system. The resulting lawlessness and instability dispersed the field of fire into the alleys and byways of Baghdad where the battle for the hearts, minds, health, and welfare of the Iraqi people is also being waged. Coalition armed forces must defend against the elusive, but lethal remnants of the Hussein regime. At the same time, Ambassador Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA are working to build the physical infrastructure and democratic institutions needed to sustain a victory still being purchased in blood.

On May 13th, General Jay Garner, then serving as Director of the Department of Defense [DOD] Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, set before the subcommittee 11 essential tasks, which, if achieved by now, would put assistance efforts in Iraq on what he called a positive slope to success. They were, No. 1, establish security in Baghdad; No. 2, pay Civil Service salaries, catch up by June 30, 2003; No. 3, get police trained and back to work; No. 4, get government ministry functioning; No. 5, restore

basic services in Baghdad to prewar levels or better; No. 6, prevent a fuel crisis; No. 7, purchase crops; No. 8, solve food distribution system gaps; No. 9, install town councils in all communities; No. 10, reestablish provincial governments, target specific needs; finally No. 11, prevent disease, such as cholera outbreaks.

At that hearing, representatives of nongovernmental organizations [NGO's], providing humanitarian assistance in Iraq, also testified on the urgent need for basic security and their hopes for a more effective civil/military coordination that does not compromise their impartiality. Yesterday, nine relief agencies wrote the President requesting stronger steps to increase security, mobilize the Iraqi civil service, and provide greater access to CPA officials.

Today we ask what progress has been made achieving these goals, what lessons from previous conflicts can be applied to Iraq, and what barriers will still block the path of food, medicines and other essentials needed by the Iraqi people?

Winning the war required courage, strength and speed. Securing the peace demands humility, flexibility and patience: Humility to acknowledge the enormity of the task, flexibility to learn and adapt, and patience to nurture the democratic aspirations of a long-oppressed people.

To help us better understand the pressing issues surrounding humanitarian assistance in Iraq, we are joined this morning by three panels of witnesses. They all bring impressive expertise and experience to our discussion. We are grateful for their time and their dedication, and we look forward to their testimony.

Testifying first will be Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay M. Garner, former Director of the DOD Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq. In May, General Garner provided the subcommittee a videotape statement from Baghdad on the status of coalition efforts to stabilize postwar Iraq. We agreed then that we would invite the General to testify and answer questions after he returned to the United States, and he agreed to do that, and he is here with us. He joins us today as a private citizen, but as a citizen to whom this Nation owes a great deal for his long and most distinguished career and his continued willingness to serve whenever asked.

General, we welcome you. It's good to have you here in the flesh. [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
July 18, 2003

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*Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
July 18, 2003
Page 2 of 2*

1. Establish Security in Baghdad
2. Pay Civil Service Salaries (Catch up by 6/30/03)
3. Get Police Trained and Back to Work
4. Get Government Ministries Functioning
5. Restore Basic Services in Baghdad to Pre-War Levels or Better
6. Prevent a Fuel Crisis
7. Purchase Crops
8. Solve Food Distribution System Gaps
9. Install Town Councils in All Communities
10. Reestablish Provincial Governments, Target Specific Needs
11. Prevent Disease (Cholera) Outbreaks

At that hearing, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing humanitarian assistance in Iraq also testified on the urgent need for basic security and their hopes for more effective civil-military coordination that does not compromise their impartiality. Yesterday, nine relief agencies wrote the President requesting stronger steps to increase security, mobilize the Iraqi civil service and provide greater access to CPA officials.

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Mr. SHAYS. And at this time I would call on Mr. Kucinich, the ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today. And welcome to General Garner. Thank you for your service to our country.

I'd like to call to the subcommittee's attention two newspaper articles. The first is from May 2, 2003, from a Newsday in Long Island. As we remember, on May 1st the President landed on the *U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln* off the coast of San Diego, and he stood before the U.S. servicemembers and the American people, and he declared victory in Iraq. He said the hostilities were over and unfurled a banner that read, "Mission Accomplished."

Now, in contrast, here is a front page of yesterday's Washington Post: Guerilla war acknowledged. Army General John Abizaid, the new head of the U.S. Central Command, acknowledged for the first time that American troops are in a, "classical guerilla-type war," against rogue Iraqi forces and that the attacks are growing. They're growing in organization and sophistication.

And when the President first came to office, he promised to level with the American people. Recently it became clear that the President made misleading statements in his State of the Union Address relating to the intelligence on which his decision to go to war in Iraq was based. The White House has now conceded that the President should not have claimed in his speech that Iraq attempted to obtain uranium from Niger, because this allegation was based on crudely forged documents. At the same time the White House still appears to be clinging to the idea that it was forthright with Congress and the American people, using phrases like "technically accurate," that the President no doubt would have criticized if someone else said them. But the State of the Union Address is just one part and one particularly crystallized example of a larger pattern in which the President and his White House advisors stretch the truth, overstate the threat, and understate the true risks, the costs.

Anyone looking at the two headlines I just showed can see that the administration did not adequately prepare and implement a plan to achieve security in postwar Iraq, and they definitely did not level with the American people about it. But this pattern began even before the war. Veteran military officials with decades of experience warned the White House that the task of security was a daunting problem. The Army's Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. When asked how many troops were necessary to secure Iraq after the war, he said, "several hundred thousand."

Not only did officials in the administration refuse to listen, they actively attacked these military experts. Two days after the general testified, the administration sent Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to publicly rebuke him, saying his estimate was, "way off the mark." Today it is clear Mr. Wolfowitz was off the mark. He is in Baghdad this morning, and he will see firsthand the extent of his miscalculation.

This week the Nation passed a grave threshold. The lives of more U.S. servicemen and women have now been lost in combat than the total number of U.S. personnel killed in combat during the first

Gulf war. By my last count 147 servicemembers have been killed in combat, surpassing the number killed in the first Gulf war. In the near future I'm concerned we may surpass another awful milestone. We will have lost more U.S. lives than in the first Gulf war just since the President declared the end of hostilities in his aircraft carrier speech on May 1, 2003.

Clearly the mission has not been accomplished. The hostilities are not over. This question relates to the nongovernmental organizations represented here today and whether they can effectively deliver their critical services. I look forward to hearing from representatives from Save the Children, CARE, and World Vision, who will testify in the second panel. Your work is tremendously important, and the fact that you're still doing it despite the monumental increases and challenges you face is a testimony to your commitment and your faith in humanity.

But this issue also relates to the people of Iraq who have been starved of hope for so long and have been promised, promised by this administration that they will have a new start.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

[The information referred to follows:]

07/18/03

Submitted by Kucinski
2318 RH12 - N.Y. Sec. 12

IN PART 2

**De Niro's
Downtown
Film Fest**

What's on Tap in TriBeCa



Al Pacino: Photo: [illegible]

IN REAL ESTATE

**Hoops
In The
Basement**

And Other Luxury Options



Basketball: Photo: [illegible]

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FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2003 • NASSAU EDITION

50¢

After Dramatic Landing
On Aircraft Carrier,
Bush Declares 'Major
Combat' Over in Iraq

**'The
U.S.
Has
Prevailed'**

Pages A6-7

**GEORGE W. BUSH
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF**President Bush
declared a
major combat
operation over
Iraq as a
victory.

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The Washington Post

Thursday, July 17, 2003

A01

'Guerrilla' War Acknowledged

New Commander Cites Problems

By VERNON LOEB
Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. military's new commander in Iraq acknowledged for the first time yesterday that American troops are engaged in a "classical guerrilla-type" war against remnants of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's Baath Party and said Baathist attacks are growing in organization and sophistication.

The statements by Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, in his first Pentagon briefing since taking charge of the U.S. Central Command last week, were in sharp contrast with earlier statements by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Abizaid also addressed the growing morale problems in the 3rd Infantry Division. He said that soldiers quoted yesterday on ABC News' "Good Morning America" questioning their mission in Iraq

and calling for Rumsfeld's resignation were wrong and could be disciplined.

"None of us that wear this uniform are free to say anything disparaging about the secretary of defense or the president of the United States. We're not free to do that. It's our professional code," he said.

One of the soldiers, a specialist, said, "If Donald Rumsfeld was here, I'd ask him for his resignation." Another private added, "I used to want to help these people, but now, I don't really care about them anymore."

Abizaid said he found it "very, very saddening as a professional soldier to hear that sort of thing." But he lauded the 3rd Infantry for fighting "magnificently during the war" and promised to bring its final two brigades home by September,

10:00 am - National Security
7/18/03 Submitted for the record by
Congressman Kucinich

U.S. Fighting 'Guerrilla-Type' War, Abizaid Says

acknowledging that plans for an earlier return had been put on hold because of concerns about the security situation in Iraq. He said it is "very, very important" for soldiers to "know when they're coming home," and he noted that his wife cried when his son's year-long deployment to South Korea was extended for three months.

From now on, he promised, all troops in Iraq will know what their "end dates" are.

In assessing the security situation in Iraq, Abizaid, 52, a Lebanese American who speaks fluent Arabic, expressed resolve and said improving conditions throughout the country are at odds with perceptions in Washington and reports in the Arab media.

"Look, war is a struggle of wills," he said. "You look at the Arab press, they say, 'We drove the Americans out of Beirut. We drove them out of Somalia. We'll drive them out of Baghdad.' And that's just not true. They are not driving us out of anywhere."

But at the same time, Abizaid offered an expansive and troubling assessment of conditions on the ground in Iraq. In addition to the guerrilla campaign being waged by the Baathists, he cited a resurgence of Ansar al-Islam, a fundamentalist group the State Department says is tied to al Qaeda, and the appearance of either al Qaeda or al Qaeda "look-alike" fighters on the battlefield.

The Baathist attacks, most troubling to U.S. forces, he said, are being staged by former mid-level Iraqi intelligence officials and Special Republican Guard personnel, who have organized cells at the regional level and demonstrated the ability to attack U.S. personnel with im-

provised explosives and tactical maneuvers.

These Iraqi forces, Abizaid said, "are conducting what I would describe as a classical guerrilla-type campaign against us. It's low-intensity conflict in our doctrinal terms, but it's war however you describe it."

Abizaid's remarks were in sharp contrast to those of Rumsfeld, his boss, who insisted from the same lectern 2½ weeks ago that the U.S. military was not involved in a guerrilla war and who said as recently as Sunday on ABC News that the fighting in Iraq did not fit the definition of guerrilla war.

While Rumsfeld said that he did not have any good evidence that the Iraqi attacks were being coordinated at the regional level, Abizaid said yesterday that there is regional organization and that it is possible that these regional organizations could become connected throughout the country.

"The level of resistance, I'm not so sure that I would characterize it as escalating in terms of number of incidents," Abizaid told reporters. "But it is getting more organized, and it is learning. It is adapting, it is adapting to our tactics, techniques and procedures, and we've got to adapt to their tactics, techniques and procedures."

He hinted at a shift of emphasis, saying the focus on the size of the U.S. force in Iraq is misplaced as a measure of effectiveness against the Iraqi insurgents. "You all have to understand it's not a matter of boots per square [kilo]meter," he said. "Everybody wants to think that, but that's just not so. If I could do one thing as a commander right now, I would focus my intelligence like a laser on where the problem is, which is mid-level Baathist leaders."

Bringing the 3rd Infantry Division home by September, Abizaid said, will require creating a "rotational scheme" to be presented to Rumsfeld this week involving Army, Marine and multinational forces.

But there are few troops readily available to sustain a force of 148,000 in Iraq. The Army has 33 active-duty combat brigades. There are now 16 in Iraq, two in Afghanistan, two in South Korea and most of the rest are either committed to other missions or reconstituting, leaving just three brigades to send to Iraq as replacement forces.

The recruitment of multinational forces, a Defense Department official said, is also proving problematic. The Hungarians, for example, have offered to send a truck company to Iraq but have no trucks, the official said. "They contribute 133 drivers, but no trucks, or mechanics, or anything else," he added. "Either somebody else is going to donate trucks, or they're going to be driving ours."

Army units in line for deployment to Iraq, the official said, include a brigade of the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kan., the Army's new Stryker Brigade from Fort Lewis, Wash., and a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., which returned from Afghanistan six months ago.

The Army is also likely to activate two or more "enhanced" National Guard brigades by the beginning of next year for rotation to Iraq by March or April, the official said. "Every possible unit worldwide," he added, "is being considered for possible rotations in different mixes and matches. Nothing is untouchable."

Mr. SHAYS. The third panel is where we have the NGO's. We'll have the government witnesses in the second panel. That's a change.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time the Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I heard former Senator Dole on the national radio program this morning remarking critically about the fact that President Clinton had promised that we would be out of Bosnia by the end of 1996, that would we would stay there just 1 year, and we're still there.

I remember reading in Newsweek Magazine just before the war started in Iraq that country had a total GDP of \$58 to \$60 billion. Now by some estimates we've spent—we passed that supplemental appropriation for \$830 billion for the war. Nobody seems to know exactly how many billions we've spent so far, but it's many, many billions. A few days ago Secretary Rumsfeld said we're spending almost \$4 billion a month there now.


I can tell you this: Many Americans, and I can tell you a great majority of people in my district, are questioning why. Why in a time of \$455 billion deficits are we doing all this, when a few days ago the leading Shiite cleric, big opponents to Saddam Hussein, and the leader, the most respected leader, of the largest population group in Iraq said that the United States should get out and leave Iraq to the Iraqis? I've heard all the cliches. I know that it's—the politically correct, sophisticated, intellectual thing is to say that we have to do this, and that we have to be there for many years to come, but I can tell you more and more people are asking why.

Fortune Magazine said in its November 25th issue before the war started that—an article entitled “We Win, What Then”—and they said that if we stayed in Iraq that we were going to make our troops sitting ducks for Islamic terrorists. A few days ago we read about an American soldier being shot in the head at point-blank range as he stood in line to get a soft drink. We're reading more and more stories like that. I know we have people in this country and all of these departments who want to feel like world statesmen and make their name in history, but they're doing this at great cost to the American people, and they're risking the lives of young Americans. And I can tell you that I think the sooner we get out of Iraq, the better off everybody is going to be.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

[The information referred to follows:]



IRAQ

We win.

Then what?

The real battle will begin only after Saddam is gone and the shooting has stopped. If all goes well, oil will flow freely and the world economy will get a boost. But if it doesn't, watch out. BY BILL POWELL

FORTUNE • 61

The victors gathered on the northwestern coast of the Italian Riviera in a town called San Remo, then as now a place of respite for Europe's wealthy. It was April 1920, a moment that in the argot of the 21st century we would call an inflection point. They were there to divide up the world. The Great War was over, and its merciful end brought a halt not only to killing on a historic scale but to a world order. The Ottoman Empire was finished. The conquering imperial powers of the war, France and Britain, convened at San Remo to conclude a peace treaty with Turkey and to parcel out the spoils of what was supposed to be the War to End All Wars. And those spoils, they knew very well, included oil—lots and lots of oil.

For that reason San Remo was to be a private affair, a matter between those countries, Britain and France, with rich histories in colonial intrigue. Shut out was the nation for which the first world war represented the end of isolationist innocence. A relative novice at the imperial game, the U.S. would have lost the war's most valuable prize were it not for a man named A.C. Bedford. He was neither diplomat nor politician, but the chairman of what was then known as Standard Oil of New Jersey. And when the British and French concluded the deal at San Remo that divided between them the entire future output of Middle Eastern oil, Bedford intervened. He got a copy of the agreement from a friend in the French delegation and passed it on to the State Department in Washington. Alarmed at what had happened, the U.S. quickly became a player in the Middle East.

Among the biggest prizes divvied up was Mesopotamia, the chunk of geologically rich territory where the Tigris and Euphrates rivers flow. Bedford knew hydrocarbons were in the ground there. And the State Department wanted the U.S. to get its fair share. "It is economically essential," a State Department economic officer wrote at the time, "to obtain foreign supplies of petroleum in order ... to assure supplies of bunker fuel [for the Navy] and in order to perpetuate the United States' position as the world's leading oil and oil products supplier."


But Bedford and the other businessmen also knew that beyond oil, something else very likely awaited them in Mesopotamia. And that was trouble. They wanted to explore for oil only in areas that were politically stable, and unless one of the conquering powers was willing to step in and rule the area with a very firm hand, Mesopotamia would be anything but stable. It was, Bedford wrote the State Department, "a collection of warring tribes." So daunting was the part of the world that would eventually be known as Iraq that Colonel Ernest Mercier, the head of the newly formed French national oil company, had trouble raising the money he needed to look for the oil everyone knew was there. "Mesopotamia," he wrote ruefully to a friend, "was so full of international difficulties."

ON FRIDAY, NOV. 8, PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH GOT WHAT he wanted from the United Nations, just as he had, more than a month earlier, gotten what he wanted from the U.S. Congress. After weeks of dickering, the UN agreed to insist that Saddam

An oil tanker (above right) makes the drive from Baghdad to Aqaba; a decade earlier American soldiers (below right) routed Iraqi soldiers in the Burgan oil fields of Kuwait.




"Iraq is a big black box, a





box, and if you treat it otherwise, you'll get burned."



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Hussein, the brutal dictator of modern-day Mesopotamia, disarm or face the consequences. And the consequences, as far as the U.S. was concerned, were clear: the end of Saddam's regime, courtesy of the U.S. and British military and whoever else might be willing to help do the honors.

It is no exaggeration to say that the next two to three months could be among the most fateful of any period since the end of World War II. They are months that quite literally could change the world. More than 80 years after San Remo, history again beckons, as the world decides the fate of Iraq. The consequences of the choices that both George W. Bush and his sworn enemy, Saddam Hussein, must now make are breathtaking to behold. At stake are nothing less than U.S. security in the age of terror, the future of millions of people in Iraq and its neighboring countries, and the fate of the global economy and the financial markets that gauge its health.

What Morgan Stanley economist Stephen Roach calls a "clean war" and then a smooth aftermath could send oil prices tumbling, kick-start a long-awaited global economic recovery, and finally put the bear market in equities into hibernation. As warm and fuzzy as all that sounds, an awful lot has to go right for it to happen. And an awful lot could go wrong. Indeed, so fraught with possible dangers is round two with Saddam that there are those within the U.S. national-security establishment who still can't quite bring themselves to believe that Bush will actually make the decision to go to war.

Yet for months war, and its maddeningly unpredictable consequences, have seemed inevitable. The U.S. has been steadily moving military equipment and personnel to the Gulf. The Air Force has expanded the number of targets in the so-called no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, taking out radar and command

and control centers. The U.S. military has also begun training 5,000 Iraqi exiles to fight along with allied troops should an invasion finally occur. And according to Zaab Sethna, a senior member of the Iraqi National Congress, the political leadership of the Iraqi opposition abroad, a second tranche of 10,000 will begin training in a matter of weeks.

Despite all this, administration officials were at pains, in the wake of the UN resolution, to say that war was not yet a foregone conclusion. If Saddam allows inspectors over the next few months to go anywhere they want, without obstruction or argument, war could perhaps be avoided, they insisted. One former senior Defense Department official believes administration spokesmen are being truthful when they say that the President has not yet, either in his gut or in his mind, made the decision to go to war. Nonetheless, there is no question that if Saddam fails to disarm, post haste, the game will be over. And former UN weapons inspectors are gloomily unanimous in believing that little in Saddam's past behavior suggests that he will ever be serious about abiding by UN demands that he rid himself of weapons of mass destruction. "I would assume he thinks if he can get inspectors in again, then the games can begin anew," says one inspector. "I bet he thinks the U.S. won't go to war over whether he refuses to unlock some door in one of his palaces. But if this is what he's thinking, he has probably miscalculated, and that means the end."

If war is somehow averted, Saddam's now frantic neighbors, oil traders, and plenty of investors the world over will finally exhale.

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The fog of uncertainty that plagues business decision-making in executive suites everywhere will dissipate at least a little. But if the current Washington consensus is correct—that the U.S. will be marching on Baghdad by February, if not sooner—it will be, as oil economist Philip K. Verleger says, a “historic roll of the dice.”

The issue is not whether the U.S. and its coalition will prevail militarily. As Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, told FORTUNE in a recent interview, of that there is no question. The real battle for Iraq will be won or lost only after Saddam is gone and most of the shooting has stopped. It is not unthinkable that a military victory could turn into a strategic defeat for the U.S. Anything other than a quick, decisive campaign could mean trouble. Civilian casualties in Baghdad and elsewhere could easily trigger regional turmoil, spurred by an anti-Americanism that is, alas, all too real in the Islamic world. Saddam on the way out may well opt for what Amatzia Baram, a historian of Iraq at the University of Haifa, calls the “Sampson option”—that he will use the weapons of mass destruction he now possesses as well as sabotage Iraq’s oil fields. A prolonged, expensive, American-led oc-

side of the most feverish conspiracy theorists—and the Arab world has far too many of them—believes that Bush and his administration want to go to war in Iraq to “control” Iraq’s oil. But it is an inescapable strategic and economic fact that Iraq has the second-biggest reserve base in the world (behind only its neighbor, Saudi Arabia) of the fuel on which the global economy will continue to run for decades. There is, moreover, a lot more of it waiting to be discovered in Iraq. And while the Bush administration doesn’t spend a lot of time talking about it in public—why provide more grist for all those hysterical anti-American tirades broadcast daily on Al-Jazeera?—it doesn’t shrink from the subject either. In drawing distinctions between postwar Afghanistan and a potential postwar Iraq, Rumsfeld, in his recent interview with FORTUNE, matter-of-factly stated the biggest obvious difference: “Iraq,” he said, “has oil.”


But the fact that Iraq has oil is only where the debate about what happens the “day after” begins, not where it ends. Does Iraq’s bountiful endowment make the prospect of holding together a stable post-Saddam country easier—or more difficult? To those optimistic about the prospects of a post-Saddam Iraq, the answer is obvious. The oil in the ground, they believe, not only makes Iraq’s economic future bright but helps ensure the political stability necessary to rebuild the country.

The good-news economic scenario is pretty straightforward. As Fadhil Chalabi, a former Iraqi oil minister who is now the executive director of the Center for Global Energy Studies in London, says, “Iraq’s oil fields are rich and abundant, but the country needs to develop every barrel in order to reconstruct its economy, and it needs to do so fast.” Under Saddam, thanks to the cumulative effect of two wars and the sanctions that followed, Iraq’s sustainable production level has fallen to two million barrels a day. Chalabi and others believe that given sufficient time and money, that could be ramped up to eight million barrels a day.

A reconstructed Iraqi oil industry would be the economic engine of a country that should not be confused with neighboring Gulf sheikhdoms like Saudi Arabia, where hard work is what foreign guest workers are supposed to do. Before the outbreak of

WHO HAS WHAT

Only Saudi Arabia has more of the world’s proven oil reserves than Iraq.



“It won’t be in Iraq’s interest to cooperate with OPEC.”

cupation is also plausible, one that could turn U.S. troops into sitting ducks for Islamic terrorists, à la Lebanon in the 1980s. All of that could have immediate and decidedly negative consequences for the global economy; an aftermath that does not proceed relatively smoothly would almost certainly short-circuit what everyone hopes—and assumes—will be stronger economic growth worldwide in 2003.

Whether any or all of that can be avoided is, as Bush must understand better than anyone, frighteningly unknowable. But both those who shrink in fear from what another war in Iraq may unleash and those who believe a post-Saddam Iraq would be the best thing that has happened to the Middle East in decades agree on one thing: Oil remains as central to Iraq’s future and the peace and stability of the region as it was 80 years ago.

AS THE YEARS THAT FOLLOWED WORLD WAR I SHOWED, the history of the modern oil industry and the history of the modern Middle East are inseparable, for a very obvious reason: That’s where the oil is. A post-Saddam Iraq means that, for better or worse, another chapter in that history will be written. No one out-

side of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, “Iraq had a booming, prosperous economy,” says Farid Abaffathi, an Iranian who is the Middle East specialist at the consulting firm formerly known as DRI/WEFA, now called Global Insight. “It had tremendous agricultural resources, higher productivity than most countries in the region, and a much more dynamic population.” Rumsfeld and the other hawks in the Bush administration are routinely criticized for naive happy talk when they portray a booming, post-Saddam economy that would help lift countries throughout the region via expanded trade as Iraq rebuilds and boosts its oil production. But it’s not just the hawks who think that. Abaffathi, for one, believes it would be the most likely outcome of another war with Iraq—“By far the most likely,” he says flatly.

If true—how do you say “rosy scenario” in Arabic?—the benefits could be huge, and they would obviously ripple far beyond Iraq’s immediate neighborhood. They would be global. Yet there is so much uncertainty and trepidation about what might come in the wake of another war in Iraq politically that it can be difficult to see what might be just over the horizon economically if things go well. Chalabi, the former oil minister, is one of the few

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who puts it bluntly. "Iraq at eight million barrels a day of oil production would be the greatest problem ever faced by OPEC. It would not be in Iraq's interest to cooperate with OPEC, because we would need to develop every single barrel we could over the next five years. It would be," he concludes, "an alternative to Saudi oil."


Even the formulation—"the greatest problem ever faced"—is overly polite. An Iraq at full throttle five years from now, snubbing Saudi pleas to play ball, would turn what is already a not very effective cartel into an oil-funded social club. Members could gather in Vienna or Geneva, drink Scotch, and recall old times, but they could not even come close to controlling the price of oil.

Iraq would be the shiny new gas station on the block, and business would be very good indeed. Its reemergence as an oil power could even awaken the ghosts of San Remo. Chalabi believes that Iraq, the first of the Gulf producers to take back its oil industry

shall see, cannot be ruled out). Lower oil prices have always helped fuel global growth, and higher prices always do the opposite. If, under the good-news version of a post-Saddam Iraq, oil prices plunge below \$20 and stay there for a few years, that puts money in the pockets of energy consumers, both individual and corporate. "It would improve profits, help equity prices—overall it's just a win-win scenario for the global economy," says Abalfathi.

One thing it does not mean, it's important to note, is rock-bottom oil prices that are here to stay. As economist Verleger points out, oil prices are rarely stable over prolonged periods. Oil is a commodity that has always responded to the basic laws of supply and demand, and always will. Demand for oil will continue to rise in rapidly growing developing countries like China and India, and low oil prices would displace other sources of energy everywhere, boosting overall consumption. And as demand rises, so

"The betting is that the Iranians will sit by and watch."



A quick touchup in Tehran traffic. Will a new Iraq spread democratic values across the region?

from the multinationals in the 1970s, will have no choice but to invite Western companies back in to help reconstruct its infrastructure and develop new fields. Given how much capital is required for the job—up to \$35 billion over ten years, according to one estimate—"there is no reason to think that roughly the sorts of terms given to, say, Shell or British Petroleum in Nigeria could not apply in a post-Saddam Iraq," says Abalfathi.

For both the industrialized and developing world, the eventual return of Iraq as a large, efficient producer of crude would obviously be very beneficial. A gradual resumption of Iraqi production would lead to lower oil prices, assuming that the Saudis did not take radical action in response (something which, as we

eventually will prices. "Even under the best possible outcome [of a war in Iraq], it doesn't mean oil under \$20 a barrel and gasoline at 90 cents a gallon forever," Verleger says.

But even Verleger, who is deeply skeptical of the good-news scenario, admits that a stable Iraq five years out changes the globe's energy equation in ways that would benefit the consuming world immensely. "It *could* happen," he concedes. That's not, of course, a reason to go to war. But if war comes, it is an outcome the world could more than live with.

THE ONLY PROBLEM, OF course, is that it is an awfully long way from here to there. So much has to go right, so many bullets (figuratively speaking) have to be dodged, and the inescapable fact remains that on the eve of war the majority of

experts who have looked long and hard at its possible consequences believe that the good-news scenario flirts with outright fantasy.

Consider, for example, the assumption that upon arrival, allied troops would be greeted joyfully as liberators—a prospect that optimists like Abalfathi take as a given. There is no question that within Iraq the loathing for Saddam is as wide as it is deep. Skeptics caution, however, that despising Saddam does not necessarily mean that the welcome mat will be out for America—for either its occupying troops or, later, its capitalists. As one former senior government official with long experience dealing with Iraq policy puts it, "Everyone agrees that the U.S. has, mildly speaking, an image problem in the Middle East and

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the Islamic world. Yet at the same time there seems to be this working assumption that Iraq is somehow exempt from that. It's not."

Ellen Laipson, an Iraq expert and former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, fears the U.S. may be in for some rude surprises in Saddam's wake. "Many Iraqis," she says sarcastically, "particularly those in their 30s and 40s, do not appreciate the nuances of Western-sanctions policy." Laipson worries that the assumption that any successor regime would inevitably be a coddly, disarmed, Western-leaning government open to foreign investment and multinational oil companies could turn out to be profoundly wrongheaded. "A post-Saddam government," she says, "could project deep animus toward the West, [and Iraq] could still be in a defiant and fiercely independent posture in its regional and international relations."

And that's if the country is able to hang together. As A.C. Bedford wrote more than 80 years ago, Iraq has been a country of "warring tribes"—and it remains so today. Minority Sunnis, and in particular members of Saddam's tribe, from a region called Tikrit, have dominated Iraq ruthlessly for decades. They have suppressed the Shia Muslim majority, located mainly in the south near the border with Iran, and infamously used poison gas on the ethnic Kurds in the north near Turkey. One of the reasons George W. Bush's father did not march to Baghdad in 1991 is that his advisors feared chaos—a country splintering into a sectarian bloodbath that alliance troops would have been hard-pressed to control.

That scenario—though it is among the absolute worst cases—is still out there. The Kurds in the north, now protected by the no-fly zone, live next door to one of the oldest and largest oil-producing regions in Iraq, known as Kirkuk. Many Kurds seek a state of their own post-Saddam, and they want Kirkuk to be part of it, for obvious economic reasons.

The U.S. has made it clear that, post-Saddam, it intends to maintain, as Rumsfeld puts it, "the territorial integrity of Iraq."



Hamas gunmen in Gaza; below, an Israeli tank patrols the West Bank. U.S. support of Israel sows mistrust in the Arab world.



That is in part because neighboring Turkey, a key U.S. ally with its own Kurdish minority, wants no part of an independent Kurdistan.

Thus, the critical immediate mission of any occupation force will be to minimize ethnic and religious score settling. Beyond that, a key element to ensuring that Iraq hangs together is—what a surprise—oil. Abulfathi of Global Insight insists that if you can convince all concerned that an expanding economic pie will be divided up with a reasonable amount of equity, it will help keep the place together.

A big problem, however, is that Kuwait and Russia also have substantial claims to Iraq's oil wealth. Baghdad owes Moscow billions in debts, some of which go back to the Soviet era. Almost everyone believes that without at least some assurance that their financial interests will be addressed post-Saddam, the Russians would not have allowed the Nov. 8 UN resolution to pass. Kuwait, for its part, demands hundreds of millions in UN-mandated reparations from the 1990 Iraqi invasion.

Sorting this out is essential given how important oil is to the future of Iraq. The optimists believe that the Iraqi people, sans Saddam, would be willing to compromise as long as they are confident that they will be getting their fair share of their nation's patrimony. "You tell them they cannot derive the benefits of their oil without peace," says Abulfathi. "It's that simple."


It's my belief that [the people] of Iraq will understand that. The rest of the world had better hope so. Just as the benefits of a smooth war and a relatively peaceful transition to life after Saddam would deliver quick dividends to everyone, the opposite is also true. The initial risks of a mess in postwar Iraq are geopolitical, and then spread from there. The reactions of three countries in particular will be critical. The first is a non-oil producer, Jordan, Iraq's neighbor to the west. Itself a creation of post-Ottoman mapmaking, Jordan has a population of 5.3 million, more than 50% of whom are Palestinian. And nothing reflects the cursed history of the modern Middle East more than

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the fact that among those Palestinians, Saddam Hussein is actually popular. (Recall that in the last Gulf war, King Hussein, the late father of Abdullah, the king of Jordan today, sided with Saddam.) Saddam's popularity is a function of the low esteem in which the U.S. is now held, particularly among young Palestinians, given America's support for Israel. If an invasion of Iraq does not go quickly, or if the U.S. is then viewed as a heavy-handed occupier, it spells trouble for King Abdullah. "Jordan is first on the list of potential problems—of that there is no question," says historian Amatzia Baram. And for that reason, one

George Bush's axis of evil. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, among others in the Bush administration, believes a successful outcome in Iraq could bolster a young population in Iran that is increasingly dissatisfied with the mullahs' repressive grip on power there. Pessimists worry that Shiite Iran may be tempted to exploit any post-Saddam chaos in Iraq, particularly in the south, which is dominated by Iraq's Shia population and is home also to the biggest new oil fields in the country. As one regional expert who served in the Clinton administration says, "The betting is that the Iranians will be cautious and just sit by and watch for a while to see what happens. But again, you just don't know."

A U.S. soldier shows an Afghan boy how to brush his teeth. Is occupation of Iraq next on America's agenda?



Post-Saddam Iraq, of course, could present its neighbors with more than just geopolitical challenges. Iraq's potential as a serious rival to Saudi Arabia as an oil producer has obviously not escaped the attention of the leaders in Riyadh. Abulfathi says he believes that "it's a big part of the reason the Saudis can't seem to make up their minds what to think about a U.S. invasion." (Just recently the Saudi Foreign Minister had a public debate with himself about whether his country would allow the U.S. military to use bases there as a staging ground. He first told CNN that it would not; then, a day later, he told the *New York Times* that he might change his mind.) Verleger agrees that Iraq poses big problems for Riyadh, and he does not rule out the possibility that to forestall rapid development of new Iraqi oil fields, the Saudis could deliberately

"The U.S. has an image problem in the Middle East."

former State Department official says, "the King is just scared to death right now."

Should the government in Jordan be seriously challenged or even toppled in an anti-U.S. backlash, the law of unintended consequences could kick in with a vengeance. What might happen then in Saudi Arabia, another "moderate," pro-American neighbor that, let's face it, is economically far more consequential than Jordan, thanks again to that little three-letter word? Saudi Arabia is a society deeply split between pro-American Westernizers and conservative, anti-Western Wahhabi fundamentalists. Some of them happily give money to Islamic charities, which in turn hand it over to al Qaeda. Few analysts, it's true, would necessarily bet on big trouble in the House of Saud. But should it come, the economic ramifications of instability in Saudi Arabia are clear enough: oil prices higher than they otherwise would be, possibly much higher and possibly for quite a while, with the attendant negative effects that would have on economic growth worldwide.

Nor is Saudi Arabia the only repressive, fundamentalist, oil-producing regime that keeps war planners awake at night. Next door lies Saddam's bitter enemy Iran, another charter member of

drive the price of oil down to make new investment uneconomic, thus maintaining their position as the world's most important supplier. While that would be a short-run boost to the global economy, it would be a disaster for the new Iraq, and would eventually lead to higher prices.

At some point within the next few months, the dizzying scenario-spinning will finally end. The U.S. could well be at war. We will see our sons in cumbersome gear designed to protect them against chemical and biological weapons. We could see them in brutal building-to-building fighting in Baghdad. We could see missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction hurtling toward Israel. The questions of economic and geopolitical outcomes, so resonant of those on the table eight decades ago, will recede in the face of those stark life-and-death images—the images of war. But they will come back soon enough. "The problem with Iraq," says Raad Al-Kadiri, the head of country risk analysis for Petroleum Finance Co., "is that there are no givens. It is a big black box, and if you treat it otherwise, you are going to get burned." We are apparently about to bust that black box open. Pray that it isn't Pandora's. ■

FEEDBACK: bpowell@fortnemail.com

Mr. SHAYS. Before asking you to address this, General Garner, we have Mrs. Maloney, a very effective Member.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, and thank you, General, for your wonderful service to our country.

And I first would like to state that our troops did an excellent job in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and we are all proud of their dedication and commitment to freedom and democracy, and their success really to this point. They were assigned a very difficult task, and they performed it in an extremely capable and efficient manner, and we are all grateful.

I would also like to thank the representatives we'll be hearing from later from the NGO's, CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, for their ongoing work in Iraq to help the Iraqi people. You are our best diplomats, and we thank you for the important work that you do.

According to all reports, we won the war in Iraq. The question is are we going to win the peace? And every day that we remain in Iraq, we are putting U.S. lives at risk. Since President Bush's May 1st speech, 36 U.S. soldiers have been killed in the so-called peacetime, and today it has been acknowledged that it's a guerilla-type war as the front page of the Washington Post yesterday that we're confronting a whole different kind of challenge.

I met yesterday with the President of the U.N. General Assembly. I represent the United Nations, it's in my district, and I'm proud of the work that they have done in places such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor, working with the United States and our allies to bring stability to the regions. And we can rely on them because they have organizations such as UNCA, UNICEF, UNFPA and others that have been successful working in 170 different nations, with roughly 150 other nations supporting them. So I feel that as we go forward, we should do it in a more multilateral way with support from other countries. And I would say the United Nations with—working with the United Nations, our Arab allies could help us with the peace there and assume some of the responsibilities so that our troops are more protected and the necessary services and supplies are given to the Iraqi people.

We are spending, my colleague said, 4 billion; I read yesterday it was 3.9 billion. Whatever you call it, it's a lot of money a month in Iraq. As we are galloping toward a \$455 billion deficit here at home, it would be, in my opinion, prudent that we would share the burden in Iraq not only with a multilateral approach to the peacekeeping, but share the burden and the cost of keeping the peace. So I am hopeful that Secretary Powell will succeed in securing a U.N. mandate so that other governments can be brought in and other nationalities can be there to help with them.

After September 11, which happened in the district that I represent, I lost 500 constituents in it, the world literally came to our side and aided us jointly in our war on terrorism, and it represented global cooperation at its best. And now that we are in Iraq, it is our duty to American citizens and Iraqi citizens and the citizens of the world, in my opinion, to work in a more international, cooperative way with other countries in not only bringing

the peace, but humanitarian assistance and really helping to restore peace and democracy in Iraq for the Iraqi people.

But I look forward to your comments, General. We thank you for your service and thank you for this hearing today.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

We've been joined by Mr. Lynch.

Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Garner, I want to welcome you before the committee. Last time we spoke, we were actually at your headquarters in Baghdad, and I want to thank you for your good work in that area. I know that we had a menu of problems that we were dealing with at that time both from a security point of view vis-a-vis our troops; also a humanitarian; a civil administration task that was in hand, but still not quite stabilized. And I'll be very interested in hearing about the progress since May 18th when we were in Baghdad.

But I do thank you for your courtesy in helping this committee with its work. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. And without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Chris Bell follows:]

Congressman Chris Bell
Statement at the Government Reform hearing on, "Humanitarian Assistance
Following Military Operations: Overcoming Barriers—Part II."
July 18, 2003

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling such an important hearing involving such an important matter – rebuilding Iraq and providing its people humanitarian assistance.

As you know, on May 1st President Bush made a public declaration of victory over Iraq aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln off the coast of San Diego. Since that day, 36 U.S. soldiers have been killed in hostile action. There is no doubt that guerrilla style attacks on U.S. forces have increased. Unfortunately, there have been 147 U.S. personnel killed in combat since the start of the war – equaling the number soldiers killed in combat during the 1991 Gulf War.

Mr. Chairman, in Prime Minister Tony Blair's address before this body yesterday he stated, "Finishing the fighting is not finishing the job." He continued, "We promised Iraq democratic government. We will deliver. We will stay with these people so in need of our help until the job is done." Very compassionate words from a very honorable man.

I would have to agree with the Prime Minister that we are compelled to see this mission through. Under the Geneva Convention we have a specific obligation, as the Occupying Power, to ensure that food and medical supplies reach the people of Iraq. According to Amnesty International, pervasive lawlessness following military operations in Iraq is severely obstructing badly needed humanitarian efforts.

Mr. Chairman, before this subcommittee, Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, then the Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, outlined "Eleven Essential Tasks" necessary to establish a positive "slope" towards success in Iraq.

I believe it is essential that we critically examine the progress made in rebuilding Iraq if we are to fulfill the assertion made by Prime Minister Blair yesterday, that charges of American imperialism will be hollow, "when these failed countries are...seen to be transformed from states of terror to nations of prosperity, from governments of dictatorship to examples of democracy, from sources of instability to beacons of calm."

I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses and would hope they can address whether each of the General's goals have been completed.

Mr. SHAYS. I ask further unanimous consent that all Members be permitted to include their written statements in the record, and without objection, so ordered.

General Garner, we swear our witnesses in. If you would just rise, we'll swear you in. This is an investigative committee. We do that.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record the witness has responded in the affirmative.

Again, General Garner, it is nice to have you here. We appreciated the very extensive video that you sent when you were actually in Baghdad. It's nice to close the loop. We recognize without your having to say that there are some limitations. You've left Iraq, so you can't tell us what happened yesterday, but you can give us some insight on the effort to begin this process, and that will be very helpful to this committee.

We thank you, and with that we welcome your testimony.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) JAY M. GARNER, PRESIDENT, SYCOLEMAN, FORMER DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

General GARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of the Members. It's an honor to be here, and I thank you for your kind words and your support of our team and your support of what is going on in Baghdad even today.

Let me give you a quick synopsis of my tenure there. On January 17th I accepted the task from the Secretary of Defense. On January 22nd I tasked the interagency for people, the people began coming in this the first week in February. On March 16th we deployed to Kuwait. On April 21st I went to Baghdad with eight people, and on April 24th my team from Kuwait arrived in Baghdad. And on May 10th I met Ambassador Bremer in Qatar, and he and I went to Baghdad. On June 3rd, with my task complete, I departed Iraq.

I was given an excellent team by our government. I had five retired flag officers. I had four retired Ambassadors and four active Ambassadors. The overwhelming majority of volunteers I got from each of the agencies were excellent people. Sometimes we're a little short on quantity, but we were never short on quality.

We planned for a humanitarian crisis. We felt that there would be a large number of refugees and displaced people at the termination of the war. I can go into that further later if you like. We also planned on substantial reconstruction of the infrastructure and the restoration of the oil fields. We also planned on the restoration of the ministries at the national level and restoration of the local governments.

The actual situation we found as we entered into Iraq and got into Baghdad, was there really was no humanitarian crisis. There were humanitarian issues, but no crisis at all, and we had preserved the oil fields. Now you can credit that to the skill of the military and specifically to the skill of Lieutenant General Dave McKiernan, who is the Land Force Commander, and his two Corps Commanders, General Scott Wallace of V Corps and General Conway of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.

The immediate problem we had was the restoration of basic services and the reconstitution of the infrastructure. One of the problems with the infrastructure is that it had been absolutely abandoned for the last 30 years. No money was spent on it. I can go into that more if you'd like. But to deal with this we established immediately the April 11th task that the chairman went over as he opened this session.

What I'd say is despite the conditions that we had, the environment that we found initially was we're dealing in a country the size of California, had no power, shortage of water, no police, no communications, and 17 of the 23 ministries had been destroyed mostly by looting, not by military damage or collateral damage. But despite these conditions, the magnificent Americans and British that I had on my team, I think in the first 30 days they established and paid a \$20 minimum payment, emergency payment, to all the public service workers. They began payments to all pensioners. On May 24th they began paying salaries to all the public servants. That's close to 2 million people. They arranged to purchase the harvests. They restored basic services to 80 percent of Iraq. They restarted all the schools, returned the police forces to duty, installed town councils in 17 of the 26 cities above 100,000 people, re-established the ministries with interim leadership, found workplaces for the ministries, began the refurbishment of buildings, and, very importantly, they avoided epidemics and met all the pressing health needs.

Now, this was accomplished by civilian and military teams, very dedicated people that are working in temperatures above 120 degrees, with very little sleep. I'll guarantee you all of them missed at least one meal every day.

Things are still hectic, but I see the glass as half full. I think in Ambassador Bremer we have a very talented, very skilled diplomat who is doing all the right things. He's got a wonderful team over there. And on top of that, Iraq is not a Third World country. The people of Iraq are extremely skilled. They have excellent engineers, excellent doctors, excellent academics, and they are marvelous administrators, as you find in most totalitarian regimes. On top of all that, they have the wealth of oil that's never been shared with them before and will be shared with them now.

So I know where we are is a dicey road right now. I know there's a lot of complaints about where we are. But I see this getting better. The noose is tightening on the terrorists. I think the noose is tightening on Saddam Hussein. I think in 4 or 5 years from now, you'll see a completely different Iraq. You will look across and see an Iraq with a democratic government, an Iraq that's secular, an Iraq that has a good economy, and I think that will establish the baseline for change in the Middle East without doing anything else. There is incredible potential for our Nation to make this successful because we—by making it successful, we will change what's going on in the Middle East.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members, for the opportunity to come here and talk to you. I'm ready to answer any of your questions that I can answer.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, General.

Why don't I begin and just ask you, in your judgment, what are the basic humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, such as are they starving, do they need potable water, do they lack shelter, are they waiting for medicines and medical care?

General GARNER. The first problem is a problem of neglect of 30 years. There has been no money spent on the Iraqi people during the reign of Saddam Hussein, the services available are minimal to the people. And the facilities, you can go into the largest hospital in Basra, and there is open sewage running down the middle of the street between the buildings. So the humanitarian needs really are in the form of infrastructure.

I'll give you a quick story. I walked into the oil fields, and outside Basra and I walked into the control room, and there were two British gentlemen there about my age wearing British uniforms. I knew they were too old to be in the army. I said "are you guys in the army?" They said, "oh, no, that's what they gave us to wear." I said, "what are you doing here?" They said, "well, we're here getting the oil field stood back up again." And I said, "why are you here?" They said, "well, we're both retired, and we began operating with British Petroleum in 1960, and it was on this kind of equipment, and we're the only people they could find that knew how this kind of equipment worked again." Now, that's not just the oil fields, that's everything in Iraq because nothing has been spent on the infrastructure.

So the basic humanitarian needs are really to restore the infrastructure that services the people, such as the health, the school, the food, and that type of thing.

Mr. SHAYS. I had a constituent who said we have been out of Iraq for so long, we don't know what the hell is going on inside. This was before the war began. And he said that we have no real intelligence. It strikes me that this is kind of obvious information that I wasn't aware of before the war. I'm wondering how prepared our military and our civilian folks were for this just unbelievable backwardness in its infrastructure. In other words, we tell these stories almost in disbelief, as if we didn't know before. Maybe you could just touch on that.

General GARNER. Well, I think you're correct. I think we had very little knowledge of what goes on inside Iraq because it was so—Saddam Hussein had everything tightened down so tight that you couldn't get information out of there. I don't think we had as much knowledge as we would like to have had of what was going on there. And certainly the infrastructure, I knew the infrastructure would be bad, but it was worse than I thought it would be. The only place where you have good infrastructure there is in the palaces.

Mr. SHAYS. Why weren't we able to take advantage of the numerous defectors that were involved? Let me ask you, did you have in your organization any Iraqis who had defected who were there to help you with providing this information? Did they, in fact, know about the actual backwardness of this infrastructure and just think that maybe you knew and didn't bother to tell us, or did we not think to ask? It just seems to me like this shouldn't have caught us by surprise.

General GARNER. By the time we deployed to Baghdad, we had about 180 free Iraqis that were in our organization, but most of when had been free Iraqis for several years, and they eventually deployed to Baghdad to help us. The free Iraqis never mentioned to me or anyone else that I know of how bad the infrastructure was, but that infrastructure was all they knew. So I can see why they wouldn't have mentioned that to us.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, a lot of us voted to use force against Saddam Hussein, some didn't, but even those who have voted to use force may have a disagreement on our task now. I think, for instance, that I have a big disagreement with my Republican colleague Mr. Duncan. I believe that if we were to fail, if we were to leave Iraq, if we were to fail, that anything we said in the future would almost be meaningless. I guess I'd like you to touch on the issue of whether there's room for failure and what the consequences would be if we failed to stay the course, failed to help Iraq introduce democratic government, introduce a market economy and grow economically. If you could tell us about your view of that.

General GARNER. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, I can't imagine that we would walk away from this. If we did, and if Saddam Hussein is still alive, he'd return immediately, and our credibility worldwide would be zero.

Second of all, like I said earlier, the potential for us staying the course, and I think we will stay the course, in being successful, and I believe we will be successful. The potential is incredible, because restoring Iraq, putting in a democratic government, having a Constitution, having a government that expresses the freely elected will of the people will change the nature of the Middle East. You'll have the Iranians looking across saying, "why can't I have that; the Syrians looking across saying, why can't I have that; the Egyptians and Saudis the same thing." So the potential there is enormous.

Mr. SHAYS. Before recognizing Mrs. Maloney, I would also say some Members that felt it was not wise that we went into Iraq now that we're there clearly don't want us to leave and don't want us to fail.

General GARNER. Well—you know, I had over 70 meetings with Iraqi people, garbage workers, schoolteachers, police, politicians etc. Every third day I walked through the market, and I get 400 people following me, and I would stop and talk to them. When you begin talking with them, they raise hell with you in the first 20 minutes, like they do in any town meeting in America. But at the end of that, it gives you a chance to address all their problems, tell them what you're doing and say thank you for your time. As I walked away in all 70 plus meetings, I always got a thumbs up. "Thank Mr. George Bush for taking away Saddam Hussein, and please don't leave."

I don't like the words "silent majority," but there is a tremendous amount of silent majority of Iraqi people who are glad we're there, who are thankful we're there and don't want us to leave.

I think right now the tasks that are in place to be done are being done. We just started reconstituting the Army and we just established the committee for government. I think all these are positive things.

I believe three things need to happen that will have a huge turnaround in Iraq, I believe: No. 1, find Saddam Hussein dead or alive; No. 2, reestablish a government, and that's going on right now, and Ambassador Bremer has his arms around that; and No. 3, reestablish an Iraqi Army that can pick up some of the security tasks, and that's beginning to happen now under Walt Slocombe. I think we bottomed out of this thing, and from this point on I think we'll see an increase.

Now, you got the terrorists there, and we tighten the noose on them every day. In my estimation, part of the increased contacts with terrorists is because we're now taking the fight to them. We're seeking them out, and we're having more contacts with them, but I see that as good. The noose tightens every day on Saddam Hussein; the noose tightens on the guerrillas every day.

Mr. SHAYS. If other Members don't get to my 11 points. I'll choose in my second round to ask about that.

Let me just say I used 8 minutes, so I'll apply that same amount of timing to the Members that follow.

Mrs. Maloney, you have the floor.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very disturbed at the mounting number of American soldiers that are being killed during the peacetime, and I am very, very concerned about it. And if we continue at the rate that we're going, we will lose more of our people, our men and women, during the peacetime than we lost during the war, and it's very upsetting. They're doing very innocent things, buying a Coca Cola, and they're shot, walking down a street and they're shot. So I was very encouraged with reports this week that we were moving forward to employ Iraqi Army members in securing the safety sites around Iraq, therefore relieving our people.

But could we do other things? Could we call upon our Arab allies to come in and help us in maintaining the peace? Could we call upon the United Nations to come in and help us maintain the peace? What can we do to really move forward to stabilize the economy and the government, to help the Iraqi people, but at the same time to really protect the American men and women who are there trying to help the Iraqi people?

General GARNER. I think you're absolutely correct. To get an international flavor of stability forces in there would be a positive thing. To reestablish elements of the Iraqi Army that could do things like border security and guard static locations would be a good thing, and that would allow our forces to—free up our forces to do more mounted and dismounted patrolling, which is somewhat safer than being static. It allows us to relieve some of the forces there.

I think you're right, but also what I see evolving now is with the governmental committee that Ambassador Bremer has established now, you have some Iraqi voices now to talk to the people. And as a result you have fundamental Shiites, moderate Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, Kurds. So I think over time, you will see them taking more control, and they have great influence over the Iraqi people.

Like I've said, I think we hit the bottom now. It's going to be a slow climb up, but I think the climb is going up.

Mrs. MALONEY. How long do you expect we'll need to stay in Iraq?

General GARNER. Oh, I don't know, ma'am. It's certainly going to take more than a year just to get the government process in place. I think once we get that in place, once there's a Constitution, once we have elections, and once we have an Iraqi Government and we have handed back the administration and the basic services of running Iraq back to an Iraqi Government, I think you'll see great change after that, positive change. How long that process takes is unknown right now.

Mrs. MALONEY. You have no sense of how long it will take to set up a government and a stable economy?

General GARNER. I think it can be done in a year to a year and a half.

Mrs. MALONEY. Year to year and a half.

General GARNER. Say you did it in a year, but once you've established it and set it up, there's a period of time there that you still have to remain with it to make sure it's stable, it's running right, and to give it the overhead cover that it needs to do what it needs to do. We're dealing with people who have been living in one of the worst regimes of the century for the last 35 years and have had really no democratic government for 1,000 years, so it takes—you're dealing with people that have been locked up in a black dark room for 35 years, and we just opened the door and let the light in. They're now trying to adjust their eyes and see. So it takes time to do that.

Mrs. MALONEY. We're receiving assistance now from the British Government in the south and the Kurds in the north, and there appears to be some resistance from our government to work with the United Nations. Do you think it would be helpful if the United Nations went there and worked with the Kurds and worked with the British Government in the south? Would that alleviate some of the pressure that we're feeling?

General GARNER. I'll give you my opinion. I don't think the Kurds care anything about having the U.N. in there. I think the Brits do, because the Brits have always been large supporters of the U.N. in this endeavor.

My personal experience with the U.N. is they do subtasks pretty well; they don't do major tasks very well. So I wouldn't turn the government over to them.

Let me give you a thought here. If you went north and went into what we loosely call Kurdistan, three provinces we call Kurdistan, you'd want to vacation there. It's incredible. It's beautiful. The cities are marvelous, they're clean. The economy thrives. The people, most of the people, dress like Westerners. Women have equality there. You have women running for the government. Many of the schools are coeducational, and that's just happened in the last 12 years.

When I walked out of northern Iraq in 1991, it looked like Basra. It was rubble. It was terrible. It was horrible. Now all we gave them was a guarantee that we wouldn't let Saddam Hussein back in there, and in 12 years they've turned that around without really any help from us and without any money from us. Think what can happen in the rest of Iraq now when you have us there, we're going to be there, we're spending money there. And they have the wealth of oil. The rest of Iraq will turn around in half that time, if not

sooner. There's a great lesson learned, I think, as you look up north, and that they accomplished that with only freedom. That's all. No other help from us.

Mrs. MALONEY. That's wonderful to hear.

What is the probability that guerilla warfare and social unrest would subside if we were able to provide stability and humanitarian assistance and services more quickly and directly? From what you're saying, there is a huge infrastructure challenge, and we're having a lot of problems on the humanitarian side. Is the guerilla warfare connected to that, or is that a totally separate—

General GARNER. I don't know whether it's connected or not. One thing that we all know is if the economy gets better, and if things get better, then those that are mildly disgruntled will quit being that way. The hard-core people aren't going to change. We're going to have to root them out and capture them or kill them.

Mrs. MALONEY. What happens if we have an election and they elect a restrictive government that is restrictive toward women, such as the Taliban, and restrictive in other ways toward the people?

General GARNER. I think you control that with the Constitution.

Mrs. MALONEY. With a Constitution.

General GARNER. You ensure rights for everyone in the Constitution, and you ensure in the Constitution that it represents all of Iraq, that it's a mosaic of Iraq.

Mrs. MALONEY. We've had great success with our Constitution. I wish the Iraqi people will have as strong a Constitution, too.

My time is up. I thank you, General, very much for your time and testimony.

General GARNER. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentlewoman.

At this time recognize Mr. Duncan for 8 minutes.

Mr. DUNCAN. I won't take 8 minutes.

General, let me ask you this: First of all, let me say I know that General Garner and all the military have all done great jobs in Iraq based on what they were told to do. What my problem is how we justify spending \$4 billion a month in Iraq and paying the back salaries of the military, paying Iraqi retirees, building or rebuilding 6,000 schools, giving free health care to Iraqi citizens, all of these things that we're doing, because while I have voted—I have always voted for the Defense Department, and I'm very much in favor of national defense. I'm not in favor of turning the Defense Department into the Department of International Social Work or the Department of Massive Foreign Aid, because most conservatives that I know have traditionally been against massive foreign aid, and this is massive foreign aid on an unprecedented scale that we're doing in Iraq right now.

I know that the Congressional Budget Office estimated that a 3-month—they estimated before the war that a 3-month war and a 5-year occupation would cost us \$272 billion, and that was when the estimated monthly costs were far less than the \$4 billion that we're apparently seeing now.

But, General, let me ask you this: Did you happen to see the reports on the national news last night, or have you read the report of the CSIS team that just got back from Iraq that, according to

the report, said that the window of opportunity in Iraq is greatly narrowing, and the country is about to slide into total chaos?

General GARNER. I briefly read that this morning in the Washington Post. Yes, sir.

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me say this: You know, when you talk about the Iraqi citizens wanting us there, I think that in a country that poor, they would want anybody there that was willing to spend \$4 billion a month. I mean, that is a great boon to their economy. And I know you—and I know everybody that's in this room is connected to the agency or department or company that wants us to be there.

So I know that all these things I'm saying are very unpopular, and that makes me very uncomfortable, and I apologize because I don't mean to offend anybody, but I can tell you that we forget how much a billion is up here. We just talk about it like it's almost nothing. And \$4 billion exceeds the yearly budget of most major cities in this country. I mean, it's just mind-boggling. You know, I'm sorry, but I just can't see it. I think that, you know, you've mentioned that Iraq has humongous oil wealth. I think what we should do is we should let them use that oil wealth to rebuild their own country.

We have a lot of needs in this country. Yesterday in one of the subcommittees on which I serve, we passed a bill that was a \$20 billion bill over a 5-year period to rebuild what everybody agrees is a really aging, deteriorating waste-water infrastructure in this country, and people do not realize how poor that waste-water infrastructure is in this country. And yet we were told that even though that money has been authorized, we won't be able to fund that, and that is \$4 billion a year, and we're not going to be able to fund it. And it's hard to justify to my people, because, you know, my people have the quaint notion that the American Congress should put the American people first.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you want to comment on anything that—

General GARNER. Just one thing. I share your concern with the cost, Congressman. I really do. And one thing that I think gets a little confusing is when you talk about the burn rate on money of paying salaries, paying pensioners, and doing basic things, you have to remember that money is not appropriated money. Those were frozen assets. Those were Iraqi money. So what the coalition is doing now, they're paying salaries and they're doing an awful lot. There's close to \$3 billion in frozen assets. I think what you'll see as soon as the oil fields get up and running, you'll see that the oil money will be going into an account that will be very visible and very audible, and that money will be spent also. So it's my hope, as yours, that those two things together will diminish the amount of money that we have to spend on Iraq.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, some of it is frozen money, but we did a supplemental appropriations bill for \$80 billion on top of the biggest increase in defense spending ever, both of which I voted for, but there's an awful lot of appropriated money being spent and already having been spent.

All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank the gentleman.

I would recognize Mr. Lynch for 8 minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, in mid-May when I was in Iraq, we had a chance to go into Baghdad and into Kirkuk, and at that time, talking to our people on the ground, our troops, they explained that in the early weeks of our military operation, there was, you know, pretty much chaos. They hadn't had—I think they said that they hadn't had the garbage picked up on the streets in Baghdad in something like 10 weeks, and that as the utilities were turned on and the garbage was picked up and the basic services started to come online, that the temper of the people themselves, it was moderated considerably.

Now, in mid-May we had about 40 percent of the electricity on, we had 40 percent of sewage treatment and potable water. What was the percentage of utilities that we had on when you last were in Iraq?

General GARNER. As I left, the north and south had as good of water and better electricity than they ever had because they were getting electricity 24-hours-a-day. The problem was in Baghdad, because Baghdad never had the electrical grid capacity to generate enough electricity for the city, so that the electricity for Baghdad had to be ported or transported from the northern grids and the southern grids into Baghdad. But the problem was there were—the high voltage lines that did that were destroyed partly during the war and partly by terrorist or guerilla-type activities right after the war, and so it took a month, a little over a month actually, to reestablish those lines, and as they were reestablished, many of them would get destroyed or sabotaged after they did that.

I think that's the problem today. But what the coalition has done, they're buying more capacity by bringing in huge generators, and they're putting more security on the high-voltage lines.

Now, even when you get all the grids up and running, there's not enough electrical capacity for all of Baghdad to have electricity 24/7, so electricity has to be shared. It will continue to be a shared activity until the Iraqis build larger grids or another grid.

Mr. LYNCH. Let's get into that, because that is one of the major problems there is, that country has never really been fully equipped to provide basic services to all its citizens. Now, in some of our contacts with your civil administrators in Baghdad, they were saying that these basic power stations were totally inadequate, they were a mishmash of not only different companies, but different nations that had come in there over the years and tried to provide some type of electrical power.

Given the disastrous condition of basic utilities in Iraq, do you have any sense of what the cost would be to get them up to what they need for a decent standard of living in that country?

General GARNER. Congressman, I couldn't give you a number on that, but there will have to be significant restoration of the grids. And you put your finger on the problem right now is every power station, the equipment in there, in them, is from a different country. So there's no—there's no homogenous set of equipment there. And most of it is old, so it has to be either refurbished or restored. Then we have to have more than is there, and what the cost number is on that, I don't know.

Mr. LYNCH. And they need everything. They need basic roads, bridges, sewage treatment facilities, power stations. I just don't—

General GARNER. That's absolutely correct.

Mr. LYNCH. I see some of these estimates that are coming out about what it's going to cost the American taxpayer to help these people out and get them stood back up on their feet, as they say, and I just don't see it as honest and forthcoming as it should be. I think we're in for a long haul in Iraq if we're going to try to get these people up to a decent standard of living and try to do it ourselves.

The other question I had was based on your own understanding of the oil supply and oil revenue, as Mr. Duncan had referred to earlier, is there any hope; is there any hope that with full capacity that Iraq would be able to handle a major portion of their infrastructure repairs through the oil revenue?

General GARNER. Oh, I believe there is. I think we need three things there. I think we need to bring the oil fields up to producing as much capacity as they can, given the equipment that they have. That's No. 1. No. 2, I think that we need to have a long-term budget for Iraq for what we're going to do, a plan for what will be accomplished over the next 10 years, and apply the revenues of the oil to that plan. And the third thing I think we need to do, and probably one of the most important things that can happen, is I think that we need to look at what is the debt that the people of Iraq are going to be faced with when all this is over, because if we don't—if we don't minimize that debt structure, we're looking at a Germany of 1920, 1921.

So I think it's very important to eliminate their debt. It's very important to get the oil fields to the maximum capacity we can get them to. It's very important to come out with a long-term economic plan and budget for restoration of Iraq and for the economy. I think that's going on right now. They are working hard on the oil fields. They are working on a long-term plan.

The thing that can't be done in Iraq by the Coalition Provisional Authority is elimination of the debt. We have to take the lead probably here in this body that have you here to do something like that.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

One other issue. I've got a couple of other issues, but in talking to our people on the ground, military personnel, in Baghdad and Kirkuk, they were saying that 95 percent of their contacts are positive with the Iraqi population. They said, but the other 5 percent are trying to kill us. Now, based on my own experience going into your former headquarters in Baghdad, and just given the nature of the job that we've handed to our military personnel, there is close daily intimate contact with the Iraqi population every single day; driving into downtown Baghdad, throngs of people, thousands of people out on the street; going into your own headquarters, dozens and dozens of young Iraqi males looking for work or payment. It just seemed to me that the physical security of our personnel there was very much vulnerable under the protocols that we had there given the job we had to do. There's no way around it.

And this goes right out to Mr. Bremer who for most of our meetings wore a flak jacket at the headquarters. Is there any way we can minimize these—I think the American people are not going to

accept this daily slaughter of our young people, and there has to be some way we can do our job there and provide a greater level of security to our sons and daughters.

General GARNER. I agree with what you just said, but there is not going to be a quick solution to this. I think as the police force develops basic skills, which they never had before and they are developing now, and as Walt Slocum reactivates portions of the regular Army, and as we get some international involvement, and as we're taking daily more and more of this fight to the guerillas or terrorists, I think this will come under control, but it's going to be a long route to do that.

Mr. LYNCH. Look, I appreciate the job you have done. It's a tough job, and I appreciate your good work on behalf of this country.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

Mr. Tierney, you have the floor for 8 minutes.

Mr. TIERNEY. General, first of all I think there are a lot of disagreements amongst policy issues in the Congress and probably in this country or whatever, but I think everybody owes you a debt of gratitude for the job that you undertook to do and did to the best of your ability, and I want to make sure that you know I appreciate it and folks in my district and I think throughout the country appreciate the sacrifice that you made in doing what you did.

I have some serious policy issues, and they're not with you. I think the consequences are questionable, and I think dangerous policy, a preemptive first strike, unilateral strike by this country are now showing. We are in an entanglement now, alone primarily, that didn't have to be in, and I think it is unparalleled arrogance of the way we conducted our foreign affairs in this particular matter and the disregard for the opinions and the cooperation and the advice and assistance of our allies and friends have put us in this position right now. Where Mr. Duncan made the point that we are alone spending almost \$4 billion a month, where I think, clearly, we ought to be in a situation at worse where we are sharing that burden significantly with others. And it just boggles the mind that we could have that kind of failed leadership at this particular point in time.

We are witnessing what happens when you have intelligence and make a decision about preemptive unilateral attack that is incomplete or inaccurate or misinterpreted or misconstrued and we are bearing the fruits on that. So let me ask you, do you think that the number of troops that we have in Iraq right now, which estimates around 150,000. You might want to correct that if you have a more accurate number. Is that sufficient right now to fight a guerilla war to provide security and stability and to train others to step into that role?

General GARNER. I am going to give you two answers and one of them may be right. The first one, I mean, I am a former soldier, and I never have enough troops. I always want more troops.

But the other answer is I looked at John Abazaid's remarks yesterday and he felt comfortable—what he quoted was 146,000—that he had enough troops now to provide stability and to do the guerilla war. And John Abazaid, I know him very well, and to me he is the finest soldier in uniform today. If he thinks that's enough, then I would have to agree with that.

Mr. TIERNEY. You also agree with his remarks that, in fact, we are engaged in a guerilla war?

General GARNER. I think we are. I think what's happened is they've had time now to coordinate and pull it together. I think it's a low-level guerilla war. It's not low-level to the troops, but yes, I think we are in a guerilla war now.

Mr. TIERNEY. Tell me a little bit, if you would, about the condition that our men and women find themselves in in different areas of Iraq right now. What are their housing conditions? What is their food situation? What is their water situation?

General GARNER. It's really a function of where they are. If they're up north, the conditions are pretty good. If they're in Baghdad, in some places, their conditions are pretty good because they have a palace or a huge government building. The south is in horrible, horrible shape. I mean the south is representative of 35 years of brutality and neglect.

Mr. TIERNEY. What percentage of our troops are in the south, sir?

General GARNER. I don't know the answer to that, sir. I don't know. But the problem right now, as you well know, is the heat is intense, the days are extremely long, and it's a dangerous situation. You know, if you take that triangle Falluja, Tikrit, Baghdad and you look at that and realize that was absolutely Baathist-centric, Sunni-centric, the bad side of the Sunnis. And there are over a million in there—I am talking about real-hard core Baathists and hard-core Sunni Baathists. Where we are right now, even if only 5 percent of those people are against us, that's a big number, and so there's a lot to contend with there. Until we tighten the noose on them, until we eliminate that and show them there's no chance for them, that's going to continue. But I think the military and the civilian authorities are doing it now, but it's a long road.

Mr. TIERNEY. Explain to me what we're doing—I mean, there's a large young population there, young male population there. What are we doing to try to keep those folks occupied, and how do we compensate them in some meaningful way so whatever currency they get in terms of compensation is actually a value to them?

General GARNER. The basic approach is to try to restore the economy and try to create jobs. And much of that is being done through as—I'm dated now, but much of that was being done through the Ministry for Trade and was being overseen by Ambassador Robin Rafel, and she had a very comprehensive plan to do it, but it's slow. The creation of jobs is extremely important. As you create jobs, you put money in peoples' pockets. They're less interested to do mischievous things.

Mr. TIERNEY. What's the relationship with NGO's and others that might want to provide some humanitarian relief? What's the status of that right now? And what do you foresee in the near future?

General GARNER. I don't know what the status of it is right now. The thing about NGO's is essentially, the environment needs to be fairly permissive for them to work, and if it's not permissive, then they go in harm's way. The NGO's do a marvelous job, and they're great people, they're wonderful people, but I have to tell you when they come to you, they complain all the time about how terrible

things are and how they don't get supported, because that's the way they get money. They can't get money without griping. So what we need to do is find another way to fund the NGO's.

Mr. TIERNEY. I was going to say they're saying nice things about you. Thank you for your time.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank the gentleman, Mr. Ruppertsberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You have done a tremendous job. Thank you for your service to the United States of America.

I agree with most of what you have said, and I really appreciate your candid responses to the questions, and we don't always get that in committees.

The plan is important. There's so much emphasis right now that's being put on weapons of mass destruction, and we should because of the credibility issue facing the administration and also to learn from our mistakes that we can do better. But it seems to me that the issue—the highest priority is what's happening now in Iraq and the fact that on a daily basis our military are being knocked off. It's a guerilla warfare, and it was probably planned before we started the war, and we are in that situation.

In your list, No. 1 is establish security and with a plan. And I think the world and the American public want to understand, really, what is going on. And if we have a plan, if we articulate exactly that we are having a problem, we need to secure the area before we can get to the next level, we need to move forward. And my question is, is there a plan articulated by the administration or Defense Department on what we need to do first to obtain security, so we can get to the issue of the humanitarian issues?

General GARNER. Congressman, thank you for your remarks. I can't tell you what the plan is right now, but I can assure that there's a plan. And I can assure you, in General McKiernan, you have probably one of the most skilled soldiers that we've had and in General Abazaid together, the two of them together, I can assure you, have a very comprehensive plan to do what you just said.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The plan has to come from the top. And there are issues about the resources, there are issues about what—there are issues, do we form a coalition with other countries not only to help with security, but the cost factor, until we can get the oil fields moving?

General GARNER. The more international flavor that we can put on this, the better off we'll be. We need to maintain the control of it. On weapons of mass destruction, I agree with you, we have a credibility issue there, but let me say this, that he had weapons of mass destruction. If I could take you right now with me to the marketplace in Basra, and we bring Iraqis, 100 of them, and you say "do you think he had weapons of mass destruction?" Every one of them would say, "certainly. I lost an aunt to that in 1984. I lost my uncle in 1985. I lost my brothers in 1986. We could go up north to the Kurds and get the same response. In 1988, my mother and father were gassed." He used it against Iranians. He used it against the Shiites, he used it against the Kurds, then we gave him 12 years to learn how to hide it. And it's a big country and weapons of mass destruction are little things. So he's had the chance to hide it. I think we'll find those.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. It's a matter of priority. And in my opinion, the priority is what we are going to do to Iraq with American soldiers being shot?

General GARNER. You're colored by your experiences, and so my problem with all this is if I could have had each of you stand with me in the killing fields in al-Hillah, which is next to the ancient city of Babylon, and have you watch them unearth the bodies of the thousands—and I think the number will approach a million that he killed in 1991 and 1992. I mean absolute genocide. And the horrors of that and the emotions of the people. And as you look at the bodies being exhumed and laid out on the ground, many of them not even 3 feet long—children—and you look at that and we're dealing with someone on the level of Hitler in Germany or Pol Pot in Cambodia. And if you looked at that, that to me alone is enough to take this dictator out. And all the people will tell you thank you for doing this. "Thank you for eliminating Saddam Hussein. You're 12 years late."

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You know, I don't disagree with you on that issue, the issue of whether or not we're going to war is over with, we are there and we have to deal with the reality of today. If your administration wants to use a good argument, they were there in Desert Storm. So let's move on and deal with what's happening today. The focus is clearly going to be on we're there or we're there not. But the issue is American soldiers being knocked out everyday, and second, bringing this country where it needs to be, which you said is going to take a long time. A lot of times we raise expectations, maybe for political reasons and that is one of the worst things you can do because it's going to take a long time.

Let me get to another other issue, the issue of oil. Is there an aggressive program? And who's overseeing the program to start getting the oil moving so that the resources can be used to pay for what we're paying for right now?

General GARNER. I can tell you that. Ambassador Bremer spends a lot of time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do you know where we are at this point?

General GARNER. I don't know where we are at this point, but I can tell you there's an aggressive program to make the oil successful in user revenues for reconstruction for the Iraqi people.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do you feel, and I know the question was asked before, do you feel it would be wise, from a diplomatic point of view, to reach out to the U.N. or other countries to come in and put together a plan, not a haphazard situation where we have all different types of equipment, but a world plan as we did in Desert Storm to come in and take care of this situation? First secure Iraq. It's not secure right now, and second, start the humanitarian issues, the education, the infrastructure building, all of those issues?

General GARNER. Basically, yes, I agree with that. The more international flavor you can have, there are some things that the U.N. does that are extremely good. We can use them, but I wouldn't turn the operation over to the U.N.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Everybody might want to because of the oil.

General GARNER. Well, the oil is something we have to be very careful with. And we have to be absolutely set up in a way where

it's very audible and that money is very visible, it's audible and it goes strictly to the Iraqi people.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And use our expertise and other expertise to set up a banking system, a system where people will be able to use that.

Thank you for your testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. The Chair recognizes Mr. Bell for 8 minutes.

Mr. BELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General, thank you very much for being here to testify. And I apologize for missing your earlier testimony. If my questions are redundant, I apologize for that also, but it would merely make me like 99 percent of the other Members of Congress.

But first question I have for you has to do with your statement regarding standing in the killing fields, and that being after seeing what you did when you were in Iraq, that's reason enough. And you know there are a lot of different opinions on our side of the aisle as to the military action in Iraq. I happen to support the military action, but I did so on the basis that we were told that Saddam Hussein was manufacturing weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring terroristic activity. And that's what this administration chose to tell the American people.

And I'm curious as to your earlier statement. And if you don't think that being there creates some credibility and trust problems down the road if the reasons that were offered—because regime change was talked about, but it was not given as the reason for why we were moving forward. I think there was an agreement throughout the international community that Saddam Hussein was an awful leader and an evil leader, but there are other evil leaders in other parts of the world that we are not attacking in the same manner. And I am curious as to what your feelings are now on that particular subject, whether we will have a trust and credibility problem going forward if the reasons that were offered for the military action do not prove to be true?

General GARNER. I believe we will have a trust and credibility problem if we don't find the evidence of weapons of mass destruction. And we will have that problem from people who want to make it a problem. But again, I feel sure he had them. I feel we are going to find them, eventually. I feel very strongly that we shouldn't allow genocide, and there's much genocide there. But someone put their finger on it that we are where we are, and this Nation can do anything that it wants to. And I think what we all ought to do is we ought to galvanize, and we ought to make this mission successful because the potential of that, not only in our reputation, but the future of the Middle East and the tensions in the Middle East will be mitigated, I believe, if we're successful here. And I think it ought to be one team, one fight, and let's get the job done.

Mr. BELL. You assure us that you think there's a plan, and I realize all you can speak to is your own experience, but some of us have been a little bit shocked. And I'm very glad you're here because you can answer some of what has been suggested previously and at other hearings I have attended what. Has been suggested is that the administration, that the Defense Department, that our military leaders believed that once Saddam Hussein was overthrown, that the American troops would be welcome with open

arms, that their presence in Iraq would be celebrated, and there would be a smooth transition from that point forward. Was that your belief going in? Is that what your expectation was? Was that the plan?

General GARNER. That wasn't my belief, and I don't think it was the belief of the military because the military knew there was an extremely hard-core element that was going to continue to be there after the war was over. I don't think that any of us could stand up here in front of you and tell you we predicted what is going on today, but we certainly didn't predict a cakewalk, and we certainly knew that there would be elements of terrorism. We certainly knew that the infrastructure would be a problem. The looting, I expected there to be looting. I didn't expect though the consequences of looting that we faced. When we went up north in 1991, there was looting up there, but they simply stole everything, and they took out the windows and stuff like that, but they didn't destroy the buildings. What happened this time, the buildings were destroyed. They pulled out the wire, they pulled out the plumbing and set them on fire. I think there were certain things we expected, but the consequences and the depth of it was far greater than we had anticipated.

And it's like anything you go into, no plan turns out exactly the way you planned it. But the reason you plan is to keep you from starting with a blank sheet of paper. And I think, essentially, the military did an excellent plan. I think from the time we had, we did a decent plan.

And so like I said, we are where we are. We just need to stay the course and get the job done.

Mr. BELL. I guess that's why you have to have alternative plans. You referred to this hard-core element. And we read everyday about our troops continuing to be shot at, killings taking place on an almost daily basis, and I'm curious as to what the plan was to deal with that kind of activity if it were to occur?

General GARNER. Sir, I don't know what the plan is today. I can't answer that.

Mr. BELL. Was there a plan in place?

General GARNER. Yes, sir. There was a plan in place. In fact, there were daily sweeps in operations to begin ferreting out these people.

Mr. BELL. We move forward and look at where we are today and the 11 essential tasks that have been put forth by you beforehand, as far as those tasks are concerned, we go down the list establishing security in Baghdad, would you say that's been accomplished?

General GARNER. Yes, I think we have security, but it's not to the degree that you want it. I mean it certainly falls far short of where you want it, but it doesn't mean we are not doing those things necessary to provide security. People are able to get out and work in Baghdad, but certainly the security isn't anywhere we want in Baghdad or any other places.

Mr. BELL. I believe we are paying Civil Service salaries?

General GARNER. Yes.

Mr. BELL. The police force—there has been an effort to train police?

General GARNER. I was told they just reactivated the police academy.

Mr. BELL. The government ministries are not functioning are they?

General GARNER. I believe they are. The ability to pay people says that the Central Bank is functioning. The Ministry of Trade is functioning. The schools are open. They are not functioning to the degree we want them to, but they are working.

Mr. BELL. Restoring basic services in Baghdad to prewar levels, we're certainly not there?

General GARNER. To my knowledge, we are not.

Mr. BELL. Where does the fuel crisis come in?

General GARNER. I don't know where that is now.

Mr. BELL. Are we purchasing crops?

General GARNER. Yes.

Mr. BELL. The food distribution system gaps.

General GARNER. I don't know where we are on that. The problem since the Gulf war is that they operated on a huge distribution system. They had over 40,000 nodes in it. And while there was no food crisis, what we needed to do was reestablish that system and see what nodes were missing. We would have to replace those, and we want to make sure that the food distribution system was up and running, because we knew within a matter of months, we would have to begin distributing food.

Mr. BELL. My time has expired, General, but would it be fair to wrap up by saying we still continue to face huge challenges given the essential tasks that you had put forth?

General GARNER. Oh, yes, sir. There are huge challenges. Absolutely, I agree with that.

Mr. BELL. Thank you very much for being here.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

General Garner, I am going to let you leave in just a second. I would just like to ask you a few more questions.

And let me say to the second panel. I think some of the second panel have something to do with the Heritage Foundation. We're willing to switch the second panel and have it go third. Talk to my staff. We have votes that will probably prevent us from getting back until maybe 10 of 12 or so. I'll let you work that out with the staff director and try to be flexible in that.

General Garner, the Center for Strategic and International Studies had the opportunity to go to Iraq June 26th to July 27th. They had five members, and they came in and made this point. They basically said, we saw significant progress everywhere we went, but the enormity of this undertaking cannot be overstated. There are huge challenges ahead. We hope the recommendations in the attached report will assist in shaping a successful reconstruction in Iraq.

And then they had seven major areas needing immediate attention. One, the coalition must establish public safety in all parts of the country, which is really your point 1 in your 11 issues. And then they said Iraq ownership, the rebuilding process, must be expanded at national, provincial and local levels. And that's really points 9 and 10 of yours. No. 3, idle hands must be put to work and basic economic social services provided immediately to avoid

exasperating political and security problems. That was two, three and four of your recommendations.

Then they had decentralization is essential. That is something different. They had the coalition must facilitate a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind from centralized authority to significant freedoms, from suspicion to trust, from skepticism to hope.

Six, the United States needs to quickly immobilize a new reconstruction coalition that is significantly broader than the coalition that successfully waged the war.

And then seven, money must be significantly more forthcoming and flexible, which is point seven.

What they did not include was in yours, restore basic service in Baghdad to prewar levels or better. That sounds like in a sense it's been done. Prevent a fuel crisis, which they didn't include, which was yours. Food distribution gaps, and prevent disease and cholera outbreaks, which we will be interested to hear from the NGO's, but they didn't include that.

I guess my question to you is, you are an invaluable witness because you've been there, and you were able to talk about people you spoke with. One of the points I want to ask you is, you were very accessible, people interacted with you and you interacted with them, do you have a sense that the same interaction is going on by Mr. Bremer and his team?

General GARNER. Well, the 3 or 4 weeks that I was there with Ambassador Bremer and his team, he was very accessible, and I have seen no evidence that he has changed that. I see television clips of Jerry Bremer all the time, all over Iraq. Jerry Bremer is an extremely talented diplomat, so he's going to be accessible.

Mr. SHAYS. I agree—he happens to have been a former constituent of mine and happens to have been a former Ambassador on terrorism. But there's an accusation that his team is in the palaces and the public doesn't, interact with the palaces, that, kind of, almost makes a statement. Is that something that is advisable, being in the palaces?

General GARNER. No. I think you have to get out. I don't think that statement is correct. I think the people get out quite a bit. I have not been there for 6 weeks. But I would be surprised if that team has sequestered itself inside the palace.

Mr. SHAYS. The Baath Party, the Republican Guard, basically a decision. If you were part of either, you don't have a future in Iraq. A number of people have criticized and some of the NGO's are going to make this point that there were lower-tier people in the Baath Party, lower-tier people in the Republican Guard, people who really had to participate in Saddam's Iraq, and, therefore, were part of them, but the sense that redemption is a valuable thing. Why turn all of them against you, why not co-op some of them. Your opinion about that?

General GARNER. Well, I agree with most of what you said. There is a line, you don't want to end the day with more enemies than you started with that morning. But I think what is missing in this, you have to look at where those elements of the Baath Party were. If they were in the education system, where you couldn't teach in Iraq unless you were Baathist. So you find the bulk of the people

in the education system are not hard-core Baathist at all. If you go over to the security system, military system, they are all hard-core Baathist. So what is left in that policy, as I remember it, is there is the chance—there is the opportunity for, even if you were taken out of your job as part of that policy, there's a chance to come back in and plead your case and get put back in that job, based on your personal background.

Mr. SHAYS. I have basically 2½ minutes until the machine technically closes, we are going to insert this into the record, and I'm just going to say as someone who has complained to everyone I can, everyone I can, the Defense Department invited five people in to spend 7 days to do what the work of Congress should be. And I know that's not your responsibility, but I just want to put it on the record.

I'm really at my wit's end to know what we have to do to get this Defense Department to allow Members to see the things that you see. I don't just want to hear it from you. I don't want to hear it from the press. I want to see it, I want to feel it, I want to taste it and I think other Members should be allowed to do that, and I don't mean taking us from one place in Baghdad to another. If you're saying the northern part is safe, then there is absolutely no excuse for Members of Congress not being part of that.

You have been a wonderful witness. I am delighted you were here and grateful you were here.

We are going to adjourn, and staff will talk to the next two panels. I am running out so, please don't think I am being rude. Thank you for being here. Do you have any closing comment.

General GARNER. Thank you, sir. It was an honor to serve.

Mr. SHAYS. It's an honor to have you serve our country.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to call this hearing to order and apologize to panels two and three for the extraordinarily long wait. While there is a real battle in the Middle East, there is a skirmish in the hall of the House.

Our second panel is Dr. Susan Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade, General Accounting Office; Dr. Joseph Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, Department of Defense; Mr. Richard Greene, Principal Deputy Assistant, Bureau of Population Refugee and Migration, Department of State; Mr. James Kunder, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID].

I would request—do we have all—if you would stand, I'll administer the oath, and then we can take testimony.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. For the record the witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

Your testimony is very important. I think this hearing is very important, and I am sorry that you have had to wait. And it is likely, if there are more votes, I am going to stay here so we can continue. I know everyone has other things they have to do today.

With that, Dr. Westin nice to have you here. Thank you for being here.

What we are going to do you is, you have 5 minutes. You can roll over another five, but please don't get to 10.

STATEMENTS OF SUSAN S. WESTIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; JOSEPH J. COLLINS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, STABILITY OPERATIONS; RICHARD GREENE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION; AND JAMES KUNDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Dr. WESTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my entire statement be put in the record, which I will summarize.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's observations on assistance efforts that followed military conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

First, I have a few general observations about assistance in post-conflict situations. Second, I will discuss some essential elements for carrying out assistance effectively. My third topic of discussion is challenges to providing assistance. I hope these remarks will prove useful context in the subcommittee's oversight of post-conflict assistance to Iraq.

Let me briefly discuss two general observations about post-conflict assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. We learned that humanitarian assistance must be part of a broader, long-term effort that includes military, economic, governance, and democracy building measures. We also learned that even when the fighting has stopped, local tensions and conflicts continue and must be recognized. Local parties have competing interests in and differing degrees of support for the peace process. For example, in Afghanistan, war lords control much of the country and foster an illegitimate economy fueled by the smuggling of arms, drugs and other goods. Second, our work has consistently shown that effective reconstruction assistance cannot be provided without three essential elements: a secure environment, a strategic vision for the overall effort, and strong leadership. I will briefly discuss each of these.

Examples abound for the need for a secure environment to effectively provide humanitarian assistance. In Bosnia and Kosovo, humanitarian and other civilian workers were generally able to perform their tasks because they were supported by large NATO-led forces.

In contrast, throughout the post-conflict period in Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance workers have been at risk, due to ongoing security problems caused by domestic terrorism, longstanding rivalries among war lords, and the national government's lack of control over the majority of the country.

In our years of work in post-conflict situations, we learned that a strategic vision is an essential element for providing assistance effectively. In Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement provided a framework for assistance efforts, but lacked an overall vision for the operation. NATO, supported by the President of the United States, subsequently provided an overall vision for the mission by first extending the timeframe, and then tying the withdrawal of the NATO-led

forces to benchmarks, such as establishing functional national institutions and implementing democratic reforms.

Our work also highlights the need for strong leadership in post-conflict assistance. In Bosnia, for example, the international community created the Office of the High Representative to assist the parties in implementing the Dayton Agreement and to coordinate international assistance efforts. The international community later strengthened the High Representative's authority which allowed him to remove Bosnian officials who were hindering progress.

Let me turn to four key challenges in providing assistance. No. 1, ensuring sustained political and financial commitment for post-conflict assistance efforts is a key challenge because these efforts take longer, are more complicated, and are more expensive than originally envisioned. In Bosnia, stabilization efforts continue after 8 years, and there is no end date for withdrawing international troops, despite the initial intent to withdraw them in 1 year. In Kosovo, after 4 years, there is still no agreement on the final status of the territory. This makes it impossible to establish a timeframe for drawing down troops. Moreover, providing this assistance costs more than anticipated. Total U.S. military, civilian, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo from 1996 through 2002 was almost \$20 billion, a figure that significantly exceeded initial expectations.

A second challenge to effectively implementing assistance efforts is ensuring sufficient personnel to carry out operations and follow through on pledged funds. To give one example, in Afghanistan, inadequate and untimely donor support disrupted the World Food Program food assistance efforts. WFP's deliveries were about 33 percent below requirements for the April 2002 through January 2003 period due to lack of donor support.

No. 3, coordinating and directing assistance activities between multiple international donors and military components has been a challenge. In Afghanistan, coordination of international assistance, in general, was weak in 2002 primarily because the bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental assistance agencies prepared individual reconstruction strategies, had their own mandate and funding sources, and pursued development efforts in Afghanistan independently.

A fourth challenge is ensuring that local political leaders and influential groups support and participate in assistance activities. In Bosnia, the Bosnian-Serb leaders and their political leaders opposed the Dayton Peace Agreement and blocked assistance efforts at every turn. For example, they obstructed efforts to combat crime and corruption, thus solidifying hard-line opposition and extremist views.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, GAO will apply these important lessons as we conduct reviews of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Let me briefly summarize our ongoing work. First, we are monitoring the efforts of all U.S. agencies to provide humanitarian, economic development, security and reconstruction assistance to Iraq. This work responds to requests from the House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

Second, in a response to a request from the House Financial Services Committee, we are assessing U.S. efforts to locate and return the financial assets of the former regime to the Iraqi people.

Third, we are assessing the adequacy of the process used to award the initial USAID and DOD reconstruction contracts in Iraq.

And finally, we will begin work to account for the total and projected cost of the war and the post-war reconstruction efforts. We hope the GAO's work will provide Congress with critical information for effective oversight.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Dr. Westin.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Westin follows:]

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International
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House of Representatives

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FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Observations on
Post-Conflict Assistance
in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan

Statement of Susan S. Westin, Managing Director
International Affairs and Trade



GAO-03-980T

GAO
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Highlights

Highlights of GAO-03-980T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform

Why GAO Did This Study

The circumstances of armed conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan differed in many respects, but in all three cases the United States and the international community became involved in the wars and post-conflict assistance because of important national and international interests. Over the past 10 years, GAO has done extensive work assessing post-conflict assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo and, more recently, has evaluated such assistance to Afghanistan. GAO was asked to provide observations on assistance efforts in these countries that may be applicable to ongoing assistance in Iraq. Specifically, GAO assessed (1) the nature and extent of post-conflict assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan; (2) essential components for carrying out assistance effectively; (3) challenges to implementation; and (4) mechanisms used for accountability and oversight.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-980T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Susan Westin at (202) 512-4128 or westins@gao.gov.

July 18, 2003

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan

What GAO Found

Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—as well as in Iraq—is part of a broader, long-term assistance effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and democracy-building measures. While the post-conflict situations in these countries have varied, they have certain conditions in common—most notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance operations take place.


During years of work on post-conflict situations, GAO found that three key components are needed for effective implementation of assistance efforts:

- a secure environment where humanitarian and other civilian workers are able to perform their tasks;
- a strategic vision that looks beyond the immediate situation and plans for ongoing efforts; and
- strong leadership with the authority to direct assistance operations.

GAO also observed a number of challenges to implementing assistance operations, including the need for sustained political and financial commitment, adequate resources, coordinated assistance efforts, and support of the host government and civil society.

Finally, GAO found that the international community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability in and oversight of assistance operations.

World Food Program Assistance in Afghanistan



Source: World Food Program.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's observations on assistance efforts that followed military conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Although circumstances differed in many respects, in all three cases the United States and the international community became involved in the military conflicts and post-conflict assistance efforts in pursuit of important national and international interests, such as the need to prevent conflict in the Balkans from destabilizing Europe or to combat terrorists and their supporters in Afghanistan.

My comments today will cover observations on (1) the nature and extent of post-conflict assistance in these three locations; (2) the essential components for carrying out assistance effectively; (3) challenges to implementation; and (4) mechanisms used for accountability and oversight. My testimony is based primarily on GAO reports over the past 10 years on post-conflict assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent report on post-conflict food aid and agricultural assistance to Afghanistan.¹ (See app. I.) These comments should provide useful context in the subcommittee's oversight of post-conflict assistance to Iraq.

Summary

Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, is part of a broader, long-term assistance effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and democracy-building measures. The post-conflict situations in these locations have varied, but they have certain conditions in common—most notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance operations take place. We found that a secure environment, a strategic vision, and strong leadership are the key components needed for effective implementation of assistance efforts. In addition, we observed a number of challenges to these efforts, including the need for sustained political commitment, adequate human and financial resources to carry out operations, coordinated assistance, and the support of the host government and civil society. Our work also showed that the international

¹U.S. General Accounting Office, *Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability*, GAO-03-607 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).

community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability and oversight with regard to assistance operations.

Background

In Bosnia, conflict raged from 1992 through 1995 and involved the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia's three major ethnic groups. All were fighting for control of specific territories tied to each group's definition of its own state. During this time an estimated 2.3 million people became refugees or were internally displaced. NATO forces intervened in the conflict to support international humanitarian and peacekeeping operations beginning in 1993, culminating in a month-long bombing campaign against Bosnian-Serb forces in July 1995. This pressure and U.S.-led negotiating efforts resulted in a cease-fire and negotiation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. About 54,000 NATO-led troops were deployed beginning in late 1995 to enforce the military aspects of the agreement and provide security for humanitarian and other assistance activities. Currently, about 12,000 international troops remain in Bosnia to provide security, including 1,800 U.S. soldiers.

The conflict in and around the Serbian province of Kosovo between Yugoslav security forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents fighting for Kosovo's independence took place from early 1998 through mid-1999. NATO initiated a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999 to end Yugoslav aggression and subsequently deployed about 50,000 troops to enforce compliance with cease-fire and withdrawal agreements. Currently, there are about 25,000 NATO-led peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, including about 2,500 U.S. soldiers.

The conflict in Afghanistan extends back to the Soviet Union's 10-year occupation of the country that began in 1979, during which various countries, including the United States, backed Afghan resistance efforts. Three years after Soviet forces withdrew, the communist regime fell to the Afghan resistance—but unrest continued. The Taliban movement emerged in the mid 1990s, but was removed by coalition forces in late 2001 for harboring al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11. In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement was signed, which provided for interim governance of the country. Currently, about 4,600 International Security Assistance Force troops provide security for the city

of Kabul and the surrounding area and approximately 11,000 U.S.-led coalition forces continue to fight remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda.²

Nature and Extent of Post-Conflict Assistance

GAO's work over the past 10 years on Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent work on Afghanistan, indicate that post-conflict assistance is a broad, long-term effort that requires humanitarian, security, economic, governance, and democracy-building measures. For Bosnia and Kosovo, forces led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided overall security, and the international community developed country-specific and regional frameworks for rebuilding the country and province, respectively. Bosnia's plan included the 3- to 4-year, \$5.1 billion Priority Reconstruction Program, which provided humanitarian, economic, and other assistance based on needs assessments conducted by the World Bank and other international organizations.³ A number of international organizations involved in the Bosnia peace operation, including the Office of the High Representative, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, helped develop government institutions and supported democracy-building measures and police training. In Kosovo, a U.N. peace operation oversaw assistance through (1) the United Nations and other donors for housing winterization, refugee relief, and other short-term needs; (2) the medium-term Reconstruction and Recovery Program devised by the European Commission and the World Bank; and (3) programs to build a judiciary, a police force, and government institutions. The Bosnia- and Kosovo-specific programs were complemented in 1999 by the Stability Pact, which focused on encouraging democratization, human rights, economic reconstruction, and security throughout the region.

For Afghanistan, the World Food Program's (WFP) food assistance effort constituted the largest portion of humanitarian assistance in the post-conflict period. To determine the needs of the Afghan people, WFP conducted and continues to undertake periodic rapid food needs assessments and longer-term food and crop supply assessments. Based on

²NATO has agreed to lead the International Security Assistance Force beginning in August 2003.

³*The Priority Reconstruction Program: From Emergency to Sustainability*, prepared by the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Central Europe Department of the World Bank for the Donor Information Meeting, vols. 1, 2, and 3 (November 1996), and *Implementation of the Priority Reconstruction Program in 1996*, prepared by the European Commission and the Central Europe Department of the World Bank (March 1997).

the results of these reviews, WFP designs short-term emergency operations focusing on free distribution of food, as well as longer-term recovery operations including health, education, training, and infrastructure projects. Owing to the size of WFP's effort and its years of experience in Afghanistan, WFP provided much of the logistics support for other organizations operating in Afghanistan during 2002 and 2003. A range of humanitarian and longer-term development assistance is being provided through broad assistance programs developed by the United Nations and other multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental organizations. These programs include infrastructure rehabilitation, education, health, agriculture, and governance projects, among others.

Post-conflict assistance efforts differ in the extent of multilateral involvement. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is responsible for enforcing the military and security aspects of peace operations under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1031 and 1244, respectively. The United Nations, the European Union, and other international organizations are responsible for rebuilding political and civic institutions and the region's economies under U.N. resolutions and the Dayton Peace Agreement. In Afghanistan, the United States is one of many bilateral and multilateral donors of aid helping to implement the Bonn Agreement. In contrast, in post-conflict Iraq, the United States and Britain are occupying powers under international law and are recognized as such in U.N. Security Resolution 1483. The obligations of occupying forces as enumerated in international conventions include respecting the human rights of the local population; ensuring public order, safety, and health; protecting property; and facilitating humanitarian relief operations, among others.⁴

While the post-conflict situation in each location has varied, certain similarities are apparent, chief among them that assistance efforts continue to be provided in volatile and highly politicized environments where local parties have competing interests and differing degrees of support for the peace process. In Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb parties continue to oppose terms of the peace agreement, such as the freedom of ethnic minority refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their prewar homes. In Kosovo, groups of Kosovar Albanians and Serbs retain unauthorized weapons and commit acts of violence and intimidation

⁴The obligations of an occupying force, as specified in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

against ethnic minorities in violation of the peace agreements. In Afghanistan, warlords control much of the country and foster an illegitimate economy fueled by the smuggling of arms, drugs, and other goods. They also withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in customs duties collected at border points in the regions they control, depriving the central government of revenue to fund the country's reconstruction.

Essential Components for Effective Post- Conflict Assistance

Our work has consistently shown that effective reconstruction assistance cannot be provided without three essential elements: a secure environment, a strategic vision for the overall effort, and strong leadership.

Secure Environment

In Bosnia and Kosovo, humanitarian and other civilian workers were generally able to perform their tasks because they were supported by large NATO-led forces. In Bosnia, the NATO-led forces enforced the cease-fire, ensured the separation and progressive reduction of the three ethnically based armies from more than 400,000 soldiers and militia to 20,000 by 2003, and disbanded paramilitary police units. In Kosovo, the NATO-led force provided security by (1) ensuring that uniformed Yugoslav security forces withdrew from Kosovo as scheduled and remained outside the province and (2) monitoring the demilitarization and transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Despite the relative security in these two locations, various paramilitaries continued to operate, and sporadic violent incidents occurred against international workers and the local population. From 1996 through 2002, eight humanitarian workers were killed in Bosnia and from 1999 to 2002, two humanitarian workers were killed in Kosovo as a result of hostile action.

In contrast, throughout the post-conflict period in Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance workers have been at risk due to ongoing security problems caused by domestic terrorism, long-standing rivalries among warlords, and the national government's lack of control over the majority of the country. The 4,600-troop International Security Assistance Force operates only in Kabul and surrounding areas, while the mission of the approximately 11,000-troop (9,000 U.S. and 2,000 non-U.S. troops), U.S.-led coalition force is to root out the remnants of the Taliban and terrorist groups—not to provide security. In 2002 and 2003, the deteriorating security situation has been marked by terrorist attacks against the Afghan government, the Afghan people, and the international community—including humanitarian assistance workers. Among the incidents were attempted assassinations of the Minister of Defense and the

President; rocket attacks on U.S. and international military installations; and bombings in the center of Kabul, at International Security Assistance Force headquarters, and at U.N. compounds. On June 17, 2003, the U.N. Security Council expressed its concern over the increased number of attacks against humanitarian personnel, coalition forces, International Security Assistance Forces, and Afghan Transitional Administration targets by Taliban and other rebel elements. These incidents have disrupted humanitarian assistance and the overall recovery effort. Since the signing of the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, four assistance workers and 10 International Security Assistance Force troops were killed due to hostile action.

Strategic Vision

In our years of work on post-conflict situations, a key lesson learned is that a strategic vision is essential for providing assistance effectively. In Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement provided a framework for overall assistance efforts, but lacked an overall vision for the operation. This hindered both the military and civilian components of the peace operation from implementing the peace agreement. For example, the Dayton Agreement determined that the military operation in Bosnia would accomplish its security objectives and withdraw in about 1 year but did not address the security problem for the ongoing reconstruction efforts after that time. Recognizing this deficiency, NATO, supported by the President of the United States, subsequently provided an overall vision for the mission by first extending the time frame by 18 months and then tying the withdrawal of the NATO-led forces to benchmarks—such as establishing functional national institutions and implementing democratic reforms.

In Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement sets out a framework for establishing a new government. In addition, multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance have each developed independent strategies, which have resulted in a highly fragmented reconstruction effort. To bring coherence to the effort, the Afghan government developed a National Development Framework and Budget. The framework provides a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and broadly establishes national goals and policy directions. The budget articulates development projects intended to achieve national goals. However, despite the development of these documents, donor governments and assistance agencies have continued to develop their own strategies, as well as fund and implement projects outside the Afghan government's national budget.

Strong Leadership

Our work also highlights the need for strong leadership in post-conflict assistance. In Bosnia, for example, the international community created the Office of the High Representative to assist the parties in implementing the Dayton Agreement and coordinate international assistance efforts, but initially limited the High Representative to an advisory role. Frustrated by the slow pace of the agreement's implementation, the international community later strengthened the High Representative's authority, which allowed him to annul laws that impeded the peace process and to remove Bosnian officials who were hindering progress.

In Afghanistan, WFP recognized the need for strong leadership and created the position of Special Envoy of the Executive Director for the Afghan Region. The special envoy led and directed all WFP operations in Afghanistan and neighboring countries during the winter of 2001–2002, when the combination of weather and conflict was expected to increase the need for food assistance. WFP was thus able to consolidate control of all resources in the region, streamline its operations, and accelerate movement of assistance.⁵ WFP points to creation of the special envoy as one of the main reasons it was able to move record amounts of food into Afghanistan from November 2001 through January 2002. In December 2001 alone, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food, the single largest monthly food delivery within a complex emergency operation in WFP's history.

**Challenges to
Implementing
Assistance Operations**

Among the challenges to implementing post-conflict assistance operations that we have identified are ensuring sustained political and financial commitment, adequate human resources and funds to carry out operations, coordinated assistance efforts, and local support.

**Sustained Political and
Financial Commitment**

Ensuring sustained political and financial commitment for post-conflict assistance efforts is a key challenge because these efforts take longer, are more complicated, and are more expensive than envisioned. In Bosnia, reconstruction continues after 8 years, and there is no end date for withdrawing international troops, despite the initial intent to withdraw them in 1 year. Corruption is difficult to overcome and threatens successful implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. In Kosovo,

⁵The special envoy's term ran from November 2001 to May 2002. A second envoy was not appointed.

after 4 years, there is still no agreement on the final status of the territory—whether it will be a relatively autonomous province of Serbia or a sovereign entity. This makes it impossible to establish a time frame for a transition in assistance efforts. Moreover, providing this assistance costs more than anticipated. Total U.S. military, civilian, humanitarian, and reconstruction assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo from 1996 through 2002 was approximately \$19.7 billion—a figure that significantly exceeded initial expectations.

In Afghanistan, the preliminary needs assessment prepared by the international community estimated that between \$11.4 billion and \$18.1 billion in long-term development assistance would be needed over 10 years to rebuild infrastructure and the institutions of a stable Afghan state. Others have estimated that much more is required. For January 2002 through March 2003, donors pledged \$2.1 billion. However, only 27 percent, or \$499 million, was spent on major development projects such as roads and bridges; the remainder was spent on humanitarian assistance. Consequently, more than a year and a half of the 10-year reconstruction period has passed and little in the way of reconstruction has begun. For fiscal year 2002, U.S. assistance in Afghanistan totaled approximately \$717 million. The Department of Defense estimates that military costs in Afghanistan are currently about \$900 million per month, or \$10.8 billion annually.

Shortfalls in Providing Resources

Another challenge to effectively implementing assistance efforts is ensuring sufficient personnel to carry out operations and follow-through on pledged funds. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community has had difficulties providing civilian staff and the specialized police for security in the volatile post-conflict environment. For example, operations in Bosnia had a 40 percent shortfall in multinational special police trained to deal with civil disturbances from returns of refugees or from efforts to install elected officials. These shortfalls sometimes threatened security in potentially violent situations. In Kosovo, U.N. efforts to establish a civil administration, create municipal administrative structures, and foster democracy were hindered by the lack of qualified international administrators and staff. Delays in getting these staff on the ground and working allowed the Kosovo Liberation Army to temporarily run government institutions in an autocratic manner and made it difficult to regain international control.

In Afghanistan, inadequate and untimely donor support disrupted WFP's food assistance efforts. When the operation began in April 2002, WFP had

received only \$63.9 million, or 22 percent, of required resources. From April through June—the preharvest period when Afghan food supplies are traditionally at their lowest point—WFP was able to meet only 51 percent of the planned requirement for assistance. WFP’s actual deliveries were, on average, 33 percent below actual requirements for the April 2002 through January 2003 period. Lack of timely donor contributions forced WFP to reduce rations to returning refugees and internally displaced persons from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms.⁶ Lack of donor support also forced WFP and its implementing partners to delay, in some cases for up to 10 weeks, compensation promised to Afghans who participated in the food-for-work and food-for-asset-creation projects. WFP lost credibility with Afghans and nongovernmental organizations as a result. Similarly, resource shortages forced WFP to delay for up to 8 weeks in-kind payments of food in its civil service support program, which aimed to help the new government establish itself.

Coordinated Assistance Efforts

Coordinating and directing assistance activities between and among multiple international donors and military components has been a challenge. In Bosnia, 59 donor nations and international organizations—including NATO, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the World Bank, and nongovernmental organizations—had a role in assistance activities but did not always coordinate their actions. For example, the United Nations and NATO initially could not agree on who would control and reform the Bosnian special or paramilitary police units. For the first year of post-conflict operations, these special police forces impeded assistance activities. The NATO-led force finally agreed to define these special police forces as military units and disbanded them in 1997. In Kosovo, the need for overall coordination was recognized and addressed by giving the United Nations a central role in providing overall coordination for humanitarian affairs, civil administration activities, and institution building.

In Afghanistan, coordination of international assistance in general, and agricultural assistance in particular, was weak in 2002. From the beginning of the assistance effort, donors were urged to defer to the Afghan government regarding coordination. According to the United Nations,

⁶These rations are intended to provide sustenance to these groups until they reestablish their lives.

Afghan government authorities were responsible for coordination, and the international community was to operate and relate to the Afghan government in a coherent manner rather than through a series of disparate relationships.⁷ The Afghan government's attempt to exert leadership over the reconstruction process in 2002 was largely ineffective primarily because the bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental assistance agencies—including the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and others—prepared individual reconstruction strategies, had their own mandate and funding sources, and pursued development efforts in Afghanistan independently. In addition, according to the international community, the Afghan government lacked the capacity and resources to be an effective coordinator, and thus these responsibilities could not be delegated to it. In December 2002, the Afghan government instituted a new coordination mechanism, but this mechanism has not surmounted conditions that prevented effective coordination throughout 2002.

Ensuring Local-Level Support and Participation

Another challenge is ensuring that local political leaders and influential groups support and participate in assistance activities. In Bosnia, the Bosnian-Serb leaders and their political parties opposed the Dayton Peace Agreement and blocked assistance efforts at every turn. For example, they tried to block the creation of a state border service to help all Bosnians move freely and obstructed efforts to combat crime and corruption, thus solidifying hard-line opposition and extremist views. In mid-1997, when donor nations and organizations started linking their economic assistance to compliance with the Dayton Agreement, some Bosnian-Serb leaders began implementing some of the agreement's key provisions.

Although Afghanistan's central government is working in partnership with the international community to implement the Bonn Agreement and rebuild the country, warlords control much of the country and foster an illegitimate economy. They control private armies of tens of thousands of armed men, while the international community—led by the U.S. military—struggles to train a new Afghan national army. Meanwhile, the Taliban regime was not party to the Bonn Agreement, and remnants of the regime continue to engage in guerilla attacks against the government and the international community.

⁷Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program for the Afghan People, January 17, 2002.

Mechanisms Used for Accountability and Oversight

Over the course of our work, we found that the international community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability in and oversight of assistance operations.

First, the international community has monitored the extent to which post-conflict assistance achieved its objectives through reports from the United Nations and the international coordinating mechanisms. Individual donors and agencies also have monitored their respective on-the-ground operations. For example, the United States monitors aid through the U.S. Agency for International Development and USAID's inspector general.

In Bosnia, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)—a group of 59 countries and international organizations that sponsors and directs the peace implementation process—oversaw humanitarian and reconstruction programs, set objectives for the operation, monitored progress toward those goals, and established mission reconstruction and other benchmarks in the spring of 1998. The High Representative in Bosnia, whose many responsibilities include monitoring implementation of the Dayton Agreement, reports to the Peace Implementation Council on progress and obstacles in this area.

In Kosovo, the High-Level Steering Group (comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) performed a similar guidance and oversight role. It set priorities for an action plan to rebuild Kosovo and to repair the economies of the neighboring countries through the Stability Pact. Moreover, the U.N. interim administration in Kosovo was responsible for monitoring and reporting on all aspects of the peace operation, including humanitarian and economic reconstruction efforts.

In Afghanistan, WFP has used a number of real-time monitoring mechanisms to track the distribution of commodities. Our review of WFP data suggested that food distributions have been effective and losses minimal. WFP data indicated that in Afghanistan, on average, 2.4 monitoring visits were conducted on food aid projects implemented between April 2002 and November 2003.

In addition to WFP monitors, private voluntary organization implementing partners who distribute food at the local beneficiary level make monitoring visits in areas where WFP staff cannot travel due to security

concerns. During our visits to project and warehouse sites in Afghanistan, we observed orderly and efficient storage, handling, and distribution of food assistance. (Because of security restrictions, we were able to conduct only limited site visits in Afghanistan.) WFP's internal auditor reviewed its monitoring operations in Afghanistan in August 2002 and found no material weaknesses. USAID has also conducted periodic monitoring of WFP activities and has not found any major flaws in its operations.

Over the past 10 years, GAO has evaluated assistance efforts in 16 post-conflict emergencies, including those in Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Specifically, these evaluations have focused on governance, democracy-building, rule of law, anticorruption, economic, military, food, agriculture, demining, refugee, and internally displaced person assistance projects. In broader terms, our work has examined the progress toward achieving the goals of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the military and political settlements for Kosovo, as well as the obstacles to achieving U.S. policy goals in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to any questions you or other members may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Susan Westin at (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this testimony were Phillip J. Thomas, David M. Bruno, Janey Cohen, B. Patrick Hickey, Judy McCloskey, Tetsuo Miyabara, and Alexandre Tiersky.

Appendix I: Selected GAO Reports on Post-conflict Situations

Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability. GAO-03-607. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-03-792R. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.

Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key Efforts Are Lagging. GAO-02-569. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2002.

Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations. GAO-02-707R. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002.

U.N. Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal Years 1996-2001. GAO-02-294. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2002.

Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. T-NSIAD-00-219. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000.

Bosnia Peace Operation: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. GAO/NSIAD-00-156. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2000.

Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability. NSIAD-00-125BR. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2000.

Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force. GAO/NSIAD-99-19. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 1998.

Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated as International Involvement Increased. GAO/NSIAD-98-138. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 1998.

Former Yugoslavia: War Crimes Tribunal's Workload Exceeds Capacity. GAO/NSIAD-98-134. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1998.

Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few Challenges Emerging. GAO/NSIAD-98-160. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1998.

Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement's Goals—An Update. T-NSIAD-97-216. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 1997.

Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's Goals. GAO/NSIAD-97-132. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1997.

United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace. NSIAD-97-34. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 1997.

Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Seem Likely to Exceed DOD's Estimate. GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 1996.

Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers. GAO/NSIAD-95-113. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 1995.

Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia. GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1994.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Collins, thank you.

Dr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to be here, and I thank you and all of the members of the committee for their support of the Armed Forces in the field and our ongoing efforts for relief and reconstruction.

I have a longer statement which, I will presume, will be included in the record, sir, and so I will just summarize a few of the high points.

U.S. Government planning for relief and reconstruction in Iraq was conducted on an interagency basis and was well-coordinated with CENTCOM. Indeed, between Afghanistan and Iraq, I have spent enough time with the two gentlemen to my left to be declared a blood relative of either one of them.

As a result of careful planning in the scale and professionalism of our combat forces, the widely predicted humanitarian crisis in Iraq was averted. There's been no food crisis, no widespread outbreaks of disease, no systematic human rights abuses, no significant ethnic reprisals, no large-scale population displacements, and no destabilization of states in the region, all of which were problems for us that we considered in our planning.

America owes much to the excellent work of its Armed Forces but also to the interagency humanitarian planners and to Jay Garner and his team and his successor, Ambassador Bremer and his team. The Coalition Provisional Authority is working closely together with the United Nations under Mr. Sergio de Mello, as well as a number of NGO partners and friends.

I recently found out that the U.N. and the CPA have both exchanged liaison officers, and the work of the U.N. in a number of areas, particularly in the distribution of food, has been both critical and irreplaceable. In the U.S. Government effort, Ambassador Bremer has maintained the positive momentum on General Garner's near-term tasks that were talked about previously, and he had made great progress on mid to long-term goals. These are his priorities, and I will speak to a few of them.

The first priority for our forces and for the CPA is security. We must eliminate the resistance and safeguard our people, our most precious asset. Daily progress is evident on a number of fronts. Reformation and reconstitution of the Iraqi Police Force. We now have 34,000 Iraqi police that have been rehired, many more thousands in training. Training of a few thousand additional facility protection forces, establishment of an international stabilization force, which will include participation of about two dozen nations, and the creation of a new Iraqi Army of 40,000, 12,000 of whom should be trained by the end of the first year.

A second critical priority is rapid improvement in the quality of life of the Iraqi people through the restoration of basic services. Much there, of course, remains to be done, especially in regards to the Iraqi electrical system. I am pleased to report that the CPA now estimates that they will achieve, by the end of July or the first week in August, the prewar electrical production level. This is still a problem for the future. The demand is about 6,000 megawatts, and the supply before the war was only 4,000. So a lot needs to be done.

A third critical priority is to maximize international contributions. United States and international organizations have raised over \$2.3 billion of international contribution. And Ambassador Bremer has made good use of the vested and seized assets. Added to this, of course, will be the revenue from the production of oil, which again, will be a few billion dollars in the remainder of this year.

Economic development is a fourth priority and CPA is enacting a number of promising initiatives. They recently approved the national budget. They have a planned currency reform, and there is a new major infrastructure investment project, which is also an attempt not only to jump start infrastructure improvement, but also to provide employment for unemployed Iraqis.

Finally, Iraqi self-government is the ultimate goal and progress has been made there at the local, ministerial and national levels. The recent establishment of the Governing Council is a significant milestone. Constitutional development will follow. National elections will follow that. And that, of course, will bring us close to our ultimate goal in the country.

In conclusion, careful interagency planning and cooperation, combined with the skill and professionalism of our combat forces, helped avert a humanitarian crisis and laid the groundwork for General Garner to quickly establish positive momentum. Ambassador Bremer has built on this momentum and has expanded the coalition's reconstruction efforts. In the prewar combat and stabilization phases of this operation, interagency and international cooperation in Washington and in the field, I believe, has been excellent.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Dr. Collins.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Collins follows:]

Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations
House of Representatives
18 July 2003

Joseph J. Collins
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Stability Operations

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am honored to be here, and I thank the members of the Committee for their support of our Armed Forces in the field and the ongoing relief and recovery efforts in Iraq.

Before the President made the decision to use force to end Saddam Hussein's regime, officials throughout the government engaged in careful planning to address humanitarian, civil-military, and reconstruction issues related to such an endeavor. These officials and their leaders realized that even a decisive military victory would ultimately be compromised, if humanitarian issues were not adequately addressed. The subsequent planning effort drew on lessons learned from recent experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. At the same time, the planning effort recognized that Iraq represented a unique situation in terms of U.S. national objectives, culture, and Saddam's legacy of oppression.

United States Government planning for relief and reconstruction in Iraq was conducted by an interagency group, which included the State Department, USAID, Department of Defense and other agencies. This group established a humanitarian planning team of experts to work with the United States Central Command to develop a single, coordinated U.S. government humanitarian relief plan. Members of the group and the humanitarian planning team conducted extensive outreach with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, regional allies, and other actors to help further planning efforts. Our humanitarian relief plan -- approved by the President well before conflict began -- focused on six general principles:

- **Effective interagency coordination,**
- **Protection of humanitarian infrastructure and minimization of the disruption of civilian life,**
- **US government and international stockpiling of relief supplies,**
- **Facilitation and funding of UN agencies and NGOs,**

- **Effective civil-military coordination, and**
- **Preparation for the resumption of the public distribution system for food and medicines.**

As a result of careful planning and the skill and professionalism of our combat forces, the widely-predicted humanitarian crisis in Iraq was averted. There has been no food crisis, no widespread outbreaks of disease, no systematic human rights abuses, no significant ethnic reprisals, no large-scale population displacements, and no destabilization of states in the region.

The initial interagency planning allowed Lt. General (ret.) Jay Garner and his team, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), to begin focusing on the early stages of relief and recovery. Before the war began, the ORHA team grew from a small headquarters-planning cell in Washington to an interagency team of hundreds of dedicated professionals. It deployed to the field before Baghdad fell.

General Garner identified the initial critical tasks essential for establishing success in Iraq. He populated his team with a range of experts from across the U.S. Government and built on the existing civil-military coordination mechanisms and the established relationships with international and non-governmental organizations to further his objectives. By the time General Garner turned the reins over to Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, he had established palpable momentum on relief and recovery activities.

Following Garner's successful start, Ambassador Bremer developed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) into a large-scale interagency team with representation from a myriad of agencies and organizations, now spread throughout Iraq. Ambassador Bremer enjoys the support of representatives from several Coalition nations and benefits from productive relationships with international and non-governmental organizations.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 provided international recognition of the CPA and defined the role of the United Nations in post-war Iraq. Ambassador Bremer coordinates closely with the UN Special Representative for Iraq, Mr. Sergio de Mello, and both leaders have exchanged liaison officers.

In all, Ambassador Bremer has maintained the positive momentum on General Garner's critical near-term tasks and has made great progress on CPA goals:

- The leading CPA priority remains security. Recovery efforts in Iraq will not flourish until a secure and stable environment is established and considerable effort has been focused on this task. Daily progress is evident

on many fronts: reformation and reconstitution of the Iraqi Police Force, training of ministry and facility protection forces, establishment of an international stabilization force, and creation of a New Iraqi Army.

- A second critical priority is rapid improvement in the quality of life of the Iraqi people through the restoration of basic services. Much has been accomplished in the areas of food delivery, health, power, water, and sanitation. Much remains to be done, especially in regards to the Iraqi electrical system.
- A third critical priority is to maximize international contributions to Iraq's recovery. Many countries have already contributed to this effort through military, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction assistance, and financial contributions. A fall donor's conference will further energize international contributions.
- Economic development is a fourth priority and the CPA is enacting a number of promising initiatives in this area. The recently approved budget for the remainder of 2003 is a significant step forward, as are the planned currency reform and infrastructure investment projects.
- Finally, Iraqi self-government is the ultimate goal in Iraq. Progress is evident on this front at the local, ministerial, and national levels. The recent establishment of the Governing Council of Iraq is a significant milestone, to be followed by a constitutional development process, and, in time, national elections, leading to a democratically-elected government for a free Iraq.

With regard to international organizations and non-governmental organizations, the U.S. Government (USG) recognized even before the conflict began that it could not "go it alone" on relief and recovery activities in Iraq. Consequently, the USG engaged in significant outreach efforts to facilitate the preparation of these organizations and established multiple liaison and civil-military coordination activities, as well as a pre-war humanitarian mapping effort. A particularly successful effort in this area was the establishment, with the Kuwaiti Government, of a Humanitarian Operations Center in Kuwait to facilitate information-sharing, planning, and entry of NGOs into Iraq.

In conclusion, careful interagency planning and cooperation combined with the skill and professionalism of our combat forces helped avert a humanitarian crisis in Iraq and laid the groundwork for General Garner to quickly establish positive momentum on humanitarian relief and recovery activities. Ambassador Bremer

has been able to build on his predecessor's efforts to expand Coalition reconstruction efforts. In the pre-crisis, combat, and stabilization phases of this operation, interagency and international cooperation in Washington and in the field has been excellent. Significant progress is being made in Iraq, but much remains to be done.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Greene.

Mr. GREENE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to speak with you again today regarding the current challenges in the relief arena in Iraq. I just want to say 1 week after the last time I spoke before this committee, I was on the West Bank working on some refugee issues, and I had met with some of the same people that you had met with, and they really appreciate the time and the way you went about your meetings there. So thank you, sir.

We remain in the early stages of Iraq's recovery and there are two major relief and initial reconstruction challenges facing the CPA and the U.N. system that fall within my area of responsibility, which is preventing further population displacements and managing refugee returns.

Certain groups in Iraq are vulnerable, including Palestinians, some Iranians and displaced Arabs, and they are increasingly intimidated and often forced to leave land and homes given to them under the former Iraqi regime. About 4,000 Palestinians are currently taking shelter in very difficult conditions in a stadium in Baghdad. In northern Iraq, the reintegration of 800,000 internally displaced Iraqis from previous conflicts constitutes an additional long-term challenge to the stability of Iraq. The issues to be faced there include property dispute resolution, compensation and assistance to those displaced by the returning indigenous populations. Tensions have already flared in some communities between returning Kurds and Arab settlers.

The CPA and others have said the conditions do not yet exist for large-scale organized refugee returns. And until security, legal protection and infrastructure problems are addressed, the system will not be prepared to handle massive refugee repatriation. And we estimate there's about 500,000 refugees or close-to-refugee status who want to return quickly. We are working closely with the CPA and various U.N. agencies to create the conditions that will ultimately ensure well-managed, sustainable returns. And in the expected economic transformation of Iraq, it is essential to ensure that the most vulnerable, including returning refugees and internally displaced people, especially women and children, have access to the resources they need.

Regarding lessons identified, there are about four key lessons I want to point out—or three key lessons that I, want to point out here regarding my responsibilities.

First is the importance of early funding and contingency planning. For Iraq, the key agencies, as Dr. Collins said, within the U.S. Government, carried out quiet contingency planning. As a result, by February, our plans were complete, and we were able to present publicly our humanitarian preparations to minimize suffering in Iraq in the event of conflict. A major part of these preparations were stockpiles of food and assistance for up to a million people by AID.

Second, the importance of engaging the multilateral system, we engaged early and often with senior levels of the United Nations to have them prepare to carry out their operations.

Third was fostering military planning for humanitarian issues and civil military cooperation. Failure to conduct such planning caused some confusion and delays in the Balkans. One of the les-

sons of the Kosovo operation was recognition of the need to minimize internal and external displacements of people. We applied these lessons in Afghanistan taking steps to feed the Afghan people while the allied coalition destroyed the regime that oppressed them. The result of U.S. policy was that very few people left Afghanistan and 2 million people were able to return shortly. In the case of Iraq, the international community anticipated the exodus of over a million refugees and internally displaced persons. In fact, thanks to the rapid conclusion of hostilities and our humanitarian preparations, and some of the preplanning we talked about, there was very little in terms of population displacements.

In terms of the challenges that we face now in my areas of responsibility, clearly the first challenge is security. Security is the fundamental precondition for recovery from conflict. Refugees and IDP returns will not be sustained unless security improves.

Humanitarian action, reconstruction, society-building in general are heavily dependent on the restoration of law and order and public safety. Clearly, as Chief Administrator Bremer says, the first job of any government is to provide security and maintain law and order, and that's the most important challenge in Iraq now.

Second, property rights disputes need to be channeled and settled. We remain concerned that pent-up ethnic and religious tensions in Iraqi society will encourage human rights abuses and even a humanitarian crisis. Such tensions have already exacerbated land tenure disputes and competing property claims inherent in any return effort.

Third, human rights abuses. We're concerned that Iraqi regime's legacy of terror and persecution might encourage a popular backlash of retribution and score-settling. To date, as Dr. Collins pointed out, such retribution has been limited thanks in part to DART teams from AID, civil affairs units, U.N. agencies and NGO's, who are identifying potential tensions and working with community leaders to diffuse them. However, these tensions are still simmering and need to be carefully monitored and addressed if we are to avoid population displacements.

Fourth, coordination between the CPA and U.N. agencies, and this is about getting value out of the U.N. system and letting the U.N. do the things that they have proven successful in other exercises. President Bush said that the United Nations has a vital role in play in postconflict Iraq. The U.N. brings resources and experience to Iraq's recovery efforts, and the administration and CPA are working to clarify the roles and responsibilities with U.N. agencies in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, we're all echoing the same themes here. First, there is no humanitarian crisis in Iraq now. Second, a lot of postconflict progress has been made because of some incredible efforts on a number of fronts by a number of incredibly talented and dedicated people. Third, but a lot more needs to happen quickly. And, fourth, security and public safety is key. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Greene.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Greene follows:]

Richard Greene
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Population, Refugees, and Migration

Testimony to House Government Reform Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations

July 18, 2003

Rayburn House Office Building - Room 2318

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I thank you for the chance to speak with you again today regarding the current challenges in the relief arena in Iraq. In addition, I will reflect on the lessons we have identified from past humanitarian operations and how they shaped our approach to these issues in Iraq. Finally, I will discuss some of the challenges we now face in Iraq in my area of responsibility.

The State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration implements U.S. overseas refugee and related humanitarian policy: fostering physical and legal protection for refugees and conflict victims, facilitating refugee returns when conditions allow, and maximizing the efficiency of the UN, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations working on these issues.

CHALLENGES

We remain in the early stages of Iraq's recovery and there are two major relief and initial reconstruction challenges facing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the UN system that fall within my area of responsibility: preventing further population displacements and managing refugee returns.

Certain population groups are especially vulnerable, including Palestinians and Iranian minorities. They are increasingly intimidated and often forced to leave land and homes given to them under the former Iraqi regime. About 4,000 Palestinians are currently taking shelter in very difficult conditions in a stadium in Baghdad, where UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are providing food, water and other assistance. In northern

Iraq, the reintegration of 800,000 internally displaced Iraqis from previous conflicts constitutes an additional long-term challenge in northern Iraq. Issues to be faced include property dispute resolution and compensation and assistance to those displaced by the returning indigenous population. Tensions have already flared in some communities between returning Kurds and Arab settlers.

The CPA and UNHCR have said that the conditions do not yet exist for large-scale organized refugee returns, and we strongly agree with them. Until security, legal protection, and infrastructure problems are addressed, the system will not be prepared to handle massive refugee repatriation. Spontaneous returns, however, are already taking place from neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Iran. There is also pressure for large scale returns from among the 200,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran. Furthermore, many European countries are also seeking to return their significant caseloads of Iraqi asylum-seekers. We are working closely with the CPA and various UN agencies to create the conditions that will ultimately ensure well-managed, sustainable large-scale returns. In the shift from Iraq's centrally managed economy to a market economy, it will also be important to ensure that the most vulnerable, including returning refugees and internally displaced persons, especially women and children, continue to have access to the resources they need.

LESSONS IDENTIFIED

The international community was able to avert the humanitarian crisis many had predicted in Iraq. In part, this reflected the lessons identified and applied from previous humanitarian crises and post-conflict operations. Examples include:

1. **Contingency planning.** Afghanistan taught us that humanitarian interagency contingency planning is a painstaking process, but it is absolutely vital to the success of the overall operation. For Iraq, the key agencies within the U.S. Government carried out quiet contingency planning. As a result, by February, our plans were complete and we were able to present publicly our humanitarian preparations to minimize suffering in Iraq in the event of conflict. A part of these preparations were USAID's stockpiles to assist one million in displaced persons.

2. **Engaging the multilateral system.** We engaged early with senior levels of the United Nations and other international organizations, and encouraged them to begin their own contingency planning. We provided funding to these organizations to allow them to set up response mechanisms and deploy programs as soon as security allowed. Our objective was to prepare the UN's operational humanitarian agencies for the key roles they would play in meeting humanitarian needs in post-war Iraq and to establish a UN mission.

3. **Fostering military planning for humanitarian issues and civil-military cooperation.** Failure to conduct such planning caused some confusion and delays in the Balkans. Doing it in advance of the Iraq operation helped forge civil-military consensus about what was needed and who would do what.

4. **Evaluating in advance the humanitarian impact of action taken or not taken.** U.S. military operations have evolved to the point where we build in the requirements to deal with the inevitable humanitarian consequences of conflict. One of the lessons of the Kosovo operation was recognition of the need to minimize internal and external displacement of people. The U.S. Government applied these lessons in Afghanistan, taking steps to feed the Afghan people while the allied coalition destroyed the regime that oppressed them. The result of U.S. policy was that very few people left Afghanistan, and two million were able to return to their homes. In the case of Iraq, the international community anticipated the exodus of over a million refugees and internally displaced. In fact, thanks to the rapid conclusion of hostilities and our humanitarian preparations, very few people were displaced. Successful U.S. measures included information operations broadcasts and tangible evidence of the pre-positioning of relief supplies and services. We accurately predicted a conflict would disrupt the Public Distribution System, which provided food to almost all Iraqis. USAID was particularly successful working with WFP and others to prepare for the rapid resumption of the program, which successfully occurred in June.

CURRENT CHALLENGES

Despite the lessons identified from past experiences - and we are getting better at learning from some of these lessons - there remain significant impediments to managing refugee returns and preventing further population displacements - two important planks in Iraqi reconstruction and recovery efforts.

- **Security.** It has become a cliché - but no less true - that security is the fundamental precondition for recovery from conflict. Refugees and IDPs will not return to their homes unless security improves. Humanitarian action, reconstruction, and society-building in general, are heavily dependent on the restoration of law and order and public safety. Clearly, as Chief Administrator Bremer says, "The first job of any government is to provide security and maintain law and order." Clearly, this is the most important challenge now
- **Property rights disputes.** We remain concerned that pent-up ethnic and religious tensions in Iraqi society will encourage human rights abuses and even a humanitarian crisis. Such tensions have already exacerbated land tenure disputes and competing property claims inherent in any return effort. A proper system of adjudication needs to be put in place before large-scale returns can begin. A U.S.-led fact-finding commission has reported with recommendations for a course of action. Actual adjudication will be left to Iraqi courts.
- **Human rights abuses.** We were concerned that the Iraqi regime's legacy of terror and persecution might encourage a popular backlash of retribution and score settling. To date, such retribution has been limited, thanks in part to the DART, civil affairs units, the UN agencies, and NGOs who are identifying potential tensions and working with community leaders to defuse them. However, these tensions are still simmering and need to be carefully monitored and addressed if we are to avoid population displacement.
- **Coordination between the CPA and UN Agencies.**
- President Bush said that the United Nations has a vital role to play in post-conflict Iraq. The UN brings resources and experience to Iraq's recovery efforts. The Administration and CPA are working to clarify the roles

and responsibilities with UN agencies in Iraq. A productive interaction between the UN and the Coalition will be critical to Iraqi and international support for the reconstruction effort.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the U.S. Government's humanitarian priorities will continue to highlight the promotion and implementation of strategies that prevent further population displacements and ensure the sustainable reintegration of returning refugees and internally displaced persons. Our emphasis will be on the protection of these populations to prevent displacements and ensure sustainability of returns. Sustainability of returns is closely tied to the CPA's efforts to transform the Iraqi economy. We will work closely with our international partners that have protection mandates, particularly the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee for the Red Cross, to ensure that they have the resources they need to do their jobs. Finally, we will continue to support the CPA in working with international and non-governmental organizations that have as their focus protection and assistance to the refugees, returnees, and IDPs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss these issues with the Subcommittee. I would be pleased to take your questions at this time.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Kunder.

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I request my statement be included in its entirety, please.

We very much appreciate the opportunity to testify today and the interest of the committee in this important set of issues. I'll just briefly touch on three critical elements from my testimony: Planning issues, partnership issues, and the question of standby capacity.

In terms of planning, in response to some of the questions raised by the chairman and the committee members earlier, we very much had a detailed planning process going back to last fall. We did, in fact, talk to the best experts we could find on Iraq, NGO representatives who had worked there, U.N. representatives who had worked there, academic experts. We literally got these panels together in areas like health and education and tried to get the best information we could, because we obviously had not been on the ground, and then based on our experience in dozens of previous disaster responses, we came up with planning targets. Obviously, we could bring more information to the committee on the planning documents themselves, but I just wanted to assure the chairman that there was a very substantial and detailed planning process which led to the outcomes described earlier, which is to say no humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

In terms of partners, a number of members of the panel raised the question of multilateral participation. Obviously the U.N. is on the ground, has been on the ground, and a number of grants have been made to U.N. agencies, to UNICEF, to the World Food Program, to the World Health Organization. There is already substantial engagement with the multilateral organizations. With the arrival on the scene of the special representative of the Secretary General, Sergio de Mello, and his close relationship with Ambassador Bremer, I think that's going to be strengthened.

But I want to assure the chairman that this work has been ongoing. We have been giving money to UNICEF, World Health Organization, World Food Program for months now. Same way with our NGO partners. And I'm sure you'll hear from some of the NGO's, and I say as a former NGO officer myself, clearly there are complex issues when the NGO's must operate in a wartime environment. But we are pleased that we have more than 20 NGO partners on the ground with USAID right now. We understand the complexities of dealing in an environment where the chain of command is primarily military because of ongoing operations, but we believe we have worked out and continue to work out good relations with our NGO partners on the ground.

Third and last topic I'd just highlight is the question of standby capacity. Ten years ago when I worked in Somalia, we had relatively little idea of what skill sets we would need, but now, based on our experience in Somalia, Bosnia, a lot of these crises, we understand what sorts of troops, if you will, civilian troops, we'll need to deploy: human rights monitors, people who can rebuild ministries that have been destroyed, police trainers. And what we've advocated and what the statement speaks to is the need to look at the question of having standby capacity in these areas.

Just as we would not think of going into war without having standby pilots and tank commanders and mortar units, we've got to start thinking as a government, we believe at AID, of having these categories of technical experts on call and ready to go, because just as the questions from the committee suggested earlier, we need these things as soon as our soldiers take the ground and look over their shoulders and look for support in rebuilding the country to ensure stability.

Right now what we do is we draw upon excellent partners in the U.N. system and the NGO's and within our own technical staff, but we don't have the kind of standby capacity that we can drop in in those critical early weeks and months to really make a difference in stability and reconstruction.

Overall, sir, the U.S. Agency for International Development has provided \$829 million in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan—excuse me, in Iraq. We know we've got a lot more work to do. We think we've averted the humanitarian crisis and jump-started the reconstruction effort. And with Ambassador Bremer's continued leadership, we would echo what General Garner said earlier, that we think we have a cup half full rather than half empty. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Kunder.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder follows:]

James Kunder
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Asia and the Near East
U.S. Agency for International Development

Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations
House of Representatives

On Humanitarian Assistance Following
Military operations: Overcoming Barriers, Part II

Washington, DC
July 18, 2003

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am honored to be here today to discuss the humanitarian effort that followed military operations in Iraq from the perspective of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Humanitarian Response to the Iraq Conflict

Thanks to early, prudent, and thorough contingency planning that began last fall, the pre-positioning of emergency supplies, and careful coordination within the U.S. Government, and with private sector partners and international humanitarian organizations, the humanitarian crisis in Iraq that many had predicted was avoided. Consequently, a major reconstruction effort was initiated quickly upon the cessation of large-scale military operations.

Working closely with other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including with our military colleagues, and drawing upon extensive post-conflict reconstruction efforts over the past several decades, USAID undertook an early planning process to identify likely humanitarian needs and prepare to meet those needs. USAID identified four categories of required humanitarian and reconstruction assistance that it would be called upon by the President to meet. These were: (1) urgent relief in the immediate aftermath of military actions; (2) food requirements to restart the ration system; (3) small, quick-impact projects to jump-start the transition to stability in Iraq; and (4) longer-term major reconstruction projects to return normal life for the majority of Iraqis.

In the first category, urgent relief, USAID mobilized quickly, pre-positioning staff in neighboring countries while military operations were ongoing. In fact, USAID deployed to the region its largest ever Disaster Assistance Response Team ("DART" team) outside of search and rescue teams. At its peak there were 65 people, working from Turkey, Jordan and Kuwait and prepared to respond to potential urgent humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. In addition, USAID stockpiled emergency relief supplies including water tanks, hygiene kits, health kits, plastic sheeting for shelter, and blankets.

Second, to ensure food would be available in the aftermath of the conflict, USAID provided the World Food Program (WFP) substantial quantities of commodities for emergency food distributions. Timely USAID grants, including \$60 million for logistics and \$200 million for regional purchases, helped prepare WFP to undertake the largest mobilization operation that this United Nations organization has ever carried out. Following the end of the war, WFP successfully renegotiated approximately 1.4 million metric tons of Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program contracts and accessed additional U.N. Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) resources for operational costs. These combined tonnages mean that the 2.4 million metric ton pipeline for WFP's six-month emergency operation is fully resourced. In addition, the U.S. Government, through its food aid programs, including P.L. 480 Title II, section 416(b), and the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, has committed about \$230 million for nearly 255,500 metric tons of additional food for Iraq.

On June 1, Iraq's ration distribution, which provides food to all Iraqis, and is the sole source of food for 60 percent of the population, was restarted, thanks to the work of WFP, Iraq's Ministry of Trade, and coalition forces. As a result of careful preparations and planning, there has been no food crisis in Iraq.

Third, USAID launched a number of small, quick-impact programs as soon as regions of Iraq became secure enough for our personnel. For example, USAID grants are currently helping the town council in Umm Qasr, Iraq's principal deep water port, get up and running and funding sports activities for young people there. One of the lessons we have learned from USAID's work in other failed or reconstructing societies is the need to keep young people, especially young men, off the streets, employed or in school, and in healthy activities such as sports. Unless they are occupied, young men are often a source of disruption,

for they can be easily lured into looting or organized crime and violence.

Lastly, USAID is overseeing a substantial reconstruction effort, which is focused on critical areas that will contribute to substantial improvements in the lives of the Iraqi people. These efforts include: rebuilding electricity, water, sanitation, and infrastructure; rehabilitating ports, airports, and public buildings; and revitalizing Iraq's health, education, and local governance.

USAID's reconstruction team has achieved a number of accomplishments since the conflict's end.

- Despite widely reported incidents of sabotage and looting that have hampered the full restoration of electrical power, Iraqi national electrical generation has been substantially increased from the immediate post-conflict condition. As of July 11, national electrical generation was at 3,200 megawatts, which is about 75 percent of the highest pre-war level.
- Systems and facilities are being restored to open Basra International Airport and Baghdad International Airport to commercial traffic.
- Chemicals and water purification tablets were delivered for water treatment for communities in 15 governorates of south and central Iraq.
- Over 22.3 million doses of vaccines were purchased to cover 4.2 million children and 700,000 pregnant women.
- Plus, as of July 1, more than 80,266 tons of food commodities have been dispatched at the Umm Qasr port, where USAID-funded crews are both dredging the harbor and refurbishing the grain storage silos.
- The local governance team has begun implementation of an interim neighborhood council advisory structure to represent the population in the Baghdad metropolitan area. Such councils now represent over 85 neighborhoods (over 5 million Baghdadis), and select members of the nine district councils and the Baghdad city council. The Interim Baghdad Advisory Council was officially inaugurated July 7.

In each of these humanitarian assistance efforts, USAID has worked closely with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations within and outside the United Nations system, and the for-profit private sector. These organizations are our indispensable partners in post-conflict humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. Unleashing the enormous capacity of the American private sector, both non-profit and for-profit, has been a key component of the U.S. Government's ability to alleviate human suffering as wars end. Iraq has been no exception. I should note that, as a former officer of an American NGO myself, I am aware that the independence and strong humanitarian ideals of the U.S. NGO community sometimes require such organizations to engage in soul-searching when called upon to participate in the immediate aftermath of military operations. But, we at USAID are proud that we are working with more than twenty NGO partners in Iraq.

Lessons Identified

Let me turn briefly to the broader questions raised by the Subcommittee of the organizational lessons we have learned in Iraq and in many previous humanitarian environments, to suggest ways we can continue to improve our performance. First, let me say that the President's decision to create the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and the follow-on Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was the right decision from the perspective of effective humanitarian and reconstruction programs. These structures have allowed all agencies of the U.S. Government to work together under a unified management system, in order to manage perhaps the most complex humanitarian and reconstruction effort we have undertaken since the end of World War II and the Marshall Plan. In such complex undertakings, and especially in the chaotic immediate aftermath of war, coordination requirements will inevitably arise, and they have arisen within ORHA and CPA. Overall, however, the President's decision to create these coordinating entities is a quantum leap forward in how the U.S. Government can and should respond to humanitarian crises. The USAID mission director in Baghdad, and our regional offices throughout the country, are fully integrated into the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Looking forward, USAID's experience in hundreds of responses to natural and man-made humanitarian crises suggest two areas in which we could make further improvements in our capacity. These are (1) further integration of civilian-military planning; and (2) increased stand-by capacity for critical humanitarian tasks.

1. **Further integration of civilian-military planning:** Prior to the initiation of hostilities in Iraq, indeed prior to any decision to initiate military action, USAID and other civilian agencies of the U.S. Government worked closely and well with our Department of Defense colleagues. These consultations suggested ways that military operations could be conducted to minimize humanitarian crises, methods for our DART team to coordinate with military personnel on the ground, and how the U. S. Government could jump-start immediate relief efforts once portions of Iraq became permissive for civilian workers. Such civilian-military planning paid dividends, for us and for Iraqi civilians, and should be further deepened and institutionalized prior to future conflicts.
2. **Increased stand-by capacity for critical humanitarian tasks:** Based on our experience in Somalia, in the Balkans, and in other post-conflict humanitarian interventions, we now know that certain categories of civilian functions will be required immediately upon the cessation of military operations. These categories include public administration specialists to re-establish basic government services. We are currently meeting these needs through a combination of military civil affairs officers and contract specialists hired through USAID and other U.S. Government agencies. To ensure that such critical specialists arrive when they are needed immediately after hostilities cease, and in sufficient, highly trained quantities, we need to improve our systems for locating and deploying these experts. We need to have them "on-call" prior to the next humanitarian intervention.

USAID appreciates the interest of the Chairman and the Subcommittee in these important humanitarian issues, which are central to the mission of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and we appreciate the opportunity to testify today.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask again that the chart be put up that will show the 11 issues. Can you see it on the screen in front?

I need to put on the record that I was speaking with Congressman Wolf, who has been working very hard to get into Iraq, and had to go with an NGO like I did in order to get in. And I was kind of complaining about the fact that CSIS got in to do what I want Members of Congress to do. And he said he had recommended that they go in to the Secretary of Defense, and that they were there under his recommendation. I want the record to show that I shouldn't view this rather as a negative, that it's somewhat of a plus even if it isn't Members of Congress. In other words, I'm not just looking to have Members of Congress go and have photo shoots. I want them to do what a Peace Corps volunteer would do. I want them to talk with people. I want them to listen to people. I want them to see their sweat and feel their anger, and I want them to, frankly, even feel the danger that may exist as we send NGO's there, who, I will say parenthetically, to me are my heroes. They go into the worst of situations, and they are at the mercy in some cases of whoever is in charge, and in some cases it may not be the government.

So, at any rate, when they went through again, they said there are seven major areas needing immediate action, and I'm inclined to almost want to add to them. They have some of the 11 that are there. What they don't have down is No. 5, they don't have No. 6, they don't have No. 8, and they don't have No. 11. So they don't have restoring basic service to Baghdad to prewar levels or better.

Can I make an assumption from the four of you that—as bad as services there, they're at least to the prewar levels or better? Dr. Westin, if you don't know, tell me, but if have you a sense, tell me.

Dr. WESTIN. We haven't gotten very far in our oversight yet.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Collins.

Dr. COLLINS. Yes. Mr. Chairman, we are watching this on a daily basis, literally getting daily reports, for example, on electrical supply and water issues and whatever. This is the best run-down after going through three of our statistical reports that I could come up with.

Nationwide, electricity, end of July, beginning of August, we'll be at the prewar level. Propane: August would be the target for the prewar level. Oil will be problematical, probably will get to 2004, but still multibillion-dollar moneymaker for the regime this year. Health statistics right now indicate that services are somewhere between 75 to 90 percent in each of the regions, and gasoline somewhere between 65 and 75 percent of the prewar production going on in the country.

We are not in most of these areas at the prewar level, but they're working on it. There are wide variations by region. In many cases, in many cases, things in the south and the north are much better than they are in the center or in areas where there was a lot of fighting.

Mr. SHAYS. I'll just throw it out to whichever panelist wants to answer this. They didn't include preventing a fuel crisis. This is CSIS. It was in and is No. 6 in General Garner's 11 essential tasks. How do you think we're doing on fuel? You kind of answered that.

Dr. COLLINS. In the production of fuel, we're doing very well and approaching the prewar levels. We're also at a point in time where electricity seems to be the main sore point and also the hardest to fix.

Mr. SHAYS. Solving the food distribution system gaps.

Dr. COLLINS. Food distribution is way beyond where it was right before the war began, and of all the statistics you cited, food, the food supply and food distribution in Iraq was probably the most favorable primarily because of the influence of the sanctions and the United Nations in the running of that particular system. But right now there is more food in Iraq by large measure than there was at the beginning of the war.

Mr. SHAYS. No. 11, prevent disease, cholera, outbreaks?

Dr. COLLINS. Minor cholera outbreaks someplace in the south, but no major problems noted. Lots of repair work going on in the health facilities and whatever, many of which were damaged severely in the looting.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, in the 7 immediate tasks they covered, all the others, not 5, not 6, not 8 and not 11, but they also included decentralization is essential. They say the job facing occupation Iraqi authorities is too big to be handled exclusively by the Central Occupation Authority, national Iraqi Government Council. Implementation is lagging far behind needs and expectations in key areas, at least to some extent, because of severe constraints, CPA—CPA human resource at the provisional local levels.

Bottom line is do you think decentralization—and I'll ask Mr. Greene or Kunder, and Dr. Westin, feel free to jump in when you have something that have you looked at as it relates to this.

Mr. GREENE. Decentralization is an important objective. We're trying to put teams out in each of the 18 areas. There are skeleton teams out there already, there are civil affairs people out there. We're going—we're also in the middle of just a massive recruiting effort to get a lot more people out. So it's a clear objective of the CPA and an important part of our political strategy.

Mr. KUNDER. Could I just comment very briefly on the humanitarian situation? I would agree with what Joe Collins just said. All in all, we're—in a lot of cases we're at about 75 or 80 percent and climbing. The one area I would—

Mr. SHAYS. Seventy-five to 80 percent of prewar.

Mr. KUNDER. Prewar levels.

Mr. SHAYS. May I just put on the record, I don't think you'll disagree, prewar level isn't a great level.

Mr. KUNDER. That's just what I was going to say, sir. There was enormous deterioration under the Saddam Hussein regime. He did not invest in health care. We have an inconceivable disconnect in terms of the child mortality rates in Iraq and the basic wealth of the country. The rates are much, much higher than they should be. They are of impoverished nation levels. So he just simply didn't invest. The education system is in tatters. So they were lousy before the war. So we need to exceed them at some point, as the President has pledged we will.

The one caveat I would throw out is in the water area, which leads to No. 11, the potential disease outbreaks because the level of looting was so severe at the water treatment plants and the sew-

age treatment plants. When we visited them in late June, literally the motors have been stripped out, the wires have been pulled out of the system. They need to be completely rebuilt. So you have problems with raw effluent going into the Tigris and Euphrates, which then other cities are drawing as their water source. So there is a potential there because of the looting.

On your question of decentralization—

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, my simple mind tells me you just bring in a whole new piece of equipment, and you don't worry about all the rewiring.

Mr. KUNDER. There were about 16 major urban water treatment plants on the order of what we would find at the Blue Plains treatment plant here in Washington, DC. These are very substantial engineering projects to put them back together. We had, in fact, hundreds of motors running, and they—all the motors—literally bolts cut and the motors taken out.

So, yes, we're bringing the equipment in with our Bechtel contract and doing the reconstruction, but it is a question of months until all of this can be done. And then you have damage to the lines as the—very indelicate topic we're discussing here, but as the effluent backs up and so forth, so then you have basic engineering that you have to do, sanitary engineering.

So this is not a "snap your fingers and fix it" kind of problem, but we are clearly working on it because of the potential for disease outbreak.

On your question of decentralization, sir, and the CSIS report talks about this, one of the things we anticipated and planned for was building local governance councils, recognizing that we were going to have to decentralize and create effective demand at the neighborhood and community level. We now have 85 neighborhood councils up and running in Baghdad where technicians and women and people in the neighborhoods are joining together and expressing what their neighborhood needs are. As the CSIS report says, now the trick is bringing that demand into line with the overall governing council there. So we assign a high priority to these decentralization issues and working on them.

Mr. SHAYS. Hey, Tom, I will ask to you circle 5, 6, 8 and 11, just the numbers—5, 6, 8 and 11. What I'm doing is I'm going through Garner's 11 tasks, I'm going through what we were given by CSIS and what they have, what they did not—what they have in their list that is not in this list. So 5, 6, 8 and 11 were not in their list, but now I'm giving what is in their list that is not in Lieutenant General Garner's list. So decentralization is one, and you all basically concur that it's an essential effort.

Dr. Westin.

Dr. WESTIN. I wanted to add that I think decentralization speaks to one of the challenges I mentioned, and that's getting the buy-in of the local population. So I think that you could take decentralization as one of the ways to overcome that particular challenge. And as we've seen, that's a very important challenge.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Their point 5 was the coalition must face a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind from centralized authority to significant freedoms, from suspicion to trust, and from skepticism to hope. Now, this is somewhat of, I guess, a

no-brainer in a way, but their basic point is that it needs to be highlighted as a gigantic concern. And without reading their dialog that goes along with it, if you, all four of you, care to address the issue of a national frame of mind from centralized authority to significant freedoms, from suspicion to trust, and from skepticism to hope, do any of you care to address that issue?

Dr. COLLINS. Yeah, I'll start. I'm sure everyone will have something to say about it.

The CSIS report speaks to the issue of cultural change and changing the culture of the people, the political culture of the people, from an authoritarian one to a democratic one. This is difficult. It's not impossible. A number of other nations have made this leap before in the past.

Two things, I think, are essential here in terms of steps to get there. The first, Mr. Chairman, I think, is the capture of Saddam Hussein and the remaining bigwigs, if you will, of the party out there who are intimidating people and preventing folks from taking actions which are obviously in their immediate self-interest. They're preventing them by, of course, physically intimidating them and making them fear the retribution of the Baathist spoilers. We're working hard on that, and we're taking an offensive approach to it. And General Abazaid had, I think, some eloquent words to say about it a few days before.

The second part of all of this, I think, is for a national educational process to take place, and that has to be done in conjunction with the constitutional development process. The startup of the governing council in this past week or so is the critical first step in Iraqis developing a Constitution that both reflects majority rule and the protection of minority rights. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. GREENE. The success of postconflict efforts is a function of time and resources, time and the number of people and the amount of dollars you're going to invest in. And so clearly there's an important time element to making the changes that the CSIS group emphasizes here.

Two, there's a recognition of everybody involved with the CPA and all our people there that we talk to on a daily basis of the need to do exactly what you and General Garner were talking about earlier, be out more and talking to people and making those daily connections. But, three, this is where the security issue is a huge—has a huge impact and right now is a barrier to those efforts. You look at what is involved with getting our people out, you look at the threats that are out there, and it's a challenge. And it's fair to say that it gets in the way of this.

Mr. KUNDER. The only thing I would add, Mr. Chairman, is that to reiterate two points that General Garner made, No. 1 is I think you have to—I read the report, but the country has to be dissected. In the north you have a radically different attitude than you do in the central and a radically different than the south. So in some parts of the country I notice this sort of skepticism. We discovered hope in a lot of parts of the country, certainly in the north, and some optimism in the south where people have been liberated from oppression.

And the other point I would make is General Garner's point about the silent majority. We had exactly the same experience he described, that people have their complaints, naturally they do, they're not getting electricity all day long, but then at the end of the day they come back, and the last comment is don't leave too early. Whatever you do, don't leave too early. So there is still a silent majority that I think is upbeat about the future and is just suffering from the short-term issues that we all know about and have been describing.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, Dr. Westin.

Dr. WESTIN. We haven't looked very much, as you know, at Iraq, but GAO has done a number of reports looking at democracy-building activities of the U.S. Government in various parts of the world, including a report we put out this past spring looking at Latin America and Central American countries. And it's difficult to do. It's difficult to come up with good measures of success to know how you're succeeding. So I don't think we should underestimate the difficulty of doing this.

In line also here with communication, I believe, in September, we'll have a report coming out on public diplomacy that focuses a lot on the public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me again the studies that we can look forward to? What are they again? You had about four or five that you listed.

Dr. WESTIN. Yes. For the work ongoing in Iraq?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Dr. WESTIN. We have work under way looking at the total reconstruction effort, and our first effort under that is going to be looking at the planning, the planning that took place, who the players are, and how much they actually coordinated.

The second effort that we have under way is seeking out and trying to find what efforts are taking place to find the assets of the former regime and how they can be returned to the people of Iraq.

Mr. SHAYS. Around the world.

Dr. WESTIN. Yes. As well as in Iraq, right?

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Dr. WESTIN. The third effort, we're looking at the process of awarding the contracts, the initial contracts that USAID and DOD put out.

And then fourth we're about to start work looking at the costs of the war, the whole reconstruction effort and projected costs.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me, as it relates to—I'll read you one part of—they're saying the coalition must facilitate a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind from centralized authority to significant freedoms, from suspicion to trust, from skepticism to hope. They said, drastic changes must be made to immediately improve the daily flow of practical information to the Iraqi people principally through enhanced radio and TV programming.

Now, my analogies may be way off, but if I'm on an Amtrak train and I want to get somewhere, and we start going at 2 miles an hour for about 45 minutes, I know I'm going to be late, but the one thing I think I have a right to know is what the hell is going on. When we were coming down, two things happened. A bridge was

hit, and there was a dead body on the rail. But knowing that made me a lot more tolerant in the bad service I was getting.

On the House floor, we have a hearing, they're holding the vote open for 45 minutes. There's a reason. I want to know. There's all this rumor. I'm talking about Members. We hear that there's some dispute in Ways and Means and that somebody was in the library, and then somebody didn't like the vote, and then we had the whole bill read. I'm getting my information from lots of different sources, not pretty happy about it, and I would have just liked someone to just say we have a delay here and so on.

Now, I use that analogy because it just seems to me like a no-brainer. They say drastic changes must be made to immediately improve the daily flow of practical information of the Iraqi people principally through enhanced radio and TV programming. Someone tell me what is happening in that regard.

Dr. COLLINS. I don't know the story well, Mr. Chairman, but I do know that there are CPA-dominated media sites, both for radio and TV. There are psychological operations units operating throughout the country. And there's also local media, which is free media, which is being influenced to some degree by our folks and dealing with them.

Getting the word out is extremely important, and it has to be done on a very basic level. Less than 3 percent of Iraqis have television sets, although TV is viewed by many as much more influential than those statistics would give out.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say it is pretty much an established fact that only 3 percent of the Iraqi people—

Dr. COLLINS. Have televisions. Much greater percentage, of course, inside of Baghdad, where satellite dishes, I'm told, are very much in evidence.

A lot of very primitive work—not primitive, but basic work is being done to get the word out. For example, the other day it was brought to the attention of the CPA that a number of Iraqis had voiced the opinion that we were just like Saddam, that when we wanted to punish a particular neighborhood, we would shut down their electricity. And that, of course, was, in fact, the tactic of Saddam Hussein. It is not a tactic of us and the CPA.

Mr. SHAYS. You know what? When our people are living in his palaces or having their offices in his palaces, it just strikes me that may be really superficial, and you might say, you know, that's a dumb comment to make, but to me it strikes me as kind of saying, you know, we've just changed places.

Dr. COLLINS. There is that danger, but there is also the problem of where would you have a suitable facility for a large-scale organization. And I know you've probably been there, Mr. Chairman, about the palaces themselves are often talked about in much more grandiose terms than they are. Most of the places I went inside of—Mr. Bremer's so-called palace had no air conditioning. It was 120 degrees outside, and it was about 95 in most of the offices. So they're in many cases not much to brag about despite their grand titles.

But they're working the information issue very hard, putting a lot of money against it, and also trying to at the same time jump-

start a new telecommunications system inside of Iraq which will both spur communications and help in business development.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Anyone else choose to comment on this issue?

Yes, sir.

Mr. KUNDER. First of all, the points are well taken. I think Joe is right. Everyone understands that this is a serious issue and more needs to be done. At the direction of Ambassador Bremer, our Office of Transition initiative has started—because of the problems with radio and television and power, we've started now leaflets, posters on buses and downtown Baghdad to try to get in Arabic the CPA policy on electricity, for example, so the people understand why there are electricity shortages and so forth.

I certainly don't want to claim that the problem is solved yet. We recognize it's a problem and start trying to reach out to the people, make sure people at least have an understanding of what the problems are.

Mr. SHAYS. I can make the assumption that the number of people that have radios is significant, correct?

Mr. KUNDER. Significant, yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. We were in the Peace Corps, and we didn't have a TV. A radio was something we listened to a lot, especially for news, especially to know what was going on around the world.

Let me just take the last point the United States—did you want to deal with that issue? The United States needs to—this is point 6, not included in General Garner's list of 11. The United States needs to quickly mobilize a new reconstruction coalition that is significantly broader than the coalition that successfully waged the war.

Now, this is the dialog that goes with that point. The scope of the challenges, the financial requirements, and rising anti-Americanism in parts of the country make necessary a new coalition that involves various international actors, including the countries and organizations that took no part in the original war coalition. The Council for International Cooperation of the CPA is a welcome innovation, but it must be dramatically expanded and supercharged if a new and inclusive coalition is to be built.

I think this is significant stuff here. I'd like to know what your reaction is. You know, this is a third party coming in and looking at what's going on.

Dr. COLLINS. Right.

I had the opportunity to talk with John Hamre and some of his folks who were on this team and made the visit. I think a new coalition is being forged every day. In the security area we have—it seems to me to be a number of about a dozen nations interested in providing troops to the international security force who don't have troops there now. We have also a lot of fundraising efforts that are going on that have brought new members, new nations into the coalition. I think every day out there the CPA and the U.N. are deepening their cooperation on a number of issues.

So I think in general this is an important point, and it's something that has already been started.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Kunder.

I'm sorry. Mr. Greene.

Mr. GREENE. It's an extremely high priority for us. There's a lot of activity on both the security front, on the funding front. Every day on this there is a large number of high-level exchanges on both fronts, extensive planning for a major international fundraising conference that will take place in October. And we completely agree with this, and we're putting in place a plan to do this.

Mr. KUNDER. I would just add, sir, I don't know what their—I know all the people who wrote this report. I'm not sure what their definition of supercharged is, but having nothing better to do this weekend, I'm off to Europe myself for a DAC meeting, Development Assistance Committee meeting, where, again, the whole topic will be mobilizing additional bilateral support and strengthening the coalition. So I think this has the full attention of the U.S. Government building the kind of coalition that is suggested in the CSIS report.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, Dr. Westin.

Dr. WESTIN. I think this is, as I mentioned before, one of the particular challenges. Coordination among the multiple donors is a real issue. As I pointed out, in Afghanistan we saw that the Afghan Government was weak, and therefore there were many bilateral, multilateral organizations in essence doing their own thing, planning their own reconstruction efforts, etc.

Mr. SHAYS. When I was in Umm Qasr for the brief 8 hours that are almost sacred to me now, thinking, one, how difficult it was to get in and how grateful I am to Save the Children for getting me in, under their rules, not my rules, what I'm struck with is that these NGO's know their stuff, but they're very dependent on security, and they're very dependent on funding from AID. So they're not saying, you know, we can do this by ourselves. It's a team effort. I was struck by the extraordinary poverty, by the lack of running water, by how people had to come to one area. It was a Third World environment for me, and yet what I was told was a port city that I expected to see more advanced.

Now, when we were at the port, you had nice warehouses, and you had nice equipment to take things off ships, though you had a harbor that had no depth to it. My point, though, is that when we were there—all the NGO's were together, I wanted to get them all hugs because they don't realize how cool they are. To me this is extraordinary what they do.

But one of the ingredients that they all told me at the time is we need the U.N. These folks know how to do this. I'm unclear as to what presence the U.N. has. And I just want to get a sense is this just a contest between the Secretary of Defense who's decided that we went into this without the French and the Germans? And I have no great disappointment in some ways that they don't get to call the shots, because I think they should have been involved earlier in helping us deal with Saddam Hussein and not on the sideline, but should they be there? Should the U.N. be there? First off, what is the presence of the U.N.? Clarify to me when we say the U.N. is there, how are they there?

Mr. GREENE. The U.N. has a very strong presence, had a presence before conflict, during conflict with national employees and postconflict. Emphasis has been on relief activities.

Mr. SHAYS. With all due respect, during the engagement I don't think the U.N. was much involved.

Mr. GREENE. There were national employees involved with—Iraqi national employees of U.N. organizations who stayed on the job protecting records for WFP.

Mr. SHAYS. So let me just clarify. The U.N. facilities and activities that were there, those folks stayed there.

Mr. GREENE. The national employees. The international employees all left. And with any operation there's always a large number of national employees.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. GREENE. So the U.N. focus and institutional strength is on relief activities. Probably one of the biggest postconflict success stories is getting the public distribution system up and running again, and that has been largely a WFP operation with plenty of strong support from AID and civil affairs people, but WFP have been the ones that have gotten that going. UNICEF has done some pretty remarkable work on water and on power. It's not United Nations, but the International Organization of Migration is taking this, trying to get the property claims system in place and trying to register people who have claims. UNACR is working on refugee returns. And these are traditional areas for the U.N. to work on.

I think usually what the point of discussion and the point of contention is, it's not in the relief area, not in the initial reconstruction area, it's the degree of U.N. involvement with the political transformation. And in that area, I think that Mr. De Mello has played a really key role in getting the Iraqi governing council set up and has been just a tremendous mediator, liaison between—

Mr. SHAYS. And this is the basic U.N. envoy?

Mr. GREENE. Yeah. He is the head of the U.N. operation in Baghdad, and he has established the very good relationships with the many elements in Iraq and has been a very positive force in getting this government council established.

Mr. SHAYS. So I'll put it in my uneducated terms. We don't have formal relations with the U.N. where they have the capacity to make a number of decisions; that they are working with the United States and the British Government, they're working with Mr. Bremer, let me put it that way, utilizing their resources, but not in a position to make command decisions.

Mr. GREENE. Well, they're working effectively as they work in many other situations where they're carrying out their programs in coordination with Mr. Bremer and his—

Mr. SHAYS. So they're functioning almost like an NGO would function?

Mr. GREENE. Except they have broader, more formal international responsibilities in terms of protection, and in terms of carrying out their responsibilities, NGO's will feed into the structure that they've created.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Kunder, would it be helpful if the U.N. was more involved?

Mr. KUNDER. Sir, the terms of relationship between the U.N. system and the Coalition Provisional Authority are spelled out in very, very precise detail in the Security Council resolution, which, of course, is approved by all the members of the Security Council. So,

I mean, there were obviously weeks of debate leading up to the exact wording of that, but that was approved by the Security Council, so the precise terms were worked out. We met with Dr. De Mello, the head of the U.N. while they were there. He has his team on the ground. They are fully engaged with Ambassador Bremer's team. But the terms of it are spelled out in the Security Council resolution.

What I was trying to say earlier is I don't think there's general recognition of the depth of our work with the U.N. on the ground. I'm looking through our list of grants, \$20 million to UNICEF for health, \$10 million for UNESCO for textbooks, \$10 million to World Health Organization for health programs. We've given more than \$260 million of the taxpayers' money to the World Food Program to keep those—to keep number—where is it here—prevent the food crisis, solve the food distribution gaps, to keep No. 8 working. So there is very deep, ongoing cooperation between the CPA and other elements of the U.S. Government and the U.N. agencies on the ground.

Dr. COLLINS. One thing, Mr. Chairman, that the United Nations could do, and I read in the paper that the State Department has already engaged them in the person of Secretary Powell on this issue, and that is to clarify their support. If you read U.N. Security Council resolution, I think it's 1473 that Jim just referenced, there is support for the security and stabilization force in that resolution, although the United Nations is not running it. Since then we've had a number of countries who have used the U.N. as either a or an excuse, take your pick, for not participating in the stabilization force in Iraq, and that's not exactly right. And if the U.N. could clarify their support for that, some nations that are sitting on the fence may be able to come in.

You mentioned France and Germany in a previous comment. The Secretary of Defense was asked about that last week, and he said that he would welcome their participation in the stabilization force. The French very quickly said that they wouldn't do that because the U.N. support for it is not sufficiently clear.

But both France and Germany, it ought to be said, are participating very strongly in Afghanistan, particularly Germany, which is leading the international security assistance force in Kabul right now.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Collins, let me just respond to that because that leads into a point I wanted to make. One of the things that my subcommittee gets to do is to travel around to our various commands. When I was in Tampa, we were there months ago, it blew me away because then one of the best kept secrets was—this was before our engagement in Iraq, before even the resolution, I believe, last year—and it blew me away the number of countries that were in the room that—at the time there were 40. You can't see it now, but there are 50 flags now, but there were 40 countries that were involved, and there were some sitting at a semicircle desk and then others just sitting in auditorium seats behind. And they were talking about what was happening every day, because that's where the command was for Afghanistan, and they would say, well, we don't have a transport plane, the Brits are going to take theirs in 4 weeks. And the French and the Norwegians and someone else said

they would be able to fill in the gap of these four planes. So the commanding officer turned around and said, you know, who can fill in? And one said, well, we can. And they checked with the government.

My point is there is lots of involvement, and it was extraordinarily impressive, and it was clearly a team effort. I guess now as a lead-in, what I asked my staff to do—I'm a Peace Corps volunteer, was a conscientious objector during the war in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, and I'm being asked to vote to send troops into battle, which I know we needed to do.

And so what I ask my staff to do periodically is print the names of the men and women who aren't coming home. Their names are right here, their names and their addresses. And I rejoiced that so few were lost originally. But I never want to ever say approximately 200. So we have right now in my latest list, updated, 219 who have been killed. Now, some not in battle, but tell a parent whose son was lost as two vehicles collide that they weren't killed in battle; 219 have been killed in action. And I can just look at names, Robert Frantz, I can look at Michael Deuel, I can look at Andrew Chris; these are all people who didn't come home to loved ones. Evan James. And names I can't pronounce.

And I'm just wondering why we were doing such a bad job of getting others to share and be a part of this effort. So tell me why we aren't successful in getting some—like we are here in the Central Command in Afghanistan—why aren't we able to convince some of our European allies who know how to do better police action? In other words, our troops basically—I'm told they're taught to take the hill, keep the hill at whatever cost. But we have other countries that train their military folks to be civilian peacekeepers, and I just want you to speak to the value of doing that.

I think, Dr. Collins, I'm addressing this to you. When is this going to happen? And what is it going to take?

Dr. COLLINS. We have a large number of people, probably going to be greater than 20 nations, participating in the stabilization force. The United Kingdom and Poland will lead divisions. It is possible that a third and possibly even a fourth country will also contribute a division or a division headquarters and part of that division. Some of the nations that are also participating, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Honduras, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Hungary, United Kingdom, Slovakia, the Netherlands, and active discussions are under way with Pakistan, Turkey and Morocco, we're likely going to have somewhere around 15,000 troops here in the next few months that come from countries other than the United States. And we continue to beat the drum. We continue to expand the coalition as best as we can.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I'm going to, just as we put in the Iraqi postconflict reconstruction field review and recommendations into the record, I'm going to put in the names into the record—a list of all the men and women who have died in battle. And I realized that there are also two that are still missing: Sergeant First Class Gladimir Philippe and Private Kevin C. Ott. Mr. Philippe is New Jersey, and Mr. Ott is from Ohio, and they are still missing in action.

[The information referred to follows:]

Updated: 7/18/03

Killed in Action: Iraq (219)

Spc. Jamaal R. Addison
 Pfc. Howard Johnson II
 Army Spc. Gregory P. Sanders
 Lance Corporal Brian Rory Buesing
 Corporal Randal Kent Rosacker
 Sgt. Michael E. Bitz
 Lance Cpl. David K. Fribley
 Cpl. Jose A. Garibay
 Cpl. Jorge A. Gonzalez
 Staff Sgt. Phillip A. Jordan
 2nd Lt. Frederick E. Pokorney Jr.
 Lance Cpl. Thomas J. Slocum
 Army Reserve Spc. Brandon S. Tobler
 Third Class Michael Vann Johnson, Jr.
 National Guard Maj. Gregory Stone
 Cpl. Evan T. James
 Marine Major Kevin G. Nave
 Sgt. Bradley S. Korthaus
 Gunnery Sgt. Joseph Menusa
 Lance Cpl. Jesus A. Suarez Del Solar
 Lance Cpl. Thomas A. Blair
 Lance Cpl. Michael J. Williams
 Lance Cpl. William W. White
 Pfc. Michael Russell Creighton Weldon
 Spc. Michael Edward Curtin
 Pfc. Diego Fernando Rincon
 Sgt. Eugene Williams
 Sgt. Roderic A. Solomon
 Maj. Thomas Aubin
 Capt. Ryan Anthony Beaupre
 Corporal Brian Matthew Kennedy
 Staff Sgt. Kendall Damon Waters-Bey
 2nd Lt. Therrel S. Childers
 Lance Corporal Jose Guitierrez
 Cpt. Christopher Scott Seifert
 Lieutenant Thomas Mullen Adams
 Lance Corporal Eric J. Orlowski
 Sergeant Nicholas Hodson
 Staff Sgt. James W. Cawley
 Sgt. Michael V. Lalush
 Staff Sgt. Donald C. May, Jr.
 Lance Cpl. Patrick T. O'Day
 22 Roswell, Ga
 21 Mobile, Ala
 19 Hobart, Indiana
 20 Ceder Key, Fla.
 21 San Diego, Calif
 31 Ventura Calif.
 26 Lee, Fla.
 21 Orange, Calif
 20 Los Angeles, Calif
 42 Brazoria, Texas
 31 Ney, Nev.
 Adams, Colo
 19
 25 Little Rock, Ark.
 40 Boise, Idaho
 20 La Harpe, Ill
 36 Union Lake, Mich
 28 Scott, Iowa
 33 San Jose, Calif
 20 Escondido, Calif
 24 Wagoner, Okla.
 31 Yuma, Ariz
 24 Brooklyn, N.Y.
 20 Conyers, Ga
 23 South Plains, N.J.
 19 Conyers, Ga.
 24 Highland, N.Y.
 32 Fayetteville, N.C.
 36 Waterville, Me
 30 St. Anne, Ill
 25 Houston, Texas
 29 Baltimore, Md
 30 Harrison County, Miss
 22 Los Angeles, Calif
 27 Williams Township, Pa
 27 La Messa, Calif
 26 Buffalo, N.Y.
 22 Smithville, Mo
 41 Roy, Utah
 23 Troutville, Va.
 31 Richmond, Va
 20 Sonoma, Calif

Sgt. Jonathan W. Lambert	28 Newsite, Miss.
Sgt. Keman L. Mitchell	24 Hilliard, Fla.
Pfc. Branden F. Oberleitner	20 Worthington, Ohio
Petty Officer Third Class Doyle W. Bollinger, Jr.	21 Poteau, Okla.
Pvt. Jesse M. Halling	19 Indianapolis, Ind.
Sgt. Michael E. Dooley	23 Pulaski, Va.
Sgt. Travis L. Burkhardt	26 Edina, Mo.
Pfc. Gavin L. Neighbor	20 Somerset, Ohio
Staff Sgt. Andrew R. Pokorny	30 Naperville, Ill.
Spc. John K. Klinesmith Jr.	25 Stockbridge, Ga.
Pfc. Ryan R. Cox	19 Derby, Kan.
Pvt. Shawn D. Pahnke	25 Shelbyville, Ind.
Spc. Joseph D. Suell	24 Lufkin, Texas
Sgt. William T. Latham	29 Kingman, Ariz.
Sgt. Michael L. Tosto	24 Apex, N.C.
Pvt. Robert L. Frantz	19 San Antonio
Pfc. Michael R. Deuel	21 Nemo, S.D.
Spc. Paul T. Nakamura	21 Santa Fe Springs, Calif.
Spc. Orenthial J. Smith	21 Allendale, S.C.
Spc. Cedric L. Lennon	32 West Blocton, Ala.
Spc. Andrew F. Chris	25 Calif.
Spc. Richard P. Orengo	32 Puerto Rico
Spc. Corey A. Hubbell	20 Urbana, Ill.
Thomas E. Retzer	30 San Diego, Calif.
Lance Cpl. Gregory E. MacDonald	29 Washington, D.C.
Spc. Kelvin E. Feliciano Gutierrez	21 Anasco, Puerto Rico
Cpl. Tomas Sotelo Jr.	20 Houston, Texas
Sgt. Timothy M. Conneway	22 Enterprise, Ala.
Christopher D. Coffin	51 Bethlehem, Pa.
Sgt. Jonathan W. Lambert	28 Newsite, Miss.
Pfc. Edward J. Herrgott	20 Shakopee, Minn.
Pfc. Corey L. Small	20 East Berlin, Pa.
Cpl. Travis J. Bradachnall	21 Multnomah County, Ore.
Spc. Chad L. Keith	21 Batesville, Ind.
Sgt. David B. Parson	30 Kannapolis, N.C.
Spc. Jeffrey M. Wershow	22 Gainesville, Fla.
Staff Sgt. Barry Sanford, Sr.	46 Aurora, Colo.
Sgt. 1st Class Craig A. Boling	38 Elkhart, Ind.
Pvt. Robert L. McKinley	23 Kokomo, Ind.
Sgt. Christopher P. Geiger	38 Allentown, Pa.
Sgt. 1st Class Dan H. Gabrielson	39 Spooner, Wis.
Sgt. Melissa Valles	26 Eagle Pass, Texas

Army Sgt. Troy David Jenkins	25 Ridgecrest, Calif.
Spc. Roy Russell Buckley	24 Portage, Ind.
Pvt. Jerod R. Dennis	19 Oklahoma
Airman 1st Class Raymond Losano	24 Del Rio, Texas
Spc. Narson B. Sullivan	21 North Brunswick, N.J.
1st Lt. Osbaldo Orozco	26 Delano, Calif.
Sgt. Edward J. Anguiano	24 Brownsville, Texas
1st Sgt. Joe J. Garza	43 Robstown, Texas
Spc. Roy Russell Buckley	24 Portage, Ind.
Pfc. Jesse A. Givens	34 Springfield, Mo.
Sgt. Sean C. Reynolds	25 East Lansing, Mich.
Pfc. Marlin T. Rockhold	23 Hamilton, Ohio
Chief Warrant Officer Brian K. Van Dusen	39 Columbus, Ohio.
Chief Warrant Officer Hans N. Gukeisen	31 Lead, S.D.
Cpl. Richard P. Carl	26 King Hill, Idaho.
Lance Cpl. Cedric E. Bruns	22 Vancouver, Wash.
Lance Cpl. Matthew R. Smith	20 Anderson, Ind.
Lance Cpl. Jakub Henryk Kowalik	21 Schaumburg, Ill.
Pfc. Jose Franci Gonzalez Rodriguez	19 Norwalk, Calif.
Lance Cpl. Nicholas Brian Kleiboeker	19 Irvington, Ill.
Spc. David T. Nutt	22 Blackshear, Ga.
Master Sgt. Williams L. Payne	46 Michigan
Spc. Rasheed Sahib	22 Brooklyn, N.Y.
Lt. Col. Dominic R. Baragona	42 Ohio
Cpl. Douglas Jose Marencoreyes	28 Chino, Calif.
Sgt. Kirk Allen Straseskie	23 Beaver Dam, Wis.
Spc. Nathaniel A. Caldwell	27 Omaha, Neb.
Capt. Andrew David Lamont	31 Eureka, Calif.
Lance Cpl. Jason William Moore	21 San Marcos, Calif.
1st Lt. Timothy Louis Ryan	30 Aurora, Ill.
Staff Sgt. Aaron Dean White	27 Shawnee, Okla.
Pvt. David Evans, Jr.	18 Buffalo, N.Y.
Maj. Mathew E. Schram	36 Wisconsin
Pfc. Jeremiah D. Smith	25 Odessa, Mo.
Sgt. Thomas F. Broomhead	34 Cannon City, Colo.
Staff Sgt. Brett J. Petriken	30 Mich.
Pvt. Kenneth A. Nalley	19 Hamburg, Iowa
Staff Sgt. Michael B. Quinn	37 Tampa, Fla.
Spc. Jose A. Perez III	22 San Diego, Texas
Spc. Zachariah W. Long	20 Milton, Pa.
Spc. Michael T. Gleason	25 Warren, Pa.
Spc. Kyle A. Griffin	20 Emerson, N.J.
Staff Sgt. Kenneth R. Bradley	39 Utica, Miss.

Sgt. 1st Class Paul R. Smith	33 Tampa, Fla.
Capt. Travis A. Ford	30 Ogallala, Neb.
Cpl. Bernard G. Gooden	22 Mt. Vernon, N.Y.
1st Lt. Brian M. McPhillips	25 Pembroke, Mass.
Sgt. Duane R. Rios	25 Hammond, Ind.
Spc. Larry K. Brown	22 Jackson, Miss.
2nd Lt. Jeffrey J. Kaylor	24 Clifton, VA
Pfc. Anthony S. Miller	19 San Antonio, TX
Pfc. Juan Guadalupe Garza Jr.	20 Temperance, Mich.
Staff Sgt. Robert A. Stever	36 Pendleton, OR
Pfc. Jason M. Meyer	23 Swartz Creek, Mich.
Spc. George A. Mitchell	35 Rawlings, Md
Cpl. Henry L. Brown	22 Natchez, Miss.
Pvt. Kelley S. Prewitt	24 Alabama
Staff Sgt. Scott D. Sather	29 Clio, Mich.
Pvt. Jonathan L. Gifford	20 Macon, Ill
Gunnery Sgt. Jeffrey E. Bohr, Jr.	39 Ossian, Iowa
Cpl. Jesus A. Gonzalez	22 Indio, Calif.
Staff Sgt. Riayan A. Tejeda	26 New York, N.Y.
Pfc. Tamario D. Burkett	21 Erie, N.Y.
Lance Cpl. Donald J. Cline, Jr.	21 Washoe, Nev.
Pvt. Nolen R. Hutchings	19 Boiling Springs, S.C.
Lt. Nathan D. White	30 Mesa, Ariz.
Sgt. Brendon C. Reiss	23 Natrona, Wyo.
Staff Sgt. Terry W. Hemingway	39 Willingboro, N.J.
Sgt. 1st Class John W. Marshall	50 Los Angeles, Calif.
Marine Sgt. Fernando Padilla-Ramirez	26 San Luis, Ariz.
Spc. Gil Mercado	25 Paterson, N.J.
Marine Lance Cpl. David Edward Owens Jr.	20 Winchester, Va.
Cpl. Armando Ariel Gonzalez	25 Hialeah, Fla.
Spc. Richard A. Goward	32 Midland, Mich.
Spc. Thomas A. Foley III	23 Dresden, Tenn.
Pfc. John E. Brown	21 Troy, Ala.
Pfc. Joseph P. Mayek	20 Rock Springs, Wyo.
Cpl. Kemaphoom A. Chanawongse	22 Waterford, Conn
Cpl. Jason David Mileo	20 Centreville, Md.
Capt. Eric B. Das	30 Amarillo, Texas
Cpl. John T. Rivero	23 Gainesville Fla.
Maj. William R. Watkins III	37 Danville, Va.
Chief Warrant Officer Andrew Todd Arnold	30 Spring, Texas
Chief Warrant Officer Robert William Channell J	36 Tuscaloosa, Ala.
Lance Cpl. Alan Dinh Lam	19 Snow Camp, N.C.

Pfc. Francisco A. MartinezFlores	21 Los Angeles, Calif
Capt. Aaron J. Contreras	31 Sherwood, Ore.
Cpl. Robert M. Rodriguez	21 Queens, N.Y.
Lance Cpl. Patrick R. Nixon	21 Nashville, Tenn.
Spc. William A. Jeffries	39
Lance Cpl. Joseph B. Maglione	22 Lansdale, Pa.
Sgt. Jacob L. Butler	24 Wellsville, Kan.
Spc. Brandon J. Rowe	20 Roscoe, Ill.
Marine Sgt. Brian D. McGinnis	23 St. George, Del.
Lance Cpl. Brian E. Anderson	26 Durham, N.C.
Pfc. Christian D. Gurtner	19 Ohio City, Ohio
Spc. Donald S. Oaks Jr.	20 Erie, Pa.
Sgt. 1st Class Randall S. Rehn	36 Longmont, Colo.
Sgt. Todd J. Robbins	33 Pentwater, Mich.
Master Sgt. George A. Fernandez	36 El Paso, Texas
Staff Sgt. Wilbert Davis	40 Alaska
Capt. James F. Adamowski	29 Springfield, Va.
Spc. Mathew G. Boule	22 Dracut, Mass.
Chief Warrant Officer Erik A. Halvorsen	40 Bennington, Vt.
Chief Warrant Officer Scott Jamar	32 Granbury, Texas
Sgt. Michael F. Pedersen	26 Flint, Mich.
Chief Warrant Officer Eric A. Smith	41 Calif.
Capt. Edward J. Korn	31 Savannah, Ga.
Capt. Tristan N. Aitken	31 State College, Pa.
Cpl. Erik H. Silva	22 Chula Vista, Calif.
Capt. Benjamin W. Sammis	29 Rehobeth, Mass.
Pfc. Chad E. Bales	20 Coahoma, Texas
Cpl. Mark A. Evnin	21 Burlington, Vt.
Sgt. George Edward Buggs	31 Edward Buggs
Master Sgt. Robert J. Dowdy	38 Cleveland, Ohio
Pvt. Ruben Estrella-Soto	18 El Paso, Texas
Spc. James M. Kiehl	22 Des Moines, Iowa
Chief Warrant Officer Johnny Villareal Mata	35 Amarillo, Texas
Pfc. Lori Ann Piestewa	23 Tuba City, Ariz
Pvt. Brandon Ulysses Sloan	19 Bedford, Ohio
Sgt. Donald Ralph Walters	33 Salem, Ore
Staff Sgt. Nino D. Livaudais	23 Utah
Spc. Ryan P. Long	21 Seaford, Del.
Capt. Russell B. Rippetoe	27 Colorado
Pfc. Wilfred D. Ballard	20 Lake Charles, La.
Spc. Daniel Francis J. Cunningham	33 Lewiston, Maine.
Pvt. Devon D. Jones	19 San Diego, Calif.

Lance Cpl. Jason Andrew Tetrault
Sgt. Roger D. Rowe
Cpt. Paul J. Cassidy
Sgt. Michael T. Crockett
Spc. Joshua M. Neusche
Spc. Christian C. Schulz
Sgt. Jaror C. Puello-Coronado
Lance Cpl. Cory Ryan Geurin

MIA

Sgt. 1st Class Gladimir Philippe
Pfc. Kevin C. Ott

20 Moreno Valley, Calif.
54 Bon Aqua, Tenn.
36 Laingsburg, Mich.
27 Soperton, Ga.
20 Montreal, Mo.
20 Colleyville, Texas
36 Pocono Summit, Pa.
18 Santee, Calif.

37 Linden N.J.
27 Columbus, Ohio.

Mr. SHAYS. I'm going to ask counsel to ask some questions. Then we'll get to the next panel.

Mr. HALLORAN. Thank you. There are just two areas I want to cover a little further because I know it will come up in the next panel: The issue of NGO neutrality and impartiality and how that can be maintained in this context. I'm hearing that if the U.N. flag flies, then I guess they're comfortable. Is it simply a matter of the breadth of the coalition? Is it a question of just freedom of movement? If the security situation stabilizes, they'll feel more comfortable and more at ease operating outside of the shadow of the force of one country or another? But what are the touch points or the sensitivities now that you're seeing between NGO's and the coalition in terms of coordinating aid that we're going to hear about in the next panel?

Mr. KUNDER. Having served both in the U.S. Marine Corps and Save the Children Federation, I sometimes am able to take a look at this problem from two unique perspectives. It's a very serious issue, and I've taken the time to talk a lot of our military colleagues about the importance of the NGO humanitarian space argument, which draws upon a long tradition of humanitarian law, the Red Cross movement, and basically battlefield conditions 150 years ago. It's a very important part of how the world treats humanitarian issues during conflict. At the same time I've taken a lot of time to talk to my NGO colleagues about the issues that military commanders must face on the ground in carrying out military operations. It's a complex set of issues that has been discussed extensively between the two organizations. I think—

Mr. HALLORAN. There was a story after our last hearing that some of the—two or three of the major NGO's then active in Iraq were considering not kind of reupping for the next round based—concerned on this basis. Has that happened? Did you work that—

Mr. KUNDER. I'm sure some of the NGO's will speak for themselves, but it is my understanding based on newspaper reports and words I heard at conferences that some NGO's have chosen explicitly not to participate because the entire U.S. response, humanitarian and reconstruction response, is embedded within the command structure that the President has determined flows through the Department of Defense. And I respect that. These are good solid organizations. They've made an individual choice not to participate. They're a private sector organization. I respect that decision.

But the point I would like to make is that as this debate goes on, I think it has been confused by the following: That much of the civilian/military interaction, NGO to military interaction, that has taken place since the end of the cold war has been in the context of U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping operations like Bosnia so that the soldiers who showed up in Bosnia were working there under a Security Council mandate and had particular responsibilities to support humanitarian operations.

In Afghanistan and Iraq we've been in different circumstances. We've essentially been in coalition combat operations, in my view, and so that the rules are different. The troops there are not assigned to support the civilian humanitarian organizations on the ground.

Mr. HALLORAN. In those situations with the U.N. context, is it common to ask NGO's to kind of screen media comments through the governmental entity?

Mr. KUNDER. That's an important but side issue, in my view, sir. I mean, it is not related to the fundamental question of humanitarian space. What happened in this issue was that in AID doing its contracting work and grant work, we started inserting a standard clause in the grant and contract documents that said, notify us before you hold a press conference, if you're structuring a press conference, so that we can coordinate the message that we're delivering to the outside world. In the highly sensitive environment of Iraq, which we've been discussing, and to try to get some consistent message out to the Iraqi people about what is going on, we felt that such coordination was necessary. And, after all, I mean, we're not trying to impose restrictions on privately funded money, we're talking about taxpayer-funded grants. So we inserted that. It said, please come talk to us ahead of time, and let us know what you're going to tell the press so we can coordinate the message.

I know some of the NGO's strongly objected to that. They viewed it as an infringement on their independence. And once again, I respect their individual judgments as private organizations, but we felt as Federal officers administering taxpayer dollars that it was appropriate to ask for such coordination before media messages were sent out in the complex environment of Iraq, and we had an honest policy dispute with the NGO community on that.

Mr. HALLORAN. OK. Mr. Greene and Dr. Collins, I want to go to another topic, which is the issue of refugee movements you talked about earlier. The number of 500,000 came up. Could you describe who those people are, where they are, and are you saying that in the—what we have to look forward to in the future is that when we do build some roads and get the security situation settled, then we have this significant refugee movement to handle that is going to kind of be the next problem over the hill?

Mr. GREENE. I'd look at it as instead of a problem, a good thing that 500,000 Iraqis who were driven out of their country feel that the conditions are right and that they can return to their home country. I mean, it's an objective for us, it's an objective for them. Let's use Afghanistan as an example where now it's something like 2.5 million Afghani refugees have returned.

And I think the coalition is going about it in a sensible way. CPA, Jerry Bremer are going about it in a sensible way in terms of let's make sure the conditions are right; let's make sure that we don't have 500,000 people streaming back into the country when there's not jobs, there's not security, there's not shelter, and let's get those things in place, sort of counseling calm among the refugee-hosting countries.

You asked where are they. The 500,000 are primarily in Iran, Jordan, Syria, with smaller numbers in Europe who might not have official refugee status, but would still come back. Even now some are coming back unassisted, just voluntarily deciding the conditions are right and they want to be back. They want to participate in basically the rebirth of their country, and that's a good thing.

Mr. HALLORAN. Another condition that could have would be some sort of legal system of a refugee comes back from Iran saying, oh, somebody is living in my house.

Mr. GREENE. That's a very important issue—property claims have been a very contentious issue in every postconflict situation, particularly the Balkans, Kosovo, and we need to get that assessment facility, that adjudication facility to take place. And it's a long, lengthy, complicated process that is still even now going on in the Balkans and Kosovo.

Mr. HALLORAN. What about maybe, though, it was pointed out before that perhaps the only benefit of a totalitarian regime is they keep pretty precise records of things. So maybe the land records are complete anyway.

Mr. GREENE. A problem of all the looting is that a lot of records have disappeared.

Mr. HALLORAN. OK. You want to comment on refugees in the work that you've done? I know the relocation issue in the Balkans particularly was—is still, I think, today a huge hurdle.

Dr. WESTIN. Well, I think also it points to another of the underlying tensions that has to be taken care of. I'm not too familiar with the refugee problem with Iraq, but certainly our work on the Balkans and refugee issues that we've done elsewhere point out that it's likely to be a considerably difficult situation to overcome.

One thing I did want to add, though, as we were talking before about the international forces and the involvement in the United Nations, it's my understanding that in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan there was an international stabilization force, either NATO-led or U.N.-led, whereas I believe the U.N. resolution for Iraq points out it's the United States and Great Britain are occupying powers. And I'd be interested to hear what the NGO's had to say, if that makes them feel that they're viewed differently when they're working with the military as opposed to some of the other countries.

Mr. HALLORAN. And finally, the reference before to the—was it 400 Palestinians living in a stadium?

Mr. GREENE. 4,000.

Mr. HALLORAN. Where are they from, and what's their fate?

Mr. GREENE. These are some Palestinians who were sort of protected status under Saddam who now have been evicted out of where they were living. They're getting assistance from UNHCR and from ICRC, but 4,000 people living in the stadium, just like the same pictures you see of Liberians living in a stadium, it's pretty miserable and sort of ties into the overall Palestinian refugee problem in terms of finding a place for them to go to.

Mr. HALLORAN. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just conclude with being a little clearer about one or two things about our government policy. One relates to the Ba'ath party and the Republican Guard; and, Dr. Collins, this may be an area I need to focus with you. I'm unclear as to what our policy is. If you were a member of the Ba'ath party, you are not allowed to do what? Participate in government activities? You're not allowed to own business? What aren't you allowed to do?

Dr. COLLINS. I don't know that policy very well. But it is my understanding that if you were a senior member of the Ba'ath party,

that you are banned from office; and I'm not sure that there's anything beyond that right now.

A lot of those people, of course, have had security problems here and there. There's a couple of different lists of people who are wanted for questioning. There, of course, was the deck of cards, which was the top 55 and; then there was another group on some kind of list that was often colloquially referred to as the "black list" and that was a few hundred officials. Those people, of course, are enduring much more than a ban on public participation.

Mr. SHAYS. I think my focus really isn't on that, and I think this may be outside your area. The real issue is the accusation, which seems plausible to me, but I have a disadvantage. I haven't been allowed to go into Iraq to understand this myself because my government really is not eager to have Members of Congress go, but the accusation from the embedded press, which is allowed to go and in whom I have to get my information, has suggested that there are so many members of the Ba'ath party and the Republican Guard who are not major players who are being shut out of a future Iraq. The question I have is, is that true and is that policy going to be reexamined? And if you can't speak accurately to that information, then I would prefer that you just tell me that.

Dr. COLLINS. I don't know where the dividing lines are. There has been a lot of concern also about mid-level military and security force officers as being the cornerstone, if you will, of these diehards who are attacking our troops. Beyond that, sir, I don't know the specific answer.

Mr. SHAYS. Just in this final area as it relates to the debt which I am told we still don't have a handle on what Iraq owes to other countries pre war, but I'm told that it is unbelievable amount, in the tens and tens and tens of billions of dollars, a lot of it to Russia and France, is some of our reluctance to have France involved or Russia involved related in any way to that issue?

Dr. COLLINS. I have never heard such a discussion that would suggest that we don't want France and Russia involved because of that. Iraq also has a tremendous debt to its once friendly neighbors like Kuwait. So it is a very mixed picture and a very serious problem.

Mr. SHAYS. Any of you speak, though, to the issue of the burden of such a large debt and does that mean ultimately that oil revenues—originally, I said should come to the United States to pay for the war, and I think I was rightfully criticized—not criticized. Let me put it this way. I was set straight by the administration who said it is going to go to the Iraqi people. But is there a danger that if there's such a large debt that it's going to the debtors rather than to the Iraqi people and then we end up having to pick up the bill?

Mr. GREENE. The only thing I will say on this is that debt forgiveness is going to be a very hot topic of negotiation and already is.

Mr. SHAYS. And can I suggest, that rather than saying "hot topic," an important topic?

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Finally, last thing, and the full Committee on Government Reform is going to get into this whole issue of the con-

tracts and who got them, but I would like a general reaction to what I think is plausible but may be totally inaccurate and that is, in some instances, there are a few companies that are incapable of doing the work. The task is so significant that, rather than doing what we usually do in government and that is take 6 months, and obviously the extreme was a year, to award the contract and get it out, we said we have to find the best and the brightest, give them the contract and let them run.

Somehow it seems plausible to me, and yet I realize that I don't have any of my Democratic colleagues to then point out to me that some of these contracts seem to go to people that were friends of the administration. What are we to be expecting from you, Dr. Westin and Dr. Collins, Mr. Greene and Mr. Kunder? Can you comment on the need to get contracts out and are these contracts going to the best and the brightest?

I saw three people pointing this way.

Dr. WESTIN. I am willing to start. We do have work under way under the authority of the Comptroller General. We are not doing this as a result of any request. We are looking at these initial contracts and the process to make sure that they were given in accordance with the way that USAID is allowed to give contracts; and we're looking at all companies, not just singling out individual companies.

Mr. KUNDER. I sat in every one of those contract meetings, sir; and I can tell you exactly what happened. It was precisely what you said happened. We had to plan ahead. Nobody knew if we were going to war, and nobody knew if we went to war how long it would take to win the war, but we knew this much, that if at some point if we went to war and if the war—when the war was over that our soldiers would look over their shoulders and they would expect somebody to be able to rebuild the bridges and power plants and water treatment facilities and everything we're talking about today.

And the last thing we wanted to have happen was then to wait 6 months while we had the Federal contracting procedures churn through the system. Then you would have had us up here asking us why on Earth we didn't have a contract in place. So we took the flexible authority that the Congress has given us under the Federal procurement procedures to do limited competition. We followed—our procurement executive, who will go to jail if he doesn't follow precisely the law of the land, told us exactly what we could do; and we followed the law to the letter.

Mr. SHAYS. You said it a little inaccurately. You said you will follow him to jail. So I want you to say that over again.

Mr. KUNDER. I said our Federal procurement executive, who will go to jail if he does not—

Mr. SHAYS. I want to emphasize—

Mr. KUNDER. If he doesn't follow the Federal procurement law to the letter on what precisely the Congress has given us. And within those flexibilities we then used the most flexible procedures we could according to law to shorten the list, shorten the timeframes; and then according to the letter of the law and the spirit of the law, we issued those contracts as rapidly as we could and got the firms out there who could do the job; and, thank God, they are doing the

job. So the water treatment facilities are being rebuilt, and we are up to 75 percent of electricity. And we welcome the GAO study. We're proud of the work that was done. And that's exactly what we did. We used the law the way you gave it to us to get the job done.

Mr. SHAYS. You're doing a little lobbying with GAO right here, so you're welcome.

Let me just say before you go, is there anything that any of you wants to put on the record that you think needs to be put on the record?

Mr. KUNDER. Sir, I would like to say something about our Federal Civil Service employees, because I have enormous respect for the NGO workers, having been one, and for our soldiers, but we have 35 civil servants out there unarmed walking around the countryside and another 320 contractors working for us who are also part of this picture, and they are living out there in pretty miserable conditions and doing a great job as well.

Mr. SHAYS. I was going to close my remarks before I let you go to say the exact same thing. I guess I already said that our government employees are pretty outstanding and—very outstanding, and I am in awe of the men and women in our military who serve us, the men and women in the State Department and USAID. I am in awe of all the people in our government who are involved in this process. I know they are working 7 days a week, I know they have been separated from their families, and I know they believe they have a real mission here.

I am just going to share one of my disappointments. I just wish that as a Member of Congress I could see that firsthand instead of having you tell me about it. I just wish the Secretary of Defense would at least allow us to go to some of the areas where General Garner has said it's safe and then allow us, as Members of Congress, to decide whether we're willing to go into places that aren't safe and live with the consequences as you all are doing, as the press is doing and the NGO's are doing. And I continue to appreciate the work of the GAO. I am a very proud Congressman to have such fine employees working in government.

I thank each and every one of you, and I thank you for your kindness and patience. I know you had other commitments, and I didn't see a frown on your face even if you felt it in your heart and thank you for that. So we'll get to the third panel, but my hat's off to all four of you. Thank you so much.

Our third and final panel is Ms. Tammy Willcuts, humanitarian operations specialist, Save the Children—and for the purpose of proper disclosure, Save the Children is located proudly in Westport, CT, a town I represent; Mr. Serge Duss, director of public policy and advocacy, World Vision, Inc., USA; and Mr. Patrick Carey, senior vice president for programs, CARE.

We have three extraordinary organizations that will be testifying. I thank you all for your patience, and I need you to stand up, and I need to swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. All three of our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

It's been a long day but actually very helpful to have you listen to the testimony that preceded you, and I am going under the good

faith that our government welcomes you being honest with this committee—obviously, will be honest but that our government welcomes you being honest and that you do not need to fear that honesty somehow will hurt your organizations or the tasks that you have to do. I think that I'm saying that with the full confidence that the State Department and the Defense Department feel that way, and let me say to you as well that we all can relax. You have been in far worse circumstances than coming before Congress or a Member of Congress.

I am also going to say to Ms. Willcuts, I will forever be indebted to what you did to allow me to spend 8 hours in Iraq; and I remember one thing that just blew me away. We were with someone who was from the press, Mr. Frank Luntz; and I was able to travel under the auspices of Save the Children, but he went in under the press. And at 11 p.m., we were talking about leaving the next day at 7 a.m., or 6:30—I think it was 6:30—and, unfortunately, he didn't have a driver or a car; and I'll never forget, one of your employees—and I'm thinking I brought him all the way here and this guy is not going to go in, he can't ride with us. And your employee said, it's only 11 p.m. We're not leaving until 6 a.m. We've got 7 hours. That "go to" attitude resulting in his having a car and driver, and I thought that says a lot.

At any rate, I have made it clear you are my heroes; and now I'll ask you tough questions to learn some stuff.

So, Ms. Willcuts, thank you for being here. You have the floor, and you have 10 minutes or less.

STATEMENTS OF TAMMIE WILLCUTS, HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS SPECIALIST, SAVE THE CHILDREN; SERGE DUSS, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC POLICY AND ADVOCACY, WORLD VISION, INC., USA; AND PAT CAREY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR PROGRAMS, CARE

Ms. WILLCUTS. Thank you so much for inviting us to come and to speak about the issues that we have faced in Iraq and that you have had the opportunity to see firsthand. I spent 3 months in Basra in the south of Iraq leading Save the Children's humanitarian response.

I would like to say that I have submitted a formal testimony, and I would like to just focus on three basic things.

First of all, the importance that we have found in having a clearly differentiated line from the military. It's essential for the humanitarian aid agencies to have that and to be seen as impartial and independent.

Second, the government and private relief and development agencies must prioritize the needs of women and children and the protection of women and children in all their dealings with the Iraqi people.

Third, we would like to request that the role of the United Nations and other international partners be expanded and supported.

Before I go into these in too much detail, I'd like to update you a little bit about our operations in Basra and in Iraq. Currently, we're employing 98 staff, 80 of whom are local Iraqi people. Our international staff come from 13 different countries. Our total funding equals approximately \$11 million, the majority of which comes

from USAID, from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. We receive funding from private donors, from the International Office of Migration, from the World Food Program, and from UNICEF and from private donors individually for Save the Children. While our regional office is headquartered in Basra in the south, we also are working with children and their families in Baghdad, in Najaf and in Karbala.

Some of the different programs we are involved in—we have five different sectors that we do.

First and foremost, we work with protection and education of children. That's including, for example, preschool kids. We've distributed 100 preschool kits to different schools and children around the south.

We're also working on mine awareness and hygiene education for these schools in and around Basra.

Save the Children has an agreement with UNICEF and with the Minister of Health to reestablish the targeted nutrition centers that were defunct after 12 years to ensure that the nutritional needs of children are being met.

We are also the implementing partner with the United Nations World Food Program in Basra and Najaf and Karbala, where we just completed our second monthly round of distribution of food to the vulnerable groups as well as those in orphanages, elderly homes and some other institutions. We have also been working to do some minor structural repairs in some of those same locations.

We have a new grant from UNICEF to do a rapid assessment of protection needs of children throughout Iraq. Save the Children has been working to improve access to clean water in Basra. This has included things like replacing pumps and ball bearings and filters and things that come into a main pumping station and then are distributed throughout six different smaller pumping stations in Basra governance, which is ensuring clean water for children. And, finally we're involved extensively in providing medication and education to health facilities and health staff to ensure that the clinics and hospitals get up and running as quickly as possible.

After 3 months in Iraq in addition to the 70 years experience that Save the Children has been doing humanitarian aid, we have learned some things about the way we found that humanitarian aid works for us. Those are, first of all, that reconstruction and rebuilding of societies takes a lot of time. It does not happen overnight. We have learned that it takes not only the physical structures of the buildings and the repairs of the windows and the doors, but it also needs the involvement from the social side. The children that are going to the schools need to be involved, the teachers, the parents, the neighborhoods so that they are supporting it.

We have also learned that the backbone of our programs is our local staff, that our local staff have to be a part of what we were doing. They need to own the programs themselves. They need to be able to speak with authority and with knowledge about who we are and what we represent and what we are doing. Having that backbone allows us to have our next lessons learned, which is we need to have a good relationship with our community, and the best way we need to have good relationship is that the local staff we have

can speak on our behalf because they are part of that community. They have the language, they have the context and the cultural knowledge.

And, third, we found that having this combination of local staff who can support and understand our programs as well as the community support is what allows us to have an appropriate approach to security. Security is the main barrier for humanitarian aid in Iraq for our organization.

One of our main goals is to find this humanitarian space that's been spoken of by several people today. We need to remain neutral and independent of the U.S. Military to ensure the safety of our staff.

Today, the problems that we find for our staff and for both our international and local staff is crime, drive-by shootings and kidnappings. We've experienced two of these three just within a 1-week period. We experienced some drive-by shootings. We had a person who lived across the street from our office who was shot and killed. We have a small shop right across from one of our team houses which is also near the office where some armed bandits came and robbed this small store. So it's a very real issue.

We have heard that an Italian NGO working in Basra has had three drive-by shootings in just a 5-day period. As a result of this, safety of our staff is the No. 1 priority for Save the Children.

We are working to reduce the security risks for our workers by taking a number of steps. First among these is to hire a full-time security manager for our program in Iraq. Our security manager is tasked with providing the physical security of our office and our team houses as well as program sites. This includes things like lighting and walls and perimeter areas and making sure it's a safe place for all of our staff to come to work. It also includes having an appropriate and rigorous security plan which is followed by all of our staff.

In addition, as I said before, we strive always to maintain our independence and our impartiality from the military. While doing that, we've also found that strengthening our ties with the United Nations has been an appropriate way to have ties with the community in a way that they understand, because the United Nations has had a presence in Iraq for a long time and people are familiar with what they represent and what they stand for. Increasing those ties has also been a way of increasing our security.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for your wonderful testimony. Very helpful.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Willcuts follows:]



**Testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform:
"Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations:
Overcoming Barriers—Part II"**

**Tammie Willcuts
Humanitarian Operations Specialist
Save the Children**

July 18, 2003

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing Save the Children the opportunity to testify before your committee and for your leadership in bringing us together to discuss the challenges that confront the NGO community and the US government in providing humanitarian assistance in Iraq. I am pleased to represent Save the Children before this committee.

The history of Save the Children reflects our deep commitment to working with children in war torn settings. Founded by Eglantyne Jebb, the author of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, in London in 1919, Save the Children's original focus was on providing food for starving children in Europe in the wake of World War I. In 1938 Save the Children provided food, blankets and medicine to children displaced by war in England, France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Finland. Post World War II support for children was expanded to Holland, Greece and West Germany. The organization entered Korea in 1951 to assist civilians caught in the conflict of war. According to Eglantyne Jebb, "all wars are waged against children."

Today Save the Children US works in 18 states across the United States as well as in more than 40 countries in the developing world to help children and families improve their health, education and economic opportunities. We continue to mobilize rapid life-support assistance for children and families caught in conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies – such as in Afghanistan, Nepal, Guinea, West Bank and Gaza, Indonesia, and now Iraq.

My written statement will focus on three points regarding the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in post-conflict settings: 1) The lessons we have learned from providing humanitarian assistance in previous crisis and how we have applied these to our operations in Iraq; 2) The challenges that we are encountering in providing humanitarian assistance in Iraq; and finally, 3) The solutions that we recommend for overcoming these challenges in Iraq and in future conflict situations.

First, I'd like to give you some information on what it is Save the Children is doing in Iraq. We currently have 18 international and over 80 national staff working in Iraq, with another 5 national staff working in Kuwait. Our current funding includes \$4 million from the US Agency for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, \$80,000 in private resources, \$80,000 from Save the Children Norway, and \$50,000 from DFID – the British equivalent of USAID, \$30,000 from the International Office of Migration (IOM), and most recently \$60,000 from UNICEF.

In Baghdad, we are working to provide information for mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance from school facilities and recreational areas around schools. We are also providing school and recreational supplies in the peri-urban Dora and Shula sections of the city. In order to ensure that secondary school girls can get to school safely, we are providing transport and working with communities on ways to ensure security for all

students on the way to school. Examples of this are community watches and escorts by parents.

In Basrah we have provided 100 preschool kits that include art supplies, recreational equipment, school supplies, games, story and songbooks, blackboard paint, and other supplies. We are also working in mine awareness and hygiene education in the schools in Basra governorate.

Save the Children has an agreement with UNICEF to assist the Ministry of Health (MOH) in reestablishing the Targeted Nutrition Program in Basrah Governorate.

Our organization is the implementing partner with the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) in Al Basrah, Najaf and Karbala governorates, where the first monthly food distribution to vulnerable group institutions (orphanages, elderly homes and mental institutions) and internally displaced peoples or IDPs have been completed. Additionally, Save the Children has been coordinating minor structural repairs to the orphanages, elderly homes and schools in Al Basrah and Karbala.

The recent grant from UNICEF is to provide funding for a short-term rapid assessment of the immediate protection needs of vulnerable children. Save the Children has also replaced pumps, ball bearings and filters for the main source of water for the Basrah governorate, ensuring safe drinking water for children and their families. Finally, in cooperation with the World Health Organization, Save the Children is providing essential medications, medical supplies, and health and safety training for children in hospitals and clinics in Basrah and Karbala.

Lessons Learned from Providing Humanitarian Assistance

One of the key lessons that Save the Children has learned in our 85 years of providing humanitarian assistance is the necessity of **building good relationships with the community**. In our programs in the US and in the 40 countries in which we work, this is a hallmark of our programs – involving the community in identifying their own needs and in working with them to solve their problems. Although building relationships, which translates into building ownership, takes some time, it engenders the trust and credibility needed to move forward with the support of the community to accomplish our joint humanitarian goals and improve security.

Which leads me to my next point – the importance of **hiring local staff to lead, coordinate and represent the organization on the ground**. The backbone of our programs around the world are our local and national staff that have the cultural skills and knowledge to move forward our programs in communities where US nationals could never work. We have learned that together we can share our varied expertise that result in cutting edge development and humanitarian assistance programming. I have heard over and over from my colleagues that the strength of our programming in Iraq is our Iraqi staff. We have worked side by side with them and they “own” our programs there. In addition, gaining acceptance locally for our mission and activities through the efforts

of all our staff, but particularly our Iraqi staff, is the foundation to our approach to security.

We learned that **reconstruction requires patience** – that rebuilding societies, cities, towns, mosques – doesn't happen overnight. In an age where we are all driven to deliver progress in a matter of hours or days, our practical experience demonstrates that the major successes after World War II and the Korean War were achieved after many years if not decades.

Not only does building local commitment require patience, we have also learned the lesson that **reconstruction must focus not only on material outputs** – how many schools are built, pantries stocked, hospitals supplied – **but also on the social infrastructure**. Do the women and children feel *safe* enough to go to the school or to visit the hospital? Do communities feel enough ownership of physical infrastructure to protect it and maintain it?

Finally, leading up to the war in Iraq, Save the Children was a part of Joint NGO Emergency Preparedness Initiative for Iraq Consortium, known as JNEPI. Other members of the Consortium included the International Rescue Committee, International Medical Corps, World Vision and Mercy Corps. Funded by OFDA, the grant to this Consortium allowed us to enhance the ability of international NGOs to prepare for and respond to humanitarian needs resulting from a conflict in Iraq. Aspects of such enhanced ability include strengthening the coordination of NGO assessment and planning activities in the region, providing a point of contact for inter-agency communication and liaison, improving information sharing and regular reporting within the NGO community and enabling consortium members to establish adequate contingency staffing, systems and resources in the region. We learned that this planning continued to play a key role in our ongoing operations. **We strongly recommend this type of planning and coordination whenever there is opportunity for advanced preparation.**

Barriers to Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq

The main barrier for anyone working in Iraq continues to be security. Although in some ways life in Iraq is returning to normal – stores are open, people are leaving their homes, children are slowly returning to school – more needs to be done.

As US military are increasingly being targeted for violence by those committed to resisting occupation authority, NGOs are at a growing risk of becoming targets themselves. While I totally agree that the US government should be recognized for their generosity in providing humanitarian assistance, this recognition should not endanger the lives of humanitarian workers and should be handled differently in different situations.

There must be a balance between the safety and security of our staff and the need for providing recognition of the funding source.

Additionally there is a need for "humanitarian space" for NGOs working in Iraq to provide assistance – this refers to physical and political space. We must remain neutral

and independent of the US military. If we are seen as one united operation -- military and humanitarian -- humanitarian workers in many parts of the world will be at risk of their lives because we'll be seen as taking sides.

This is an issue that is very real to us. Only three weeks ago, June 27, protesters angered by the deportation of five al Qaeda suspects unexpectedly attacked our office in Mangochi, Malawi and beat three of our staff. The protesters also attacked several churches in the immediate area of Mangochi. This incident was the first act of violence at one of our offices in 10 years of operating in Mangochi. Independence is our buffer between safety and risk.

Finally, large-scale contractor plans must include the input, consultation, and ownership of the Iraqi people. Without the partnership of the Iraqis, these schools, orphanages, hospitals, government works will continue to be targeted for looting and destruction. **The reconstruction strategy must emphasize Iraqi ownership.**

Recommendations

In May our primary recommendation was that the United States military must move quickly to establish a functioning police force that can restore order. But the main area of concern for Save the Children continues to be the interaction between humanitarian organizations and US military actors on the ground. While interaction between civil and military actors on the ground is both a reality and a necessity, particularly in sharing information about security, the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian workers and organization must be maintained.

While many of us are focused on the war and Iraq, let me also note that there are over thirty wars now being waged around the world. One in four children worldwide live in one of these dangerous situations. In the past decade, more than 2 million children were killed during wartime, more than 4 million survived physical mutilation, and more than 1 million were orphaned or separated from their families as a result of war. I urge the members of this Committee to join Representative Shays in supporting the *Women and Children in Armed Conflict Protection Act of 200, HR 2356*. **The US government and NGOs must prioritize the protection needs of women and children in the onset of our humanitarian response.**

Finally, similar to Afghanistan, the only way to ensure a long-term commitment of funding by the greatest number of partners, as well as adequate support for international policing, is to demonstrate an international presence and leadership. **Save the Children supports an expanded role for the United Nations and other international partners for post conflict reconstruction.**

Again, our recommended solutions;

- **The differentiation between the role of humanitarian workers and the military must be made clear.**

- **The US government and NGOs must prioritize the protection needs of women and children in the onset of our humanitarian response.**
- **The role of the United Nations and other international partners in post conflict reconstruction must be expanded.**

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Duss.

Mr. DUSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify before the subcommittee.

Before I do, I would like to introduce into the hearing record a letter to President Bush that was sent yesterday and signed on by nine NGO's that are either working in Iraq or closely involved in advocacy with this administration. The letter essentially is asking the administration to address the problems that are hindering the fulfillment of its obligations as the occupying power in Iraq, and so I offer the letter here for the record.

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection, it will be inserted in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]



July 17, 2003

President George W. Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

President
Mary E. McClymont
Chair
Daniel E. Pellegrini,
Pathfinder International

Vice Chair
Geeta Rao Gupta,
International Center for Research on Women

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Michael Deegan, ACCD/VOCA
Chris Dunford, Freedom from Hunger
Neal Kany-Guyer, Mercy Corps
Lelani Lelaolu, Counterpart International
Lavinia Limon,
Immigration & Refugee Services of America
Charles McCormack, Save the Children
John McCullough, Church World Service
Ruth Messenger,
American Jewish World Service
Steve Moseley,
Academy for Educational Development
Sarah Newhall, Pact
Raymond Offenheiser, Oxfam-America
John M. Palmer, III, Helen Keller Worldwide
Linda Pfeiffer, INMED
William Reese,
International Youth Foundation
Karen Remley, Physicians for Peace
Leonard Rubenstein,
Physicians for Human Rights
George Rupp,
International Rescue Committee
Ritu Sharma, Women's Edge
Milo Stanojevic, CARE
Sandra Swan,
Episcopal Relief and Development
Bruce Wilkinson, World Vision

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Dear Mr. President:

The undersigned agencies, members of InterAction, are implementing programs in Iraq. We are writing to urge the U.S. government to address the problems that are greatly hindering the fulfillment of its obligations as the occupying power in Iraq, including: insecurity; immobilization of the Iraq civil service; limited access to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); and lack of transparency surrounding the CPA's planning and programs.

Insecurity: Insecurity is not confined to Baghdad; it is affecting most of the country. Attacks on coalition forces are only one very important manifestation of insecurity. Humanitarian organizations, including the World Food Program and the International Organization for Migration, also have been attacked. In addition, rampant criminal activity is hindering the ability of humanitarian workers to provide life-saving services to the people of Iraq. Warehouses continue to be looted, vehicles stolen, and more areas are off limits due to increased violence. Many Iraqis, particularly women and girls, are afraid to engage in normal daily activities including school attendance. Moreover, Iraqi women are confronting a growing challenge to their freedoms as individuals and as members of Iraqi society.

As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently pointed out, attacks by remnants of Saddam Hussein's security forces, *fedayeen* fighters and Iraqi prisoners released before the war are increasing in frequency and sophistication. We urge your administration to act quickly and take the steps necessary to establish security in Iraq so that the Iraqi people can begin to rebuild their lives.

Iraqi Civil Service: While insecurity has crippled efforts to restore essential public services and increased risks to public health, the fact that Iraqi civil servants in health services and other critical jobs remain unpaid or underpaid further undermines service delivery and the willingness of Iraqi civilians to cooperate with the CPA. The wholesale dismissal of government managers who may have been associated with the Baath Party has also contributed to immobilizing a civil service more accustomed to taking orders than exercising initiative. High priority should be given to the

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InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S. based international development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations operating in every developing country.

regular and full payment of civil service salaries, and efforts should be made to reintegrate former government managers deemed acceptable back into the civil service.

Access and Transparency: Access to officials of the CPA, including those assigned to government ministries, remains extremely difficult for Iraqi civilians and many NGOs. Identifying government counterparts whose portfolios include humanitarian and development assistance remains a challenge. In addition, many of the CPA's plans and policies lack transparency, undermining the trust of the Iraqi people and creating unnecessary hurdles for aid groups attempting to deliver assistance in an orderly, systematic way. Plans for dealing with the forced displacement of Palestinians and others, as well as for refugee resettlement, are among those that need to be developed and shared with the affected populations.

While CPA officials appear reluctant to allow a greater role for the United Nations in coordinating relief and reconstruction efforts, it is the only institution with an international mandate to coordinate such a response and one of the few with substantial experience in this area. We strongly believe that a clearer and more robust role for the UN would help address the persistent problems surrounding access and transparency. Furthermore, it would encourage greater contributions by other donors and help maintain the distance between Iraqi civilians and civilian agencies and military forces.

We commend the Administration for its support for the establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council, which appears to be a step in the right direction toward greater Iraqi involvement in determining the future of their country. This and other initiatives designed to give Iraqis hope for the future can only succeed if the United States and its partners address the continuing insecurity and deteriorating public services that the Iraqi people, and the humanitarian agencies seeking to assist them, currently confront.

Thank you for your consideration.

Air Serv
CARE
Church World Service
Concern Worldwide
Lutheran World Relief
Oxfam America
Refugees International
Relief International
World Vision

Cc: Secretary of State Colin Powell

Mr. DUSS. World Vision is a humanitarian organization in the United States. It is a faith-based relief agency serving the world's poorest children and families in nearly 100 countries. In fiscal year 2002, World Vision and its partners from 17 industrial countries raised a little more than \$1 billion in cash and gifts in kind from private and public donors.

World Vision anticipates a 12 to 24-month program in Iraq, operating on an annual budget of approximately \$10 million. This program focuses primarily on children's needs for food, health care, education and reconstruction of schools and health facilities. Funding sources include USAID, the World Food Program, the governments of Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as contributions from citizens in a dozen industrial nations, including the United States.

Since beginning humanitarian operations in Iraq nearly 3 months ago, World Vision has worked principally in the city of Mosul and in the western Iraq city of Al Rutba, along with towns and villages in the corridor from Jordan to Mosul.

In Mosul, World Vision provides assistance to internally displaced persons. It provides an adequate supply of essential drugs to the region's 14 hospitals and has thus far rehabilitated 15 primary and secondary schools damaged by the war or post-conflict looting. We are planning to rehabilitate an additional 80 to 90 schools within the next 12 to 18 months.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked World Vision and other NGO's to direct its testimony on progress made in achieving the 11 essential tasks outlined by Lieutenant General Jay Garner in his testimony to the subcommittee on May 13. I am not able to address all these issues. However, from the viewpoint of a humanitarian relief and development agency I would like to offer four recommendations that World Vision considers most pressing to adequately address human need in Iraq.

No. 1, a secure environment for relief and reconstruction must be established. The continuing violence, looting and instability makes security the greatest challenge in attempting to adequately meet humanitarian need. In the northern area of Iraq where World Vision works, insecurity prevents us from reaching some areas and serving others. Just a few weeks ago, fighting in Mosul wounded 18 U.S. soldiers and forced the World Food Program to declare 2 evacuation days. While World Vision did not leave the city, its staff was "locked down" and unable to work.

Already this month there has been a series of hostile incidents in Mosul, including a grenade machine gun fire attack on a World Food Program office, a coalition force humvee was attacked, and a sustained 30-minute mortar attack was launched on Mosul airport. As a result of these and other incidents, World Vision has decided to increase its security and relocate temporarily the majority of its staff to Ahmen Jordan for the period of July 10 to 20. Two World Vision staff remain in Mosul.

Insecurity is compounded by the lack of local Iraqi counterparts with whom to work. Banning all or most former members of the Ba'ath party—instead of just the top three or four levels—means that there are very few competent civil servants. Mid-level and lower level servants in totalitarian regimes are rarely fanatical

supporters of the regime since they see the government's failings up close. The Coalition Provisional Authority would be wise to reinstate public servants subject to subsequent reviews of their history. Because World Vision and other NGO's typically work with local private and public partners, we are finding the virtual absence of a functional civil society a major challenge in operating humanitarian programs.

No. 2, prioritize the needs of children. Half of Iraq's population of 23 million is under the age of 18. Children have suffered the cumulative and catastrophic effects of Saddam Hussein's regime and now the war. One of every four children under the age of 5 is severely malnourished. One in eight Iraqi children die before the age of 5. Nearly a third of all girls and almost 20 percent of boys are not attending primary school. The protection and development of children is the very foundation for the future of Iraq.

High priority should be given to ensuring that children are enrolled in primary education as soon as possible and that no child faces discrimination in access to school. Every effort should be made to preserve official government records that establish children's identities. New documents should be issued to children whose records have been lost, confiscated or destroyed. Girls particularly require special attention and protection from sexual and physical abuse.

No. 3, clearly separate humanitarian and military efforts. One of the lessons of the last few years with humanitarian assistance following military operations is that the military and humanitarian NGO's have different comparative advantages. Military objectives and humanitarian objectives are not always compatible, and sometimes they do conflict. Soldiers should do the jobs for which they are trained, and humanitarian professionals must be permitted to carry out their work without interference. At times, this means the military needs to establish security so that humanitarian agencies have safe and unimpeded access to people in need, but the roles of the two should never be confused.

A blurring of humanitarian and military activities on the ground carries great risks. The safety of humanitarian workers often depends on local perceptions. If aid workers appear partisan, if we play favorites, if our assistance is based on anything other than genuine need, we risk jeopardizing ourselves as well as those we seek to assist. If armed forces or governments insist on jeopardizing the impartiality of aid organizations, there will be less humanitarian space, fewer donations from other countries and many more desperate people whose needs will go unmet.

Finally, the fourth recommendation, Mr. Chairman, is foster international legitimacy through a leading coordinating role for the United Nations. World Vision welcomes steps that have been taken in the past 2 months to achieve a greater international role in the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The U.N. vote lifting sanctions against Iraq, its recognition of the Coalition Provisional Authority as a legitimate interim government and the recent world economic forum in Jordan to discuss Iraq's future have been helpful developments toward an assumption of international responsibility for Iraq. Yet World Vision and other international NGO's believe that the United Nations must play a much stronger role in the develop-

ment of a civil society in Iraq. We continue to ask President Bush to invite the United Nations to Iraq so it may carry out its traditional humanitarian coordination role.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I reiterate the four recommendations that World Vision considers most pressing in addressing humanitarian need in Iraq: No. 1, establish a secure environment for relief and reconstruction; No. 2, prioritize the needs of children; No. 3, clearly separate humanitarian and military efforts; and, No. 4, foster international legitimacy through a leading role for the United Nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify; and I would welcome any questions from you after the testimony is over.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Duss.

We have really heard two wonderful testimonies from this panel, very helpful, very well-organized.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duss follows:]



Statement of Serge Duss

**Director Public Policy and Advocacy
World Vision**

**On Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations:
Overcoming Barriers – Part II**

before the

**Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations**

U.S. House of Representatives

July 18, 2003

STATEMENT OF SERGE DUSS

Director Public Policy and Advocacy, World Vision

before the

**COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 18, 2003

Thank you Mr. Chairman for allowing me to testify today before your Subcommittee. World Vision, founded in 1950, is the largest privately funded humanitarian aid organization in the United States. We are a Christian relief and development agency serving the world's poorest children and families in nearly 100 countries.

About World Vision

World Vision United States is the American member of an international World Vision Partnership whose humanitarian mission is to work for the well being of poor and suffering people – especially children. World Vision assisted more than 85 million people in 96 nations last year, including disadvantaged youth and families in the United States. In fiscal year 2002, World Vision raised \$1.03 billion in cash and goods from private and public donors. Worldwide, the organization employs about 18,000 staff, 97 percent of whom work in their native countries.

World Vision's relief and development work is community-based, child-focused, and available to those in need, regardless of race, gender, ethnic background or religious belief. To deliver services

effectively, World Vision establishes relationships with community leaders and joins with churches, governments, and other aid agencies whenever possible and feasible.

World Vision in Iraq

While World Vision has worked intermittently in Iraq in the past, it had not been operational in recent years. In anticipation of the war, World Vision pre-positioned supplies and staff in Jordan, Syria, Iran and Turkey and negotiated agreements with the World Food Program, the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and faith-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Caritas and the Middle East Council of Churches.

Members of World Vision's global rapid response team entered Iraq in late April. Under an agreement with Coalition forces, UN agencies and other NGOs, World Vision assumed responsibility for meeting humanitarian needs in the governorate of Nineva, whose principal city is Mosul, and for Iraqi towns along the highway from Amman to Mosul.

In accepting this responsibility, World Vision anticipates a 12 to 24-month program in Iraq, operating on an annual budget of approximately \$10 million. The program will focus primarily on meeting children's needs for food, health care, education and reconstruction. Funding sources include USAID, the World Food Program, the governments of Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and private contributions from donors in a dozen developed nations, including the United States.

World Vision's humanitarian operations in Iraq

Since beginning humanitarian operations in Iraq nearly three months ago, World Vision has worked principally in the city of Mosul and in the westerly town of Al Rutba (population 25,000).

In Al Rutba, World Vision has helped restore electrical power; and is working to rehabilitate the primary health care clinic, refurbish 12 heavily-damaged primary and secondary schools, instituting an awareness program regarding landmines and unexploded ordnance, and has assisted 3,200 families with blankets, clothing, shoes, water containers, and plastic sheeting.

In Mosul, World Vision has assisted with the registration and provisioning of internally displaced persons, ensured an adequate supply of essential drugs to the region's 14 hospitals, and rehabilitated 15 primary and secondary schools damaged by war or post-conflict looting. We are planning to rehabilitate an additional 80-90 schools within the near future.

Key points on humanitarian assistance following military operations

I offer these preliminary comments about World Vision and its humanitarian operations in Iraq by way of context for my remarks. Among other things, the Subcommittee asked that I focus my testimony on progress made in achieving the 11 essential tasks outlined by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jay Garner in his testimony to the Subcommittee on May 13. Among the essential tasks put forward by General Garner were security, civil service pay, police training, restoration of basic services, food and fuel distribution, disease prevention, and installation of town councils and provincial governments.

I am not able to address all these issues. However, from the viewpoint of a humanitarian relief and development agency, I would like to emphasize four relevant recommendations that World Vision considers most pressing in addressing human needs in Iraq.

1. Establish a secure environment for relief and reconstruction. The continuing violence, looting and instability make security the biggest challenge in attempting to meet humanitarian needs. In the northern area where World Vision is working, insecurity prevents us from reaching some areas and serving others. Even in the relative security of Mosul, World Vision is forced to follow procedures such as a two-car convoy at all times. This effectively halves our resources. Just a few weeks ago, fighting in Mosul wounded 18 US soldiers and forced the World Food Programme to declare two evacuation days. While World Vision did not leave the city, they were “locked down” and idled.

During the month of July, there had been a series of hostile incidents in Mosul, including a grenade/machine gun fire attack on a WFP office; a coalition force humvee attacked, and a sustained 30-minute mortar attack on Mosul airport. As a result of these and other incidents, World Vision has decided to increase its security and relocate the majority of its staff to Amman, Jordan for the period of July 10-20, 2003. Two World Vision staff remain in Mosul.

The insecure situation is compounded by the lack of local Iraqi counterparts with whom to work. Banning all or most former members of the Baath Party -- instead of just the top three or four levels -- means there are very few competent civil servants. Mid-level and lower-level civil servants in totalitarian regimes are rarely fanatical supporters since they see the government’s failings up close. The Coalition Provisional Authority would be wise to reinstate public servants subject to subsequent reviews of their history. Because World Vision typically works with local private and public

partners, we are finding the virtual absence of a functioning civil society a major challenge in operating humanitarian programs.

Our staff in Iraq gives Paul Bremer, administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, credit for moving humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts along faster. Nonetheless, long-term security is proving difficult to obtain. Long-term security will require Iraqi self-reliance, self-rule and an early restoration of sovereignty.

2. Prioritize the needs of children. Half of Iraq's population of 23 million is under the age of 18. Children have suffered the cumulative and catastrophic effects of Saddam Hussein's regime, of sanctions, and of war. One of every four children under the age of five is severely malnourished. One in eight Iraqi children die before the age of five. Nearly a third of all girls and almost 20 percent of boys are not attending primary school. The protection and development of children is the very foundation for the future of Iraq.

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Conventions establish the inalienable rights of children to protection, security, identity, nutrition, education, participation and opportunity. In the case of Iraq, high priority should be given to ensuring that children are enrolled in primary education as soon as possible and that no child faces discrimination in access to school. Every effort should be made to preserve official government records that establish children's identity. New documents should be issued to children whose records have been lost, confiscated or destroyed. Girl children require special attention and protection from sexual and physical abuse.

3. Clearly separate humanitarian and military efforts. One of the lessons of the last few years with humanitarian assistance following military operations is that the military and humanitarian NGOs have different comparative advantages. Military objectives and humanitarian objectives are not always compatible and, in fact, can be in conflict. Let's allow soldiers to do their job and aid workers to do theirs. At times, that means that the military needs to establish security so that humanitarian agencies have safe and unimpeded access to people in need. But let's not confuse our roles.

For non-governmental organizations like World Vision to work effectively in post-conflict situations, we must establish a close and trusting relationship with the communities we serve. To do so, we must be seen and known to be impartial and independent of any military.

Confusing humanitarian and military activities carries great risks. Our safety often depends on local perceptions. If we appear partisan, if we play favorites, if our assistance is based on anything other than genuine need, we risk jeopardizing ourselves as well as those whom we seek to assist. If our staff become identified with foreign militaries, we are just as likely to be shot at as armed troops. If we are perceived as having any bias, it must be towards assisting children.

The Iraq situation, in particular, has challenged our commitment to maintain our independence and impartiality. NGOs working in Iraq have been uncomfortable with the degree of influence that the US military has exercised through the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) in Kuwait and the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). As you know, World Vision and other NGOs providing aid in Iraq drafted a series of principles clarifying what would constitute an unacceptable military control over our provision of humanitarian assistance.

Undue military control is not the only threat to impartial and independent delivery of humanitarian aid. World Vision and other NGOs are also concerned about being used as instruments of government foreign policy. Again, if we fail to maintain our impartiality and our independence, we risk endangering our staff and those whom we assist.

If armed forces or governments insist on jeopardizing the impartiality of aid organizations, there will be less humanitarian space, fewer donations from other countries and many more desperate people whose needs will go unmet.

4. Foster international legitimacy through a leading role for the United Nations. World Vision welcomes steps that have been taken in the past two months to achieve a greater international role in the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The UN vote lifting sanctions against Iraq, its recognition of the Coalition Provisional Authority as a legitimate interim government, the appointment of Sergio Vieira de Mello as the special representative of the UN Secretary General, and the recent World Economic Forum meeting in Jordan to discuss Iraq's future have been helpful developments toward an assumption of international responsibility for Iraq. Yet World Vision and other international NGOs continue to believe that the United Nations must play a much stronger role in the development of civil society in Iraq. We continue to ask President Bush to let the UN lead humanitarian efforts in Iraq.

UN involvement will help to coordinate agencies, international donors, and local and international NGOs. It will encourage burden sharing by the international community in meeting the needs of the

Iraqi people. It will ensure the impartiality and independence of humanitarian aid in a way that the United States cannot do alone.

This continues to be a critical time for civil society in Iraq. Open, honest, transparent structures must be put in place to encourage maximum citizen participation. A clear and robust role for the UN can help bring Iraqis together to develop the practices and institutions necessary to ensure a free and democratic society. The UN confers legitimacy on the transitional process as it relates to both humanitarian assistance and interim governance. A strong UN role enhances international trust and encourages burden sharing. In ways that no single nation can accomplish, the UN can play a key role in facilitating the emergence of an Iraqi constituent assembly and a new constitution. Our hope is that this constitution will ensure human rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion, that we hold so dear.

Conclusion

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this written testimony on behalf of World Vision to the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations.

In closing, I want to reiterate the four issues that World Vision considers most pressing in addressing humanitarian needs in Iraq. Those recommendations are:

1. **Establish a secure environment for relief and reconstruction.**
2. **Prioritize the needs of children.**
3. **Clearly separate humanitarian and military efforts.**
4. **Foster international legitimacy through a leading role for the United Nations.**

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Carey, I note you are a former Peace Corps volunteer. And so you are a fellow Peace Corps, as we were referred to by the folks in the countries we served.

Mr. CAREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

CARE, of course, is a large international relief and development organization. We operate programs of poverty reduction and disaster relief in more than 60 countries around the world.

As I am sure you also may have been aware from our previous testimony in May, CARE is one of the few NGO's that has had a long-term presence in Iraq. So we have been on the ground in Iraq in the last 12 years since 1991. After the last Gulf war, we stayed operational during the entire war except for a very few days except when it was physically impossible for our staff to continue. So we have a long-term history and commitment to Iraq.

My testimony today relies both on detailed information from our staff on the ground in Baghdad and around the country as well as some observations from a recent visit that I made to Iraq as well.

When we testified in May, we indicated that we felt the overriding priority in Iraq was reestablishment of law and order. In addition, we indicated that basic restoration of services, water, electricity, were of the highest priority and that it was important to prevent the deterioration of the health services to prevent humanitarian crisis. And, finally, we indicated that we thought it was critically important to pay civil servants salaries and bring those up to date.

I am now testifying on behalf of CARE 2 months later, and I have to say those remain the priorities. Those have not changed. And we feel in general that adequate progress has not been made in all of those areas. We feel in fact that's also substantiated by the 25-member Iraqi governing council that has just come into being and on July 13 stated its overwhelming priorities were the return to security and the restoration of basic services. And of course we also feel substantiated by the study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In the security area, we believe that the day-to-day security situation prevents us from fully carrying out our humanitarian task in the way we would like to do it and diverts funds from helping poor people and malnourished children in Iraq toward security purposes.

I would give just one anecdote, that we found a health clinic where we found significant numbers of malnourished children and wanted to distribute high-protein biscuits in that center. The people who ran the center said, please don't bring the biscuits here because, if you do, the looters will be back and we cannot prevent it. What they asked us to do was provide security devices—gates, barred windows and so forth—to prevent looting, rather than in the meantime feeding the children that needed to be fed out of that center. So we consider security to be a compelling ongoing priority that remains inadequately solved.

In terms of basic services, the primary problem remains the supply of electricity in major parts of the country. Although I don't want to play the percentages game with some of the previous testifiers, our on-the-ground staff indicate that as little as 2 weeks ago there were 3 full days in Baghdad without electricity and that

the average electricity supply for most of Baghdad is down to 3 hours a day. That's certainly not prewar level—anywhere near prewar level; and, although there has been some progress, that cascades into a whole range of effects on health status, reestablishment of the cold chain for immunizations and so forth.

In terms of the health crisis, the previous testifiers are correct. There is not a humanitarian crisis, but there are still alarming signals, and the basis for a health crisis still remains. Most recent reports indicate that, of referrals to health centers of children, that 22 percent or more of those referrals are for diarrheal diseases. That clearly is an indication of increasing sanitary problems. That's three times of the percentage rate of a year ago prior to the war, and it indicates a deterioration in the sanitary conditions brought about by lack of electricity supply, basic sewage services and safe water supply.

In terms of salaries, we have seen some significant progress there, but some of the workers that we work with, for example, the National Spinal Rehabilitation Center, have yet to receive any back payment of salaries that were promised to them up to this date, so that still requires substantial progress.

I just want to touch on three problems in the end and to make one or two comments also on previous testimony. One is we believe there is a real problem of access on the part of average Iraqis to the occupying Provisional Authority. When I was in Baghdad, Iraqi staff over and over again said that they really don't know what the Authority is doing, that it doesn't have a visibility and that it's difficult to access. Even we "as an NGO" with prior agreement to meet authorities, are often refused entry at the palace for hours at a time, even though we have had preclearance to get in there. If we're having trouble doing it, I think you can imagine what the trouble for the average Iraqi is.

And the symbolism of them being ensconced in the palace is not lost on the average Iraqi. Of course, partly for security reasons, it is a very isolated place; and we do not think that the authorities of the Provisional Authority are having enough contact on a day-to-day basis with average Iraqis.

And I want to mention one particular thing. I can't comment on the overall deBa'athification policy, but I can say how it affects us in the health sector, which is one of our primary sectors. And that is all of the senior levels of the health ministry were removed by the Provisional Authority under the deBa'athification process without any vetting whatsoever of whether they were compulsory involved in the Ba'ath party or not. So all the director generals of health were removed. That removes a layer of civil servants some of which were not committed to the Ba'ath party at all and could help to restore the basic services. So we would urge reexamination of that policy.

Next to the last, I would like to reemphasize that the issue of United Nations presence and greater international involvement in there is a fundamental one as far as CARE is concerned, and we think that needs to happen.

I finally wanted make one comment on a comment that General Garner made about the NGO's as purveyors of complaints that you might hear. Although I don't think that our purpose in life is to

complain, I think what our purpose in life is is to make sure that a humanitarian mandate is accomplished, and it's important for us to tell people when it's not possible to accomplish that humanitarian mandate, and I think we have a unique on-the-ground perspective. Certainly CARE and the other agencies has had an on-the-ground perspective of how things operate or how they don't operate, and it is important for us to tell you like it is, and I'm sorry if it's understood as complaints by General Garner.

Thank you, sir. We really appreciate the opportunity to testify.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carey follows:]

**CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
DELIVERED BY**

**PATRICK CAREY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT/PROGRAM,
CARE USA**



**BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING MILITARY OPERATIONS:
OVERCOMING BARRIERS—PART II**

JULY 18, 2003

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Patrick Carey, and I am CARE's Senior Vice President for Program. Thank you for inviting CARE back to testify in this second round of hearings on overcoming barriers to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance following military operations in Iraq.

In May, CARE delivered testimony to this committee in which we identified the restoration of law and order as the most pressing priority in Iraq. In addition, we urged that priority be accorded to a handful of other essential tasks, namely the restoration of electricity, water supply, waste treatment and other essential public services, prevention of a complete collapse of Iraq's fragile health system, and the immediate payment of salaries of essential government employees. *Our assessment today remains largely unchanged, and it has been confirmed by that of the new 25-member Iraqi governing council, whose statement after its first meeting on July 13 identified its priorities as "security and the resumption of services."*

We also testified at some length on the lessons the U.S. Government should learn from recent experience in Afghanistan. These include the need to quickly address the security vacuum that results from regime change, the need to mobilize resources for a sustained, multi-year reconstruction effort, the importance of establishing an international framework to enlisting the broadest possible participation of other countries, and the need for a quick transition to full civilian control of relief and reconstruction efforts.

Today, I will focus on what progress has been made in the critical tasks identified by both CARE and General Garner in May. *As much as I would like to be able to report that the situation has improved dramatically over the last two months, such an assessment can simply not be borne out by the facts on the ground.* Based on my own observations from a recent visit to Baghdad, as well as extensive input from my CARE colleagues in Iraq, I would like to use this testimony to identify some of the key barriers impeding relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and recommend actions that could be taken by the U.S. Government, as the occupying power, to overcome them.

II. INADEQUATE PROGRESS IN PRIORITY TASKS

In his May 13 testimony, General Garner identified 11 "essential tasks" for success in Iraq and indicated that substantial progress in all these areas would be made by mid-July. While CARE is not in a position to comment in detail on all of these priorities, I can provide you the latest first-hand assessment from my colleagues in Iraq on progress in four key areas: security; restoration of basic services in Baghdad; payment of civil servant salaries; and the prevention of disease outbreaks.

A. Security

Insecurity is not confined to Baghdad, but is instead widespread, and this instability has a highly detrimental impact on the efforts of NGOs to effectively deliver assistance. The nature of the security threat has changed in the past month, and CARE has to carefully monitor these developments and adjust our operations accordingly. Murders and carjackings are still common. There is less looting, but there is also a feeling that this is primarily due to the fact that relatively little of value remains to be looted. In the case of one primary health care center being assisted by CARE in Baghdad, clinic staff asked us not to provide high-protein biscuits for malnourished children, for fear that such supplies would attract looters. Instead, they asked CARE to improve clinic security by installing security gates and repairing doors, windows and locks; meanwhile, children are being sent home hungry.

The continuing high level of insecurity in Iraq, first and foremost, has a very negative impact on the lives of ordinary Iraqis, who are afraid to venture out of their homes at night, resume economic activities, and send their children back to school. Our colleagues in Iraq report that the current security situation is having a particularly negative impact on women's and girls' freedom of movement, thereby reducing their ability to participate in education and employment, due to fears of kidnap and assault.

The current insecurity also represents a high risk to humanitarian workers, including possible injury or death due to bombings, cross fire, banditry, carjackings and looting. *While most recent attacks have targeted Coalition forces, CARE is increasingly concerned about the potential for attacks against humanitarian agencies and other "soft targets."* Recent attacks on Iraqi civilians working to restore electricity are a very worrying sign in this regard. I would also draw your attention to a statement issued last week by the World Food Program, indicating an alarming rise over the past month in security incidents—including shootings, looting of storage facilities and attacks on trucks bringing food into southern Iraq— affecting its food aid operations in Iraq.

Insecurity is currently hampering CARE's operations in Iraq in a number of ways. After two CARE vehicles were stolen at gunpoint, we had to temporarily stop using our own vehicles and rely on taxis, limiting staff mobility to undertake assessments and visit project sites. We have recently returned CARE's vehicles to service, but only after painting them a vivid shade of green to deter carjackers. Due to poor security, we have also limited the number of international staff assigned to Baghdad and required those remaining to wear flak jackets and travel by convoy to and from work each day. CARE's Iraqi staff travel to most parts of the country, but they take precautions such as traveling in unmarked vehicles and only during daylight hours. In areas such as Diyala, CARE partner organizations are unable to visit some project sites due to security concerns.

In May, CARE testified that "establishing security throughout Iraq must be priority number one of the U.S. Government, and the assets required to accomplish this objective should be deployed immediately." *Acceptable levels of security have yet to be*

established, and the longer this situation persists, the greater the risk to the success of the overall mission of rebuilding Iraq in the wake of regime change.

B. Essential Public Services

The goal of restoring basic services in Baghdad to pre-war levels has clearly not been achieved. Indeed, the trend in the last month has been going in the wrong direction. Restoring a reliable supply of electricity is most critical, since, water and waste treatment facilities, hospitals and factories all depend on it. My colleagues in Baghdad report that, since June 23, electricity shortages in Baghdad have been severe. In many parts of the city, there was no electricity at all for a 72-hour period. Since then, many people have had power for only two hours per day. For NGOs providing humanitarian assistance, the lack of basic services draws valuable resources into expensive stop-gap measures like back-up generators, and increases the need for interventions such as water tankering that would be not be necessary if electricity were restored to pre-war levels.

Clearly, this trend must be quickly reversed, a task that is now all the more challenging due to targeted attacks on electricity and other utilities by elements opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq. The inability of the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA) to deliver reliable supplies of electricity at a time when temperatures in Baghdad routinely exceed 115°F feeds a climate of public anxiety and dissatisfaction. Importantly, the lack of basic utilities also compounds the security problem in Baghdad, as the unlit streets of the city are conducive to the operations of increasingly organized criminal gangs. Three months after the end of the war, there is still no functioning phone system in Baghdad, and this also greatly increases the security risks for humanitarian agencies.

Water supply problems in Baghdad have also increased since June 23, due to electricity shortages. None of Baghdad's three sewage treatment plants, designed to handle just 30% of the city's sewage, are currently functioning. As a result, all raw sewage is currently being discharged directly into the Tigris River. In the water and sanitation sector, concerted efforts are being made by a range of actors, including the OCPA, UNICEF, the International Red Cross, CARE and private contractors such as Bechtel, to work with the Iraqi General Corporation of Water and Sewage (GCWS) to restore adequate services. After 12 years of degradation of the basic water and sanitation infrastructure, there is an enormous amount of work to be done. In addition, the offices of the GCWS were thoroughly looted after the war; and just three weeks ago, newly supplied computers were again stolen. CARE has extensive experience in water and sanitation, and this sector is currently a major focus of our work in Iraq, with significant funding from the U.S. Government's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Under the first phase of this OFDA grant, CARE will undertake repairs of 21 water and sanitation systems in 14 governorates of Iraq. (For further details on CARE's current programs in Iraq, please refer to the two documents attached to this testimony.)

Rightly or wrongly, Iraqis are beginning to compare Coalition efforts to restore basic services to those of the Iraqi Government following the 1991 Gulf War. Despite

more direct damage to infrastructure as a result of bombing in 1991, the Saddam Hussein regime is remembered for having restored electricity and water supplies to pre-war levels within six weeks. Loosely translated, the Iraqi Government's slogan at the time was "To hell with the impossible." Although current efforts must repair even more dilapidated infrastructure, and do so in a context in which some elements of Iraqi society are violently resisting U.S.-led efforts, it is now critical that the Coalition Provisional Authority be seen by the Iraqi people to be accomplishing "the impossible."

C. Paying Civil Servant Salaries

Regular payment of civil servant salaries is essential to the restoration of vital public services, the importance of which has been highlighted above. It is also important because the government was the biggest employer in pre-war Iraq; payment of civil servant salaries is thus essential to getting money flowing in the Iraqi economy again.

The latest information that we have from the field is that, while some progress has been made in disbursing salaries, the goal of catching up on all such payments by June 30 has not been achieved. In May, a one-time \$20 payment to all civil servants, excluding the military, was made. Payment of May/June salaries was reported to have commenced in mid-June. Some 70% of government employees report having been paid at least once, but some have received no payments at all. One example is the staff of the Iraq National Spinal Centre, an institution assisted by CARE. Although it is not a hospital for the military, its budget falls under the Ministry of Defense, rather than the Ministry of Health. Its staff returned soon after the end of the bombing to find the hospital and their apartments looted. Although they have cleaned the hospital themselves and returned it to service with CARE's support, they had yet to receive any salaries as of two weeks ago.

Efforts to pay civil servants have been complicated by a number of factors, including a shortage of Iraqi dinars and significant fluctuations in exchange rates. Due to problems with the recently-issued 10,000 Iraqi dinar notes, the Provisional Authority decided to pay May/June salaries in U.S. dollars. At the time that this decision was made, one U.S. dollar equaled 2,000 Iraqi dinars; since then, the rate has declined to 1,400 Iraqi dinars, significantly reducing the purchasing power of these salary payments. We hope that the recent decision by the Coalition Authority to issue a new Iraqi currency in October will address some of these problems. In addition, the initial salary scale introduced by OCPA's predecessor, ORHA, was based solely on years of seniority, with the result that a very senior manager can be paid the same or less than a much lower level staff with equal or greater years of service.

Finally, the implementation of de-Baathification has resulted in the complete disbanding of the security forces, Ministry of Information, and other parts of the government most closely associated with Sadaam Hussein. This process has contributed to increased anxiety in the short-run, as ex-soldiers take to the street to demand some means of supporting their families. The OCPA has recently announced plans to form an Iraqi army of 40,000. In the interim, a payment of between \$US 50-150 per month will be

made to 235,000 previous members of the armed forces. This will exclude members of the special forces and republican guards.

We urge the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority to accord high priority to the regular payment of the salaries of government services. Doing so will improve service delivery, contribute to re-starting the Iraqi economy, and increase the ordinary Iraqi's sense that things are returning to normal. At this time, it is much better to err on the side of paying out too much, rather than too little, in salaries.

D. Preventing Disease Outbreaks

The risk of cholera and other disease outbreaks in Iraq remains high, particularly during the very hot summer months. According to the World Health Organization's recently established sentinel surveillance system, diarrheal diseases now represent 22% of all medical consultations—a three-fold increase on last year's figures. UNICEF is now bringing emergency supplies of chlorine into the country for water treatment, and CARE and the International Red Cross have completed emergency repairs of over 60 water installations. USAID and OCPA are now becoming more involved in plans to upgrade the sewage treatment system due to the high risk of sewage-related diseases affecting not only the city of Baghdad but the millions of Iraqis who obtain their drinking water from the lower Tigris River; however, these plans will take at least 12-18 months to implement. In the near-term, as work progresses on water and sanitation, attention must be turned to the health care system to prevent the spread of diseases to epidemic levels. Here, progress is slow as a result of the collapse of the central health systems and the Ministry of Health. WHO, and a handful of NGOs, including CARE, are helping restore Iraqi capacity to manage disease outbreaks, including establishing a rudimentary surveillance system and rehabilitating laboratory testing facilities in key centers. Also, some progress has been made in re-establishing immunization programs, although the reliability of the cold chain remains problematic in some areas due to irregular electrical supplies. *Water, sanitation, and the revitalization of the health care system should continue to be accorded very high priority in the short-to-medium-term.*

III. IDENTIFYING AND OVERCOMING KEY BARRIERS

Far and away, the main problems confronting both ordinary Iraqis— and the humanitarian organizations trying to assist them— are the continuing absence of security and the slow progress in restoring electricity, water, communications and other essential public services. CARE urges the U.S. Government to focus its efforts and resources on fixing these problems, deferring other tasks to later if necessary. *Restoring a sense of normalcy in the lives of ordinary Iraqis through quickly improving security and the delivery of basic services is the essential first step in building the new Iraq.*

CARE's current program in Iraq is very much focused on the restoration of essential water, sanitation and health services. These efforts are being funded by a range of donors, including the U.S. Government (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), the

Australian, Canadian, Norwegian, Swedish, Swiss, and UK governments, the European Union, and private supporters in the United States and other countries. In May, after careful consideration, CARE declined to submit a proposal in response to a USAID RFA for the “Community Action Program (CAP).” The primary basis for this decision was the assessment of our colleagues on the ground in Iraq that conditions remained too volatile for this sort of program and that our focus should remain on the restoration of basic services. I would, however, like to note for the record that CARE did also have concerns with a number of the proposed “substantial involvement” clauses of the CAP cooperative agreement, including those allowing USAID to “redirect activities in response to changes in the political situation” and disallow project implementation in “areas restricted by civil-military authorities.” These clauses potentially called into question the ability of CARE as a humanitarian NGO to operate in a manner consistent with the principles of independence and impartiality. Subsequently, some of our sister agencies that did submit proposals have had to negotiate with USAID on other provisions of the CAP agreement, including proposed restrictions on NGO contacts with the media. Such restrictions would have been unprecedented and, in our opinion, entirely inappropriate, so we are pleased to hear that language has been negotiated that will not compromise the freedom of NGOs to speak to the media.

Beyond the obvious priorities of restoring security and essential public services, and to some extent underlying many of the problems encountered to date in reconstruction efforts, there are other, more conceptual barriers that need to be overcome. CARE urges the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the U.S. Government as a whole, to address the following weaknesses in its approach to date:

- **Poor engagement with average Iraqi people**—In part due to the high level of security surrounding the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority, it is almost impossible for average Iraqis to present their concerns to the *de facto* government. The symbolism of Paul Bremer, working from one of Saddam Hussein’s heavily fortified palaces, is not lost on the Iraqi people. While some political interest groups are being engaged in development processes, ordinary Iraqis feel disconnected, with very little understanding of what is happening in their country. Increased communications and engagement with ordinary Iraqis would improve reconstruction efforts and give Iraqis a greater sense of ownership in the process. Even for established humanitarian organizations like CARE, access to the OCPA compound is extremely difficult. Last month, CARE had a pre-arranged meeting with an OCPA official, and my colleagues were refused entry three times before being finally granted entry two hours later. Ordinary Iraqis wait outside with virtually no hope of access. The Coalition Provisional Authority must find creative solutions for increased engagement with the Iraqi people.
- **Ineffective interface between the Coalition Provisional Authority and humanitarian organizations**—As already indicated, access to the OCPA is difficult even for established NGOs like CARE. In this context, the provision of humanitarian assistance by NGOs is inhibited by lack of information on the

Authority's plans, policies and activities, confusion over what permissions are required to operate, and difficulty contacting the Authority to share information or present concerns. To give a concrete example, I would cite the problems experienced by NGOs in trying to deal with those responsible for health in the OCPA. Since the fall of Baghdad, the OCPA has promulgated numerous policies that have a major impact on the Iraqi health care system, including payment of fees, staffing decisions, and distribution of drugs from central warehouses. Over a period of several weeks, the NGO community in Baghdad sought a meeting at least five times with the newly appointed head of health in the OCPA before having any success. The NGO community has now had one meeting with the person concerned, but there is a need for much greater dialogue on critical health sector issues. Paul Bremer and his lieutenants in the OCPA should ensure that problems of this sort do not persist.

- **Inadequate understanding of how Iraq's pre-war government structures functioned**—Prior to the war, Iraq was internationally isolated and few outsiders had a real understanding of how the country worked. Despite the oppressive nature of the regime, health, electricity, water and other basic services did function, even if they declined under post-Gulf War sanctions. In general, Iraq's basic services were organized in a highly centralized manner. In such a system, you cannot expect the body to continue to function if the head is cut off, and that is what has happened in most Iraqi ministries. To use the water sector as an example, the General Corporation of Water and Sewage at the central level had all responsibility for planning, system design, procurement, central stores, budgeting and staff allocations. Directorates of Water at the governorate level only had responsibility for operations and maintenance. A failure to understand and work with established structures and procedures has led to increased confusion, undermining efforts to achieve the goal of delivering safe water supplies. We see similar problems in the Health sector, where the Health Ministry remains in turmoil and without clear leadership following the removal of all Director Generals from the Ministry under the de-Baathification policy. The current disarray in government ministries is a serious impediment to providing humanitarian assistance and to promoting the rapid re-establishment of basic services. Restoring the functioning of these institutions is critical in the short-term, while efforts to decentralize some of their functions can be considered at a later date.


IV. CONCLUSION

Nothing would make me happier than to be able to testify here today that the situation in Iraq has dramatically improved since CARE last testified before this committee in May. Unfortunately, based on my own personal observations and the best assessment of my CARE colleagues on the ground, I cannot do that. *It is not,*

however, too late to turn the situation around and to set Iraq firmly on a path that can deliver a better life for its 24 million long-suffering people.

For this to happen, the U.S. Government must first effectively fulfill its responsibilities as an occupying power to restore law and order and provide for the food, health and basic needs of the Iraqi people. Once these essential tasks are accomplished, the Coalition Provisional Authority can and should turn its attention to the many other tasks that will be tackled as a part of the long-term effort to rebuild Iraq politically and economically. As President Bush publicly acknowledged last week, the United States now faces "a massive and long-term undertaking" in rebuilding Iraq. In order to improve its performance, the Coalition Authority should look for ways to engage more effectively with ordinary Iraqis, coordinate more effectively with NGOs and other humanitarian organizations, and deepen its understanding of the context in which it is operating.

Thank you for giving CARE the opportunity of testifying before you today.



Program Overview

Brief History of CARE In Iraq

CARE is the only international non-governmental organization to have maintained a continuous presence in the center and south of Iraq since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis following the 1991 Gulf War. Since the establishment of CARE Iraq in 1991, more than seven million people, approximately one-third of the population of Iraq, have benefited from CARE's programs.

Programming from 1991 – 2002

From 1991 to 1995, CARE's programs were located in the northern Kurdish governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, where CARE was the major implementing partner for the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program, and in the center and south of Iraq. CARE provided food, logistical support and winter heating fuel to between 300,000 and 550,000 people a month, undertook school and infant feeding projects and rehabilitated schools in the governorates of Anbar, Babel, Diyala, and Najaf. In 1995, CARE also began pediatric hospital feeding in ninety-seven hospitals in all fourteen governorates in central and southern Iraq.

Between 1995 and the on-set of war in 2003, CARE directed its program activities entirely in the center and south of the country in response to the worsening humanitarian conditions. CARE projects provided supplementary and therapeutic feeding to general and pediatric hospitals, provided a food ration to 78 hospitals and supported the rehabilitation of water and sanitation and primary health facilities. In all of these humanitarian actions, CARE placed significant focus on providing assistance to vulnerable children.

CARE Iraq's Current Humanitarian Assistance Program (2003 – Present)

CARE was able to maintain a presence in Iraq throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom and to provide emergency assistance in Baghdad to vulnerable Iraqi's. During the initial bombing campaign, CARE staff distributed potable water, repaired water installations, hospital generators and distributed hygiene, cleaning and medical supplies to health centers in and around Baghdad.

CARE Iraq's Emergency programming, in keeping with its pre-conflict programming, is focused primarily in the areas of health and water and sanitation with a current program portfolio valued

at greater than \$18 million for this fiscal year. Programs are underway in all fourteen governorates in the south and center, supported by 62 national and 10 international staff.

Health Sector Programming

In the health sector, CARE's major programs include the emergency rehabilitation of health infrastructure; the provision of medical equipment to hospitals and primary health care centers (PHCs), including food and cleaning supplies; and hygiene promotion activities.

More than 100 Primary Health Care Centers and 130 Hospitals in the fourteen governorates in the south and center have received emergency support from CARE. Generators have been supplied and repaired, emergency water supplies restored, internal electrical networks and buildings repaired. Emergency cleaning supplies have been delivered thanks to funding from an Anonymous US-based Foundation, and All Our Children, the Mennonite Central Committee's relief effort for Iraq's children.

With funding from the Norwegian Government, CARE's pediatric feeding program has provided more than 250 tons of biscuits, cheese, milk powder, sugar, lactose-free milk powder and green peas to the pediatric units of 97 hospitals in the 14 governorates in the center and the south.

In Khalis, CARE's emergency response team distributed a two-month supply of food and milk to the hospital; completely rebuilt the damaged irrigation facility; and have taken apart and overhauled the entire water treatment plant. Fully functioning, it provides clean water to 80 percent of the population of Khalis.

CARE, in partnership with UNICEF's nutrition program has distributed more than 2,000, of a planned 9,000, hygiene kits to health facilities since March of this year. Through CARE's cooperative agreement with USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the distribution of hygiene kits was supported by the delivery of 15,000 blankets, with a distribution of a further 15,000 blankets planned.

Water and Sanitation Sector Programming

In keeping with our years of experience working in water and sanitation in Iraq, CARE, in conjunction with the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF, is a leading provider in water and sanitation emergency repairs and rehabilitation in Iraq.

With OFDA funding, CARE is rehabilitating water installations and treatment plants at 21 different sites in four governorates in the south and center of Iraq. Repairs run from the replacement of water pumps, chlorinators and filters to laying hundreds of kilometers of piping to restore potable water networks. Part of this project, includes work on Hilla's Water Treatment Plant in Babel governorate. CARE is rehabilitating the water treatment plant, which serves approximately 550,000 residents and is operating at 60% of its capacity. As a consequence of its diminished capacity, many residents are receiving raw, untreated water and are experiencing water supply problems. CARE is rehabilitating the low-lift, purification and high-lift systems, which will increase the plants capacity to 80%.


The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Swiss Government provide funding for CARE's Emergency Mobile Water Workshop. The mobile workshop, housed in a tractor trailer-like vehicle, visits health facilities and water and sewage installations throughout central and southern Iraq undertaking emergency repairs.

Emergency Repairs have been conducted on six sewage pumping stations, ten water pumping stations, one sewage treatment station and fifteen water and treatment plants in the governorates of Anbar, Kerbala, Diyala, Babel, Wassit and Baghdad. The emergency rehabilitation and repair of nearly 80km of potable water networks in Anbar, Qadisseyah, Babel and Diyala has begun.

Kerbala is one of the holiest cities in Iraq, with a population of 400,000 on normal days, which doubles on Fridays and days of religious festivals. During the conflict, the water supply system was damaged. CARE was able to repair the low-lift section of the water treatment plant immediately and restore running water to people's homes.

CARE is also planning to conduct complete overhauls and long-term rehabilitations of 24 water facilities in Kerbala, Missan, Diyala and Anbar Governorates, including six major water treatment plants. This is to be supported by the complete rehabilitation of over 180 km of water networks in these areas.

CARE is also currently implementing a water and sanitation technical support program, funded by the UK Department for International Development, which aims to provide training to technicians in 80 water installations and six sewage treatment plants in the fourteen governorates in the south and center of the country. CARE's team of engineers and technical experts are currently working in nearly 30 water facilities to improve the knowledge and skills of operators and technicians, develop proper preventative maintenance practices and daily record keeping, and work with Iraqi authority personnel to maintain national water and sewage databases.



Emergency Project Descriptions

OFDA Emergency Quick Impact Projects

The quick impact cooperative agreement allows for flexible funding through the submission of implementation plans to draw down funds against an initial obligated amount in the sectors of emergency health and water and sanitation. The project will support the repair of 21 water and sanitation systems in 14 Governorates of Iraq. The project also supports the post-war emergency needs of hospitals in Baghdad and vicinity through the distribution of hygiene kits, blankets and the repair of essential hospital infrastructure.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>South and Center</i>
<i>Time Frame</i>	<i>March – September 2003</i>
<i>Project Funded by OFDA</i>	<i>\$10,000,000</i>

Recovery Assistance for Vulnerable Populations in Iraq

This program is designed to mitigate the health hazards and associated loss of life faced in the post conflict environment and to facilitate a life with dignity for the citizens of Iraq.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>South and Center</i>
<i>Time frame</i>	<i>June – December 2003</i>
<i>Project Funded by AusAID</i>	<i>\$1,701,413</i>

Emergency Health Support for Regional Towns in Central and Southern Iraq

This Emergency health project supports CARE teams to carry-out assessments and make repairs, and provide essential supplies to hospitals and primary health centers in one to two governorates outside of Baghdad. Hygiene education is included in the support provided.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>1 – 2 Governorates adjacent to Baghdad</i>
<i>Time frame</i>	<i>May 2003</i>
<i>Project funded by ECHO</i>	<i>\$1,600,000</i>

Immediate Health Assistance to Conflict-Affected People in Iraq

This project focuses on geographic areas affected by the war and supports emergency repairs to hospitals, primary health centers and water installations. Emergency supplies have also been purchased and provided to hospitals.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>Anbar Governorate and Baghdad</i>
<i>Time frame</i>	<i>April 2003 – December 2004</i>
<i>Project funded by ECHO</i>	<i>\$1,534,377</i>

Emergency Support to Hospitals

The project responds to the emergency needs in, at least, four major hospitals and thirty primary health centers in and around Baghdad. Support includes emergency repairs to facility support systems, provision of basic equipment, renewable medical supplies, medical kits and hygiene supplies; and continuing assessments of key hospitals and health centers.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>Baghdad and immediate surrounding area</i>
<i>Time frame</i>	<i>April – October 2003</i>
<i>Project funded by</i>	
<i>Anonymous US-based Foundation</i>	<i>\$1,500,000</i>

Pediatric Feeding Support to Hospitals

CARE Iraq assists in the recovery of hospitalized children by providing an additional 859 Kcal (representing 33% of daily nutritional requirement) per child/day. The Project provides of basic foods such as cheese, milk, sugar, and high-energy biscuits to 4,570 children between the ages of 2 and 15 in approximately 94 hospitals. Dietary supplements are also provided to the mothers caring for these children. Funding extends to assisting with hygiene standards in the medical facilities.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>14 Governorates (South and Center)</i>
<i>Time frame</i>	<i>April – September 2003</i>
<i>Project funded by the</i>	
<i>Norwegian Government</i>	<i>\$1,116,170</i>

Lactose Free Milk Supply Project

Procurement, transportation and distribution of 110 tons of lactose free milk to pediatric hospitals and hospitals with pediatric beds. The milk is used to treat infants suffering from chronic diarrhea and acute gastroenteritis. The project also includes an awareness campaign.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>14 Governorates (South and Center)</i>
<i>Time frame</i>	<i>February – November 2003</i>
<i>Project Funded by ECHO and the Norwegian Government</i>	<i>\$728,000</i>

Emergency Relief for Vulnerable Groups

The project identifies and targets vulnerable populations and provides health, water and food services to provide a safety net for these groups.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>South and Center</i>
<i>Time frame</i>	<i>March – September 2003</i>
<i>Project funded by AusAid</i>	<i>\$505,574</i>

Emergency Water Supply Project - Mobile Workshop

The project provides rapid technical support services to water and 120 health facilities. CARE Iraq carries out rapid assessments of water systems in communities and in health facilities and undertakes essential repairs using the project's mobile workshop. Repairs to water installations in central and southern Iraq will ensure that treated water is provided to approx. 3.6 million people in urban areas.

<i>Geographic Area:</i>	<i>South and Center</i>
<i>Time frame:</i>	<i>March – August 2003</i>
<i>Project Funded by CIDA</i>	<i>\$384, 645</i>

Emergency Medical Supplies

The Japanese Embassy supports this project, which supplies emergency medical supplies to hospitals in 14 Governorates.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>South and Center</i>
<i>Time frame</i>	<i>May – December 2003</i>
<i>Project funded by the Japanese Embassy</i>	<i>\$81,966</i>

Project Descriptions – Regular Programming (projects begun prior to Conflict)

Mahaweel and Hamza Towns Integrated Water Project

Water installations in Mahaweel and Hamza are being rehabilitated. Water networks are being replaced, houses, hospitals and seven primary health centers will be connected to a clean water supply. In addition, hospitals and health centers in both towns are being rehabilitated and training for maintenance staff is incorporated into the project plan. More than 370,000 will benefit.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>Qadisseyah and Babel Governorates</i>
<i>Project funded by ECHO</i>	<i>\$2,613,443</i>

Maymoona Integrated Water Project

This project provides for the rehabilitation of the potable water network and the Maymoona Hospital, as well as the construction of a new primary health center.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>Missan Governorate</i>
<i>Project funded by SIDA</i>	<i>\$1,609,478</i>

Primary Health Care Center and Potable Water Network Missan Governorate

Water installations serving Qalaat Saleh Town are being rehabilitated, including the replacement of 15 km of the potable water network. The existing hospital is being rehabilitated and a new primary health center will be constructed in Azziya.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>Missan Governorate</i>
<i>Project funded by the Norwegian Government</i>	<i>\$381,229</i>

Central/Southern Iraq Water and Sanitation Technical Support Project 2002-2004

This project is establishing technical support systems in 80 water installations and 6 sewage treatment installations. The technical support systems will improve performance through the training of operators and technicians and the development of proper preventative maintenance practices.

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>14 Governorates (South and Center)</i>
<i>Project funded by DFID</i>	<i>\$376,943</i>

Mr. SHAYS. I am struck by all three panels being very candid and appreciate the respect. It's very important to know what you're seeing and how you feel.

I first want to ask, is there anything you disagree with any of your fellow panelists? Anything that was said by a fellow panelists that you would disagree? Is there anything one of your fellow panelists said that you would have wanted to emphasize but only slightly differently? Something you heard you said? Yes, I agree, but I really want to put the emphasis here.

The reason I ask is you all have said the same thing but slightly different. But collectively your testimony is very powerful; and I'm going to make an assumption that, based on the question that I asked and you not responding in the affirmative, you basically agree with everything that was said.

Now you had General Garner, and you mentioned—one comment that he said you wanted to respond to. What I appreciate about General Garner, he is a pretty straightforward fellow; and you know there are some things he said about what's going on that he would—even though he didn't say it as clearly as you, he happens to agree with some of the things you all have said.

But is there anything that he said or anything in the second panel that you would take issue with, that you want to just—not to make a big deal out of it but that you see it differently and make sure that we're aware that you see it differently?

Mr. CAREY. There was one point I had a difference of opinion on. And that was in regard to the state of the infrastructure in Iraq before the war and after the war. And I agree certainly that there was a gradual deterioration of Iraqi infrastructure, because the regime did not pay attention to it, No. 1, and because of the sanctions, No. 2. Certainly that happened.

But the infrastructure was not in as bad a shape, I believe, as General Garner indicated; and I think it's really important to understand that one of the major impacts on the lack of the basic services being able to operate because of lack of infrastructure was again not because of the bombing due to the war but because of the extensive post-war looting.

When I was in Baghdad, people I talked with—for example, CARE operates significantly in the whole sewage treatment side, repairing sewage treatment facilities. When I talked to the U.N. agencies, they mentioned that the sewage treatment facilities were basically intact at the end of the war in Baghdad, including the main plants which processed a significant part of the sewage output of Baghdad. But then the looting was wave after wave of looting, and that was really what has brought down the infrastructure in Iraq and the cities to the state it is now.

Mr. SHAYS. Your point is that after the major hostilities had ended, in the case of the sewage treatment plants, they were fairly intact; and so then and at that point we had an opportunity to secure them and we chose not to.

Mr. CAREY. In fact, the head of the U.N. there, Serge de Mello's predecessor, told me that when he went back to Iraq post conflict one of the first things he wanted to look at was the sewage treatment plant. It was being looted in broad daylight when he went back, that he had gone to the Provisional Authority on several oc-

casions asking for a military presence at the main sewage treatment plant and had not been provided. And every time he went back to the sewage treatment plant its facilities were degraded to the degree that I agree with previous testimony that it will now be 9 months to a year or more before those facilities are restored.

Mr. SHAYS. If that information is precisely as you understand it to be, it's got to be a bitter disappointment, because it would have been easy to have secured it, as opposed to having to rebuild it.

Any other comments?

Yes, Mr. Duss?

Mr. DUSS. Mr. Chairman, the previous government panel made mention that the U.N. is on the ground in Iraq; and that is so. But when the NGO's talk about the presence of the United Nations, we talk specifically about what has become the traditional and very effective coordinating role of the United Nations.

Within the last 10 to 15 years, particularly in the conflict in Bosnia and even before, the U.N.—particularly the UNHCR, commissioner for refugees, that office has played the coordinating role for NGO's, for the ICRC and U.N. agencies to serve as a forum to cut down on duplication from the various international agencies that are on the ground in any particular country from coordinating its efforts. The U.N. coordinating role provided—was the intermediary in many ways with military that were on the ground in those countries, particularly Bosnia, Kosovo and a number of other places. And so the NGO's and the U.N. have worked very well together over these years in various post-conflict situations.

The U.N. in this traditional coordinating role is not present in Iraq, and it makes the coordination of our work and the communication between ourselves and the various international humanitarian efforts there much more disjointed. That's why this letter was sent yesterday to President Bush asking him to strongly reconsider his decision and to invite the U.N. in the coordination role that we have asked for.

Mr. SHAYS. You know what I would love? I would love the President to meet with the three of you, and I think it would be a wonderful thing for him to have this information shared with him, and then he could ask meaningful questions of his Secretary of Defense and his Secretary of State and the people that work with him. He needs to hear the very message you're giving. I would love to see if there's a way that could happen.

Mr. DUSS. Mr. Chairman, if you could arrange it, I think we'll all be available.

Mr. SHAYS. That goes for Members of Congress. If the President wants to see you, you drop everything else, for obvious reasons.

I just want you to talk a little bit more—I'm trying to put your testimony about the U.N. and its participation and its coordinating role—because I remember Ms. Willcuts explaining that to me when I was in Iraq a few months ago. At that time, she was saying that we needed to do that, that they play that kind of role. I think that's correct.

Ms. WILLCUTS. Yes, it is.

Mr. SHAYS. And I'm having this slight suspicion were you also in the Peace Corps?

Ms. WILLCUTS. Yes, I was. I was in Sri Lanka.

Mr. DUSS. I served overseas.

Mr. SHAYS. I apologize to Ms. Willcuts because I think I now remember our conversations about that. But I want to understand what it would take to have the U.N.—what I get a sense is that the U.N. is being treated just like—treated like it's just another NGO, and it's there doing some of its relief work that you all would be, but you're saying it could take a greater role and usually does. And I guess what would it take to have that happen? Do we have to have a U.N. resolution to have a different relationship or is it a fairly simple solution that could get them in in a much bigger way?

Mr. CAREY. One thing I wanted to mention in regard to that, I understand that October there's going to be a pledging conference sponsored by the United States or the coalition.

Mr. SHAYS. When?

Mr. CAREY. Coming up in October for pledges of funds. It's common in these international situations to have pledging conferences and to invite various potential donors.

I think that one of the great ways that you could sponsor a broader U.N. role would be to move to have the U.N. sponsor that pledging conference, rather than having it be done by just the coalition, and that would be one way to reformatize the U.N. presence. And I think some members are hesitating to come in as fully as they might because they would like to see a more formal U.N. presence and coordinating role. This would be a perfect opportunity for that to happen and might bring in more money. And I note the more money we bring in from international sources, the less we will be paying out of U.S. taxpayer sources, in reference to one of the Members this morning. The greater international presence we have, the less reliance we'll have to have on U.S. funding of this rebuilding.

Mr. SHAYS. I happen to believe that we have two giants serving as secretaries, Colin Powell as Secretary of State and Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense; and I think that an administration is only as good as its people who serve under it, particularly in those roles, but I am just wrestling with this feeling that somehow I'm having a hard time understanding why—and this may sound arrogant for me to say it, since I haven't been there, but it seems so logical to me that the things that you have been suggesting to us happen.

And I wonder is it not happening because to do it would be an implicit acknowledgment that a mistake or a mistake had been made? And I think, so what? Because, ultimately, the reality is that this will only get worse, that we won't be able to hide it and we won't be able to succeed as quickly as possible and we will lose more men and women in the process and you all won't be able to do the jobs that you can do as well as you can do it if things were different.

So do you have some questions? I am going to ask the professional staff who—I should say a new doctor, having gotten his degree.

Dr. PALARINO. I'd just like to address the issue, if I may, of impartiality that some of you have mentioned in your statements and just try to understand that as you operationalize it, if you will, on

the ground in Iraq and in other situations. I understand the point is to the NGO's separate from the governments involved, but do you ever rely on the occupying powers, if you will, for any situations like that? If you would like to comment on that, I would appreciate it.

Ms. WILLCUTS. I think there are appropriate circumstances where the humanitarian aid community and the military have interactions, and I think—at least from my experience, relating mostly to security. We've relied on information that we get from the coalition in regards to certain areas where we're planning to go for program assessments or field visits or something. I think those are appropriate circumstances for us to have that interaction.

But, again, for security reasons it's so vital for us to have some distance there so there's no confusion amongst our staff or amongst the community about who we are there working for and what we are there to accomplish.

Mr. DUSS. In my testimony, I mention about blurring of the lines between civilian NGO personnel and the military; and in previous conflicts where the United States has not been an occupying force, where it was an international force, that was rarely a problem because the international force that was there, which also included Americans—and Bosnia is a good place in point—the lines were clear and military never conducted their duties and responsibilities dressed as civilians, and there was never confusion in the minds of the national population who is military and who is NGO.

This problem cropped up in Afghanistan when American combat forces, I would imagine in an effort to be able to work in certain areas, took off their military uniforms and dressed as civilians. Now the national population there knew who was military, but then they began to assume that NGO's were also military because the American military was doing humanitarian work. They were rebuilding schools and some other projects and out of the goodness of their heart. But they saw military doing humanitarian work, NGO's doing humanitarian work, and the conclusion was that the NGO's were also military.

If there was some type of action where someone was shot or killed or there was a negative reaction from the local population and they took retribution on the military, NGO's would also be involved because the assumption in the mind was that these are all military. That's why we have pleaded over and over in Afghanistan—it has not been a problem yet in Iraq—military, they have their job and have the uniforms, stick to it. The NGO's, we have our job, we have our uniforms, which is what we wear, we stick to that as well.

It doesn't mean we don't coordinate. We do. We need each other, particularly for security. We talk to each other all the time. But in terms of carrying out our responsibilities and the ways we do it, that is the key point of this discussion.

Mr. CAREY. I certainly agree with my colleagues. We, too, work in the security environment created by the military authorities in Iraq. We have no way to avoid that. And we, too, coordinate and try to coordinate on a day-to-day basis.

I think the problem comes in, again, when there is a confusion between the U.S. Military Provisional Authority and its mandates

and the NGO's as a community and their humanitarian mandates. And while there is a considerable overlap between those two, they are not one and the same.

While we are very grateful for all of the support we get from the U.S. Government from a variety of sources, and one of the major grants we have in Iraq is from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of USAID and we're grateful for that, the fact is, though, we are not an instrument of the U.S. Government in Iraq. We have our own humanitarian mandate in Iraq.

So when we talk about creating a humanitarian space, it's the ability to differentiate between that, between being an instrument of the U.S. Government and between solely concentrating on our humanitarian mandate regardless of politics and regardless of the political aims of the other parties involved.

Mr. DUSS. Just one further point, Mr. Chairman, on this.

We do receive funding from government, but we also receive funding from the American people as well. And for many people around the United States, the only news they get about what is taking place in the developing world is not from their newspapers, certainly not from the nightly news unless it's a catastrophe, it's through the communication vehicles that NGO's like ours and many others have. So we are serving the American people primarily, but we are also using taxpayer resources that flows through the government for the work that we do as well, and sometimes this point is not recognized or understood by our government partners.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank the gentleman.

We are wrapping up here. I would like to know—and if it doesn't apply then we don't have to do an analogy here—but does Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan have any comparisons to the Iraqi situation and, if so, which one most is like what we are facing in Iraq? I mean, you all have been involved, your organizations, in Bosnia and Kosovo and in Afghanistan. Are there some lessons we can learn from those experiences?

Mr. CAREY. I think that when we testified last time we mentioned that some of the lessons learned from experiences like Afghanistan and Kosovo, that there were four major lessons that we took away from those. No. 1 was the importance of rapidly filling the security vacuum that was created by the military situation; second was the importance of establishing a broad international presence as soon as possible in a situation like that to bring in as many players as possible; and the third was the need to have a long, multiyear commitment for reconstruction in a situation like Afghanistan or Kosovo; and, finally, the need to have a quick return to civilian control in those circumstances. And we would say those lessons apply in Bosnia, they apply in Kosovo, they apply in Afghanistan, and they certainly are applying in Iraq.

Mr. SHAYS. What I'm hearing you say, you're not going to have a quick involvement of the civilian population if somehow the lower echelon in the Ba'ath party and the civil servants aren't able to participate.

Mr. CAREY. And if there's not better interaction between the Provisional Authority and everyday, ordinary Iraqis.

Mr. SHAYS. That I think is very clear for Peace Corps volunteers to understand without being arrogant. I mean, that's the one thing we know so well and that is you have to have that interaction.

When Ms. Willcuts took me to Iraq, there was a gentleman named Abdullah Husan Mohammed, and he almost put his hands on my shoulder. I had a conversation with him, and he had made a number of points. One of the points he was making was, he said, I just wish you Americans would understand that when an Iraqi woman does this when you extend your hand out she is not withdrawing her hand in disappointment. She's saying, I respect what you have done, thank you, but in my culture Muslim women don't shake hands with strangers. But please know I appreciate the gesture. He said, I just wish you would, instead of being offended, just appreciate what that meant.

But then he almost put his hands to my shoulder, and he said, you don't know us and we don't know you. And too this Peace Corps heart it said, we need to get to know each other a bit, and then some good things can happen from it.

And I think there are some lessons to learn from, frankly, what happened in South Africa, how they knew in order to rebuild their society that they had a White population that had been very much involved in the infrastructure and they couldn't turn their back on that population but they could hope there could be some redemption. And I can get pretty emotional just thinking about the lessons learned there.

So, at any rate, let me ask this last area. I am not looking to end on a negative note, but I do want to face reality. Some of the things you say should happen aren't happening. If they don't happen, are things going to get worse? Are we going to just muddle through? Is it going to take us longer and then people will never realize that it could have been done better or do you think things just get worse? Want to give it a try?

Mr. CAREY. I would refer to that Center for Strategic and International Studies study also that the window is closing, that if the situation doesn't improve dramatically in terms of basic security, people still don't feel secure to go to school, they don't feel fully secure to open businesses and indulge in economic activity, that the situation will rapidly deteriorate as the Iraqi population loses confidence in our ability to do the job. And so we have a relatively short window of opportunity. We need to redouble our efforts to meet those primary tasks that General Garner identified.

Mr. DUSS. One of the many lessons that we learned providing humanitarian aid in the post-Soviet world and post-conflict situations and even during conflict is that unless populations can return to somewhat of a normal life where people go to work, children go to school, teachers teach and some semblance of life, it can only take place if there is security. And it is the same for Iraq as it is for Afghanistan. Unless there is security where business can take place, money can be made, it will be very, very difficult for the situation in Iraq to improve.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Willcuts.

Ms. WILLCUTS. On the same note again with security, I think to have—in conversations I have had with some of our own staff and women that I have met, Iraqi women, they are afraid still to send

their children to school, as Mr. Carey had mentioned. Some of our local staff have their fathers or brothers escort them to our office every day to work because there is fear of abductions, there's fear of kidnapping and these gangs that are still roving around. And I think it's an opportunity for the military to make a difference right now and show that we are serious with the commitments we've made in coming there and doing what we started.

People are waiting to see. I think people are withholding their judgment until they find out how this all turns out, what kind of services are we going to provide. Are we going to follow through on the promises and commitments that we have made. I don't think it's too late, but we will have a lot to lose if we don't follow through on these things and specifically security for women and children.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there anything you all want to put on the record before we adjourn? I know Mr. Bremer fairly well, even though I kept calling him Paul when his friends call him Jerry. But I believe him to be a very intelligent person. And I would like to think that he hears what you're saying. I said I was kind of concluding, but I want to know does your organization have the ability to have the kind of conversation we're having with him?

Mr. CAREY. Not so far.

Mr. DUSS. I think we've spoken in some way shape or form about the difficulty we have in accessing CPA. And as Pat has said, the fact that the provisional authorities housed in the palace are far away from the population, that's—perhaps we don't read it that way but the meaning of that is very significant for the people of Iraq having access to that.

Mr. SHAYS. That point was made. I'm going to ask you, Mr. Duss, if you have extensive interaction with Mr. Bremer.

Mr. DUSS. No, I haven't, but I know our staff on the ground have not.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Willcuts.

Ms. WILLCUTS. No, I've had no opportunity to meet with him.

Mr. SHAYS. Or your people in any way. Well, maybe we're starting too high. Maybe we should start with Mr. Bremer and then to have you interact with the President. You all have been and not surprisingly a wonderful panel. And your statements were so helpful that in many cases, questions weren't even necessary. I just appreciate your patience. I appreciate all your good work. The reason I feel positive is that you all are doing the work you're doing. And that you all are so capable. And your organizations are so capable.

And I'll conclude by thanking the Science Committee. This is not our general committee. And it's a lot nicer. We're not up as high and it's not as tall a ceiling. It's a little cozier. I think we had a good hearing today. Really appreciate the three of you. And with that we will adjourn this hearing.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, "Foreign Assistance, Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability," may be found in subcommittee files.]

[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]